Jordan v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedOctober 4, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-02228
StatusUnknown

This text of Jordan v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc. (Jordan v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jordan v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc., (D. Nev. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 5 Christina Jordan, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-02228-CDS-NJK 6 Plaintiffs Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for 7 v. Plaintiffs to File a Consolidated Complaint and Granting in Part Motion to Extend 8 Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc., et al., Time to Respond to Pleadings 9 Defendants [ECF Nos. 18, 19] 10 11 Plaintiffs Christina Jordan, Renee Dean, and Wendy Regge each brought her own similar 12 lawsuit against their former employer, Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., and their Wyndham 13 supervisor, Demetrius Barnes-Vaughn. All three plaintiffs bring claims for retaliation and 14 intentional infliction of emotional distress, while Jordan and Regge seek relief for violations of the 15 Family and Medical Leave Act. Regge also brings a claim under the Americans with Disabilities 16 Act. “[B]ecause of the common questions of law and fact involved” in the three cases, the parties 17 voluntarily stipulated to consolidate them into one. After the court granted the stipulation 18 consolidating the cases, the parties realized that that their understandings of the nature and scope 19 of the consolidation differ. The defendants contend that under the stipulation, the plaintiffs should 20 consolidate their claims into a single complaint for efficiency, economy, and clarity. The plaintiffs 21 protest that they never agreed to proceed under a single complaint and that the stipulated 22 consolidation was primarily administrative in nature. In keeping with the long-established 23 traditional interpretation of consolidation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 42, I 24 construe the parties’ stipulation to mean that the cases are consolidated for administrative 1 purposes only—including pretrial matters, like discovery. If the case should eventually go to trial, 2 the parties and the court will address at that time whether the plaintiffs’ claims will be tried 3 together or separately. I order the plaintiffs to file copies of Dean and Regge’s complaints in this 4 case within seven days of this order, and I order the defendants to file separate responsive pleadings 5 to each of the three complaints within 60 days of the plaintiffs’ refiling of the other two complaints 6 so that this matter may proceed to be litigated. 7 I. Relevant background 8 Jordan and Regge filed their lawsuits in December 2021, and Dean brought hers the 9 following month. Compl., ECF No. 1; Compl., ECF No. 1 in Dean v. Wyndham, Case No. 2:22-cv-00141- 10 GMN-NJK; Compl., ECF No. 1 in Regge v. Wyndham, Case No. 2:21-cv-02235-JCM-DCA. Defense 11 counsel, Kyle Hoyt, then asked the plaintiffs’ attorney, Amy Howard, if she would be “amenable to 12 stipulating to consolidate” the three matters “since they are related[.]” Email Ex., ECF No. 18-4 at 5. 13 Howard agreed to stipulate to consolidation and asked Hoyt to prepare a stipulation. Id. at 4–5. 14 Hoyt did so, and Howard approved of the stipulation without making changes. Id. at 4. The parties 15 filed the stipulation to consolidate. ECF No. 14. The Honorable United States District Court Judges 16 Gloria M. Navarro and James C. Mahan signed an order granting the stipulation and consolidating 17 the three cases under the earliest-filed case, Jordan v. Wyndham. ECF No. 15. The stipulation states 18 that “[t]he [p]arties in the actions have conferred regarding consolidat[ion of] the claims of all 19 three actions and have agreed to consolidate the Dean, Jordan[,] and Regge [a]ctions because of the 20 common questions of law and fact involved.” Id. at 2. The parties agreed in the stipulation that 21 consolidation was “for all proceedings going forward.” Id. 22 Once the court granted the stipulation, Hoyt asked Howard if the plaintiffs would agree to 23 file a single amended complaint, merging the three plaintiffs’ claims into one pleading. ECF No. 18- 24 4 at 3. Howard explained that the plaintiffs “stipulated to consolidate so that discovery can be

2 1 streamlined, and motions can be heard and decided in one courtroom to avoid conflicting rulings.” 2 Id. She further noted that they “did not contemplate merging the three lawsuits into one” and 3 explained that the plaintiffs still expected the defendants’ timely responses to all three complaints. 4 Id. Hoyt then indicated that the defendants would file a motion seeking entry of a consolidated 5 complaint. Id. at 2. The defendants now move for the plaintiffs to consolidate the three complaints 6 (ECF No. 18), a request that the plaintiffs oppose. ECF No. 20. The defendants also move for an 7 extension of time to respond to the plaintiffs’ complaints, which the plaintiffs do not oppose.1 Mot. 8 to Extend Time, ECF No. 19; Non-Opposition, ECF No. 21. 9 II. The parties’ stipulation to consolidate is administrative in nature. 10 The defendants insist that the “[p]laintiffs have changed their position” because they now 11 “assert[] that the stipulation was for ‘discovery only’ in contravention of the plain terms of the 12 stipulation and the [o]rder.” ECF No. 18 at 2. The plaintiffs respond that “[e]ach case contains 13 unique factual allegations to support separate charges brought by each of the women” and explain 14 that “the women are also alleging causes of action against the [d]efendants that do not entirely 15 overlap.” ECF No. 20 at 3. The plaintiffs clarify that they “agreed to consolidation at the suggestion 16 of [d]efendants for purposes of convenience, economy of administration[,] and discovery only” and 17 explain that “[t]he parties have not been able to reach an agreement as to the nature and the scope 18 of the consolidation ordered since realizing their error.” Id. at 4. The plaintiffs rely on Hall v. Hall, a 19 recent U.S. Supreme Court decision that discusses the history of Rule 42 and consolidation as 20 traditionally understood by American courts. Id. at 5 (citing Hall v. Hall, 138 S.Ct. 1118 (2018)). The 21 defendants do not address Hall in their motion or reply brief. See generally ECF Nos. 18, 23. 22 In Hall, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether one of multiple cases that was 23 consolidated under Rule 42(a) is immediately appealable upon an order disposing of that case, even 24 1 I find the defendants’ motions suitable for disposition without oral argument. LR 78-1.

3 1 if another case remains ongoing. Hall, 138 S.Ct. at 1118. The Court discussed the history of the term 2 “consolidate,” acknowledging that it has “a legal lineage stretching back at least to the first federal 3 consolidation statute, enacted by Congress in 1813.” Id. at 1125 (citing Act of July 22, 1813, § 3, 3 Stat. 4 21 (later codified as Rev. Stat. § 921 and 28 U.S.C. § 734 (1934 ed.))). That statute “remained in force 5 for 125 years, until its replacement by Rule 42(a).” Id. “And just five years before Rule 42(a) became 6 law, [the Supreme Court] reiterated that, under the consolidation statute, consolidation did not 7 result in the merger of constituent cases.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496–97 8 (1933)). When Rule 42(a) was adopted, it “was expressly modeled on its statutory predecessor” 9 and because it did not define the term “consolidate,” “the term presumably carried forward the 10 same meaning [the Court] had ascribed to it under the consolidation statute for 125 years[] and had 11 just recently reaffirmed in Johnson.” Id. at 1128. “No sensible draftsman,” the Court reasoned, “let 12 alone a Federal Rules Advisory Committee, would take a term that had meant, for more than a 13 century, that separate actions do not merge into one, and silently and abruptly reimagine the same 14 term to mean that they do.” Id. at 1130.

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Related

Johnson v. Manhattan Railway Co.
289 U.S. 479 (Supreme Court, 1933)
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co.
61 F.2d 934 (Second Circuit, 1932)
Bank Markazi v. Peterson
578 U.S. 212 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Hall v. Hall
584 U.S. 59 (Supreme Court, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Jordan v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jordan-v-wyndham-vacation-ownership-inc-nvd-2022.