Jordan v. Jordan

2026 IL App (4th) 250477

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0477
• Status: Published

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 250477 FILED NO. 4-25-0477 January 16, 2026 Carla Bender IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

AMBER JORDAN, as Administrator for the Estate of ) Appeal from the Julian Jordan, Deceased, ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff, ) Marshall County v. ) No. 23LA13 JANET L. JORDAN, ) Defendant-Appellee ) Honorable (Jared Gibbs, as Independent Administrator for the Estate ) Paul E. Bauer, of Julian Jordan, Deceased, Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Harris dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Amber Jordan, filed a complaint against, defendant, Janet L. Jordan, for

the death of Julian Jordan, plaintiff’s son and defendant’s grandson, who died from a gunshot

wound while staying overnight with defendant. Although plaintiff identified herself as

administrator of Julian’s estate, no estate had been opened, and she had never been appointed

special administrator of Julian’s estate. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleged two theories

of liability, premises liability and willful and wanton conduct. While this case was pending, Amber

died. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2022)), arguing plaintiff’s claim was a nullity because

she was never appointed administrator of Julian’s estate and no estate had been opened or special

administrator appointed before the statute of limitations expired for a wrongful death claim. Jared Gibbs, Julian’s biological father, who was now represented by the same attorney as Amber, filed

a response to the section 2-619 motion to dismiss, as well as a motion for leave to substitute as

plaintiff and leave to file a third amended complaint. After extensive briefing of the issues, the

trial court granted the section 2-619 motion to dismiss with prejudice. Although the notice of

appeal was filed with Amber listed as plaintiff-appellant, Jared comes before this court arguing

that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss because

“plaintiff’s proposed third amended complaint relates back to her timely filed complaint,” “failure

to timely appoint an estate administrator is a procedural defect that can be cured after the

limitations period expires,” and plaintiff’s third amended complaint cured the procedural defects

in the original complaint. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. The Initial Pleadings and Proceedings

¶4 This case arises from the death of 13-year-old Julian Jordan, who died as a result

of a gunshot wound to the head while staying overnight at defendant’s house in Edelstein, Illinois.

On December 15, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint, identifying herself as “AMBER JORDAN,

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JULIAN JORDAN, DECEASED,” seeking

damages from defendant for premises liability. She alleged defendant “permitted and allowed

multiple unlocked and loaded guns to be placed in various places in and upon the premises”; Julian

stayed overnight at defendant’s house on or about August 17, 2022; in the early morning hours,

Julian was found deceased due to a gunshot wound to his head from a .22-caliber revolver owned

by defendant; and defendant was present in the house at the time of the shooting.

¶5 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (id. § 2-

615), arguing the complaint contained mixed allegations of negligence and willful and wanton

-2- conduct in a single count. Defendant’s motion was granted. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an

amended complaint, and subsequently, a second amended complaint. In her second amended

complaint, plaintiff alleged two theories of liability against defendant. Count I alleged premises

liability (citing the Premises Liability Act (740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2022)), claiming,

inter alia, defendant failed to exercise reasonable care on her property or maintain her property in

a reasonable safe condition when she allowed Julian to have access to unlocked and loaded guns

without supervision; should have known Julian would not appreciate the danger presented by the

guns; knew Julian was at risk for self-harm when she received texts from him before his death

indicating he was considering harming or killing himself; and was present in the home when Julian

was found deceased with a gunshot wound to the head. Count II alleged willful and wanton

conduct, “pled in the alternative,” claiming, inter alia, defendant acted recklessly and/or willfully

in allowing Julian access to guns when she knew he would not appreciate the danger and was at

risk for self-harm.

¶6 On June 6, 2024, defendant filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss the second

amended complaint, arguing plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support her claims,

including failing to describe the manner in which Julian received the gunshot wound that killed

him or facts supporting that defendant had heightened knowledge, as required for willful and

wonton conduct. The following day, plaintiff filed a response, contending the allegations in the

complaint were pled with sufficient specificity and the distinct legal theories supported “claims

for both negligence and willful and wanton conduct under Illinois law” and justified the repetition

of certain allegations in each count.

¶7 On July 3, 2024, defendant’s attorney filed a suggestion of death pursuant to section

2-1008 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1008 (West 2022)), notifying the trial court that Amber had

-3- died on June 29, 2024, and stating, “[T]he Plaintiff is hereby notified of rights and obligations

arising under said statute.” The record contains no response filed by plaintiff to this notice.

¶8 B. The Proceedings After Amber’s Death

¶9 The record shows a status conference was held on August 2, 2024. Although there

is no report of any proceedings that may have taken place that day, the written order, entered by

agreement of the parties, stated a case management conference was set for October 22, 2024, and

defendant’s section 2-615 motion to dismiss was “continued generally.”

¶ 10 On October 21, 2024, defendant filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

second amended complaint. Id. § 2-619. In support, defendant contended plaintiff “incorrectly

averred and incorrectly named as a purported Plaintiff entity, the following: “ ‘AMBER JORDAN,

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JULIAN JORDAN, DECEASED,’ when in fact it

appears that no such entity ever existed.” Defendant argued plaintiff did not reference in or attach

to her complaint any court order appointing her as representative of Julian’s estate. Defendant

argued further she had not located any court probate action or other civil court order appointing

plaintiff as the administrator or personal representative of any estate. She contended, therefore,

that plaintiff’s lawsuit was a nullity at the time it was filed. In further support of her contention

that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed, defendant argued no estate was opened or wrongful

death representative appointed after the filing of the complaint and before the two-year statute of

limitations expired on August 17, 2024. Defendant did not include any supporting documentation

with her motion.

¶ 11 On October 22, 2024, the parties appeared for a status hearing. Plaintiff’s attorney

informed the court he had previously petitioned the probate court to appoint Mark Smith, an

“employee” of his law firm, as the administrator of Julian’s estate. He also informed the court that

-4- his law firm had been retained by Jared Gibbs, Julian’s biological father, and had filed a new

petition with the probate court to appoint Jared as the administrator of Julian’s estate. That matter

was still pending in probate court. Defense counsel responded, “[M]y position is that [it] should

have been done before the two-year anniversary after the young boy’s death. I filed a [section 2-

619] motion yesterday.” Plaintiff’s counsel commented,

“I don’t think there is any question that the administrator of the estate only

needs to be established at the time that there’s a judgment or ruling.

At the time of filing, Amber was alive *** when it was filed. She, since the

filing of the lawsuit, committed suicide.

So, there was a question of who should be the administrator. I contacted the

two sisters of Amber, neither of which wanted to be appointed or wanted to even

continue with the case.

I then got sort of a weird e-mail from one of them saying that she wanted to

be the administrator of the estate now. She had changed her mind. And in the

meantime, [Jared] and my office have a contract now to represent [Julian’s estate].”

So we are representing Jared as the administrator of the estate, and we have

a petition. My suggestion to the Court would be to put this off until we get a ruling

from the probate court, which may address counsel’s issues.”

Defense counsel reiterated his position that “I think it’s too late. We need to get that to a head at

some point in time in front of [Y]our Honor.” Plaintiff’s counsel responded that seemed like a

“waste of time” because “[i]f Jared is appointed to replace Amber, then your issue is moot.”

Defense counsel retorted, “I 100 percent disagree. But we are not here to argue it yet until it’s

briefed.”

-5- ¶ 12 The case was continued until November 19, 2024. On that date, the trial court set a

briefing schedule for defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss and set the matter for a status

conference on January 21, 2025.

¶ 13 On December 11, 2024, the following documents were filed: (1) a response to

defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and (2) a motion for

leave to substitute plaintiff and for leave to file third amended complaint. Both of these documents

now identified the plaintiff in this case as “JARED GIBBS, ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE

ESTATE OF JULIAN JORDAN, DECEASED.”

¶ 14 In the response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, Jared stated, “The complaint was

originally filed by Julian’s mother, Amber Jordan, within the two-year statute of limitations from

the date of death and was timely filed pursuant to the wrongful death act.” He then stated Amber

died in June 2024, and he was appointed the administrator of Julian’s estate in December 2024.

Jared argued because the original lawsuit was filed within the two-year statute of limitations and

he now had been appointed the administrator of Julian’s estate, the relation-back doctrine allowed

for his substitution as plaintiff, and as such, the motion to dismiss should be denied.

¶ 15 In his motion for leave to substitute plaintiffs and leave to file a third amended

complaint, Jared stated the following: “[T]his wrongful death action was filed by Amber Jordan,

as the mother of Julian Jordan, deceased, on December 15, 2023.” He argued that pursuant to

section 2-1008 of the Code, “this action survives Amber Jordan’s passing.” The motion stated

Jared Gibbs, Julian’s father, was appointed representative of Julian’s estate on December 4, 2024,

and as a result of Amber’s death and “the substitution of Jared Gibbs as Administrator of the Estate

of Julian Jordan, Plaintiff moves for leave to amend his third amended complaint.” Attached to the

motion was an order appointing Jared Gibbs as “independent administrator” of Julian’s estate in

-6- Peoria County Probate Division case No. 24-PR-228 and a proposed third amended complaint.

The proposed third amended complaint changed plaintiff’s name to Jared Gibbs, as administrator

of the estate of Julian Jordan, repeated counts I and II (alleging premises liability and willful and

wanton conduct), and added a new claim in count III for wrongful death and citing the Wrongful

Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2022)).

¶ 16 The parties filed briefs and further responses to the pending pleadings, and a

hearing was held on March 26, 2025.

¶ 17 C. The Trial Court’s Ruling

¶ 18 On April 7, 2025, the trial court issued a written decision, stating that the pending

motions were (1) defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended

complaint and (2) plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The court did not

refer to the motion for leave to substitute plaintiffs as pending before the court.

¶ 19 In this decision, the trial court took judicial notice of Peoria County case No. 24-

PR-228 and described certain information from that case as follows:

“The Court finds that on 08/13/2024 a Petition was filed seeking to appoint

Mark Smith as independent administrator of the Estate of Julian Jordan. Mark

Smith is an employee of the law firm representing Amber Jordan, Administrator of

the Estate of Julian Jordan. It is interesting to note the affidavit of Mark Smith stated

he had no financial interest in the estate, but he did not assert that the law firm for

which he worked was taking the case pro bono. On 10/9/2024 Janet Jordan filed an

objection to the Petition. On 10/10/2024, after a hearing on the petition, Judge Mack

denied the Petition upon the objection of Janet Jordan. On 10/18/2024 an Amended

Petition was filed seeking to appoint Jared Gibbs, biological father of Julian Jordan

-7- as the administrator of Julian’s Estate. The Amended Petition alleged that the assets

of the Estate were $0.00, which would have allowed for, by this Court, appointment

of a special administrator under the Wrongful Death Act. On 12/04/2024 the

Petition was granted.”

¶ 20 The court then went on to find plaintiff failed to allege a claim under the Wrongful

Death Act in any of the complaints filed before the court, noting,

“For the first time, in Plaintiff’s Motion to File the Third Amended

Complaint, does the complaint sought to be filed add a count for Wrongful Death.

Like earlier complaints, Count I is based in Premises Liability, Count II is

Reckless/Willful and Wanton Conduct and the newly added Count III asserts that

Janet is liable under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq.).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File the Third Amended Complaint is also a subject

to this hearing.”

¶ 21 The trial court further found plaintiff failed to seek appointment of a special

administrator for Julian’s estate under the Wrongful Death Act or any other potentially applicable

law during the two-year statute of limitations, and defendant advised plaintiff of the need for a

special administrator, even filing the suggestion of death upon Amber’s death. The trial court

concluded that dismissal was warranted because plaintiff “should not be allowed to forego [sic]

the very important requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires legal capacity to

sue.” The case was dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 22 This appeal, filed in the name of Amber, as administrator of the estate of Julian,

followed.

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

-8- ¶ 24 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 25 The unusual circumstances that bring this case before the court require us to first

address the matter of jurisdiction. See Fabian v. BGC Holdings, LP, 2014 IL App (1st) 141576,

¶ 12 (explaining a reviewing court has a duty to sua sponte consider its jurisdiction and dismiss an

appeal if jurisdiction is lacking). The notice of appeal filed in this case identified Amber, as

administrator of Julian’s estate, as plaintiff-appellant and was signed by plaintiff’s attorneys as

representing Amber in this capacity. However, the parties concede and the record supports that

Amber was never appointed administrator of Julian’s estate by any court and she died in June 2024

before any rulings were made on the relevant motions pending before the trial court. It is well

established that a deceased person cannot be a party to a lawsuit. See Keller v. Walker, 319 Ill.

App. 3d 67, 70 (2001) (“A deceased person cannot be a party to a suit because such is a nonexistent

entity and the proceedings are void ab initio.”). Likewise, an estate does not have the capacity to

prosecute an appeal. See Mareskas-Palcek v. Schwartz, Wolf & Bernstein, LLP, 2017 IL App (1st)

162746, ¶ 32 (“The well established rule in this state is that an estate lacks the capacity to sue or

be sued, and any action must be brought by the executor or representative of the estate.”).

Furthermore, the death of an independent administrator of an estate terminates the authority of the

attorney to act further on behalf of the estate. Castaneda v. Ingram, 2018 IL App (1st) 170065,

¶ 13. Thus, Amber cannot be a party to this appeal in any capacity. However, in this case, we have

the unique situation where another individual, Jared, was later appointed independent

administrator of Julian’s estate in separate proceedings (probate court), was represented by the

same counsel as Amber, and sought a substitution as plaintiff in this proceeding after Amber’s

death. Despite the misnomer in the notice of appeal and the fact that Jared was never granted leave

to substitute as plaintiff by the trial court, Jared, as the subsequently appointed independent

-9- administrator of Julian’s probate estate, is seeking review of the trial court’s ruling in this appeal.

¶ 26 Although jurisdictional, it is generally accepted that a notice of appeal should be

liberally construed. In re Jamari R., 2017 IL App (1st) 160850, ¶ 39. Illinois Supreme Court Rule

303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides a notice of appeal “may be filed by any party or by any

attorney representing the party appealing, regardless of whether that attorney has filed an

appearance in the circuit court case being appealed.” Further, the powers of this reviewing court

include the discretion to allow substitution of parties due to death or to allow new parties to be

added on such reasonable notice as it may require. Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(2) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). “The

purpose of a notice of appeal is to inform the prevailing party in the trial court that the other party

seeks review of the judgment.” People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104-05 (2008). We conclude this

purpose was fulfilled, and we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the trial court’s decision

by Jared, as administrator of Julian’s estate, to the extent that the decision impacted his potential

claims.

¶ 27 B. Issue Before This Court

¶ 28 The primary issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in denying Jared,

as independent administrator of Julian’s estate, leave to substitute as plaintiff after Amber’s death.

Although the court did not expressly state Jared’s motion was denied, after hearing extensive

argument on all pending matters, including the issue of substitution, the court dismissed the case

with prejudice, thus ipso facto disposing of all motions pending at the time of its decision. See

Fabian, 2014 IL App (1st) 141576, ¶ 12 (finding dismissal of a complaint with prejudice a final

and appealable order as it indicates amendment of the pleadings will not be allowed, “thereby

terminating the litigation”).

¶ 29 Despite being the primary focus of the trial court’s decision, the dismissal of the

- 10 - second amended complaint is not reviewable except to the extent that the trial court dismissed the

case with prejudice and affected Jared’s aforementioned potential claims. Amber was the plaintiff

of record when the second amended complaint was filed in the trial court. Because she was

deceased, Amber was no longer a party to the case when that decision was made, and as previously

stated, she cannot be a party to this appeal. Insofar as plaintiff’s law firm represented Amber as

the purported administrator of Julian’s estate, that representation ended upon her death. See

Castaneda, 2018 IL App (1st) 170065, ¶ 13. To the extent that plaintiff’s law firm represented

Amber in any individual capacity, that likewise ended upon her death. See Robison v. Orthotic &

Prosthetic Lab, Inc., 2015 IL App (5th) 140079, ¶ 12 (“[T]he attorney-client relationship is

terminated by the death of the client, and thereafter, the authority of the attorney to represent the

interests of a deceased client must come from the personal representatives of the decedent.”). We

take exception with plaintiff’s law firm filing pleadings and otherwise appearing to represent

Amber in any capacity after her death, as it was inappropriate to do so. Similarly, it was

inappropriate for plaintiff’s law firm to purport to represent the estate at any time during these

proceedings when there was, in fact, no administrator of the estate established. See Estate of

Hudson v. Tibble, 2018 IL App (1st) 162469, ¶ 32 (“[W]hen an attorney is retained by an

administrator for the purpose of administering the estate, its client is in actuality the administrator

and the estate due to the symbiotic nature of their concurrent existence. The administrator only

acts to serve the estate, and the estate cannot act but through the name of the administrator.”); City

of Rockford v. Joudeh, 2023 IL App (4th) 220036-U, ¶¶ 61-62 (denying the estate’s motion to add

the independent administrator of the estate as a party to the appeal and declining to address any

arguments raised by the estate on appeal based on its legal incapacity to prosecute the appeal).

¶ 30 C. Standard of Review

- 11 - ¶ 31 The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and

easily proved issues of fact early in the litigation. Glasgow v. Associated Banc-Corp., 2012 IL App

(2d) 111303, ¶ 12. A defendant who seeks relief under section 2-619 of the Code admits as true

all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences that can be gleaned

from those facts. Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2012 IL 112219, ¶ 18. The defendant asserts, instead,

that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by a ground specified in the Code or other affirmative matter

avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2022). A trial court’s

ruling on a 2-619 motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Süd Family Ltd. Partnership v. Otto

Baum Co., 2024 IL App (4th) 220782, ¶ 41. Further, this court may affirm the dismissal of a

plaintiff’s claim on any ground supported by the record, regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.

Id.

¶ 32 When a party is misidentified, as in this case, the trial court’s decision to allow

substitution of a party plaintiff is within the court’s sound discretion. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v.

Malarz, 2021 IL App (2d) 190984, ¶ 17. However, the question of whether the amendment of a

pleading to allow substitution of a party relates back to the filing of the original complaint is

reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 33 D. Denial of Jared’s Motion to Substitute Plaintiffs

¶ 34 Jared argues the trial court should have permitted him to be substituted as plaintiff

to represent Julian’s estate after Amber’s death and file an amended complaint. In his brief, Jared

puts the cart before the horse by arguing the merits of his proposed third amended complaint, a

matter not before this court at this time. In support of his contention that he should have been

substituted as plaintiff, Jared relies upon the relation-back doctrine (735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West

2022)). He contends the failure to timely appoint an administrator of Julian’s estate was a

- 12 - “procedural defect” that could have been cured even after the statute of limitations period expired,

and his subsequent appointment as administrator by the probate court should relate back to the

timely filing of Amber’s original complaint. However, before we can address the application of

the relation-back doctrine, we must first consider what impact the following facts have on the

viability of the claims arising from Julian’s death: (1) Amber’s death in June 2024 during the

pendency of the case and (2) Jared’s appointment as independent administrator of Julian’s probate

estate over five months after Amber’s death and four months after the statute of limitations tolled

as to claims for Julian’s wrongful death.

¶ 35 1. Impact of Amber’s Death on Pending Litigation

¶ 36 It is undisputed and the record supports that Amber’s original complaint was filed

within the statute of limitations and her second amended complaint was pending at the time of her

death. Amber’s second amended complaint alleged two separate theories of negligence against

defendant, which she claimed resulted in Julian’s death (premises liability and willful and wanton

conduct). It is further undisputed that Amber filed the complaint purporting to be doing so as

administrator of Julian’s estate, but she was not, in fact, administrator of Julian’s estate at any time

prior to her death. Still, Amber’s effort to make the claim in this manner (based on allegations of

negligence resulting in an individual’s death and brought as a purported representative of that

individual’s estate) supports the conclusion that she was making a colorable claim under the

Wrongful Death Act because it is the only avenue in Illinois for making these types of claims. See

740 ILCS 180/1 (West 2022) (establishing a cause of action when a person’s death is caused by

the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another); Miller v. American Infertility Group of Illinois,

S.C., 386 Ill. App. 3d 141, 144 (2008) (noting a cause of action for wrongful death is established

by statute and did not exist at common law); Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st)

- 13 - 100768, ¶ 92 (explaining a wrongful death cause of action must be brought by, and in the name

of, the administrator of the decedent’s estate who possesses the sole right of action or control over

the lawsuit).

¶ 37 Despite her representation to the contrary, Amber filed this lawsuit without being

named administrator of Julian’s estate. Thus, she did not have the capacity to sue defendant for

Julian’s wrongful death because such a claim cannot be brought by an individual. “[T]here is no

proper plaintiff where the person named in the caption as the administrator of the decedent’s estate

was not properly appointed.” Nagel v. Inman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 766, 770 (2010). Notably, because

no estate had been opened for Julian in probate court, Amber could have petitioned the trial court

at any time prior to her death to be appointed as special administrator of his estate. See 740 ILCS

180/2(a), 2.1 (West 2022); In re Estate of Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶ 44 (finding a

widow, who filed suit against deceased husband’s caregiver in her individual capacity, was

subsequently appointed special administrator of his estate after the statute of limitations had tolled,

and filed an amended complaint reflecting her appointment as special administrator, could

maintain a wrongful death claim because her appointment related back to the filing of the original

complaint). However, Amber did not do so.

¶ 38 Therefore, when Amber died in June 2024, the status of the case was as follows: an

individual plaintiff who was never properly appointed as special administrator of an estate of a

decedent had a wrongful death claim pending. Stated another way, there was no proper plaintiff in

this case when Amber died. We note that plaintiff’s law firm misguidedly continued to file

pleadings and otherwise appear in court to represent Amber and/or Julian’s estate even though

Amber was deceased and no administrator had been appointed to Julian’s estate. We conclude

Amber’s claims died with her and the proceedings became void ab initio. See Keller, 319 Ill. App.

- 14 - 3d at 70.

¶ 39 2. Jared’s Subsequent Appointment as Independent Administrator

¶ 40 Without acknowledging the impact of Amber’s death on the proceedings below,

Jared contends his appointment as independent administrator of Jared’s estate over five months

after Amber’s death and four months after the statute of limitations tolled as to claims for Julian’s

wrongful death should have been deemed to have cured the “procedural defect” of “failing to

timely appoint an estate administrator.” This argument fails.

¶ 41 The relation-back doctrine provides, in relevant part, that “[a]t any time before final

judgment amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable terms, introducing any party who

ought to have been joined as plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2022). It

also allows for the amendment of pleadings in a timely filed lawsuit if the cause of action asserted

in the amended pleadings grew out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original pleading.

Id. § 2-616(b). The relation-back doctrine “is remedial in nature and should be applied liberally to

favor hearing a plaintiff’s claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawler v. The University of

Chicago Medical Center, 2016 IL App (1st) 143189, ¶ 46. The key language pertinent here is to

protect a plaintiff’s claim.

¶ 42 As Jared has noted, courts have consistently held the relation-back doctrine applies

when a plaintiff filed a wrongful death complaint in his or her individual capacity and later, even

after the tolling of the statute of limitations, that plaintiff is appointed administrator of the estate.

However, these cases are distinguishable from the instant case because Jared was not, in fact, the

plaintiff who originally filed the complaint and was seeking relation back to protect his claim after

being appointed administrator of the estate. See Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶ 44;

Pavlov v. Konwall, 113 Ill. App. 3d 576 (1983) (finding a plaintiff timely filed a wrongful death

- 15 - claim purporting to be administrator of decedent’s estate, was not properly appointed as

administrator, and eventually was properly appointed special administrator of the estate after the

statute of limitations tolled, and therefore, the plaintiff’s second amended complaint related back

to the time of the filing of the original complaint); Palm v. Sergi, 2022 IL App (2d) 210057 (finding

a plaintiff, who filed suit on behalf of the decedent’s trust despite that she had not been appointed

as trustee, was later appointed as a trustee; thus, her amended complaint related back to the filing

of the original complaint); Marcus v. Art Nissen & Son, Inc., 224 Ill. App. 3d 464 (1991) (finding

a lawsuit filed in the name of a husband and wife, where husband was deceased, was not a nullity

as to the husband and the wife, who was an original plaintiff, should have been allowed to also

substitute as representative of the husband’s estate after being appointed administrator and the

amended complaint related back to the original filing); Lopez v. Oyarzabal, 180 Ill. App. 3d 132

(1989) (finding a father’s appointment as administrator of his son’s estate related back to the date

of the father’s filing of the original complaint in his individual capacity); see also Wolf v. Redmore,

142 Ill. App. 3d 770 (1986); Redmond v. Central Community Hospital, 65 Ill. App. 3d 669 (1978).

¶ 43 Jared’s reliance on In re Estate of Kleine, 2015 IL App (2d) 150063, to support his

contention that his later appointment as independent administrator of Julian’s estate should still

cure a “defect” in the pleading filed by Amber is similarly misplaced. In Kleine, Nancy Kleine

died in March 2012, and her probate estate was opened, with Richard Calkins appointed special

administrator, in January 2013. Id. ¶ 3. In March 2014, Nancy’s husband, Jim Kleine, filed a civil

complaint alleging, inter alia, a claim for wrongful death against the defendants. Jim brought the

lawsuit individually and as special administrator of Nancy’s estate, though he had not been

appointed the special administrator. Id. ¶ 4. Thereafter, Jim filed a motion to be appointed special

administrator by the trial court, which was granted. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss

- 16 - pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, arguing that the appointment of Jim as special administrator

was void because letters of office for the estate had already been issued to Calkins; thus, the court

lacked jurisdiction to appoint Jim. Id. ¶ 6. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss

but allowed Calkins to file an amended complaint in his capacity as special administrator of

Nancy’s estate. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint because it

was filed after the statute of limitations period had run and did not relate back to the original

complaint. The trial court denied the motion. An interlocutory appeal was granted with the

following certified question:

“ ‘Whether the relation back doctrine applies when a wrongful death and

survival action is timely filed by an improperly appointed special administrator,

who was appointed pursuant to the [Wrongful Death] Act despite the fact that letters

of office had already issued, pursuant to the Probate Act, to another person who did

not bring the action nor substitute in as plaintiff within the statute of limitations?’ ”

Id. ¶ 8.

¶ 44 In determining the relation-back doctrine did apply, the appellate court concluded

the situation presented by the certified question was similar to that in Pavlov. The Kleine court

noted that in Pavlov, an independent administrator of the estate had already been appointed, and it

was determined “that the amended complaint related back because the amended complaint made

substantially the same allegations and arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, the estate

was always listed as an interested party, and technical rules of pleading should not preclude

resolving the case on its merits.” Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 45 Jared’s reliance on the Kleine court’s statement that “the estate was always listed

as an interested party” disregards the important distinction that an estate had been opened and an

- 17 - independent administrator appointed by the probate court in that case before the wrongful death

lawsuit was filed and before the statute of limitations had tolled. The representative of the estate

was the only party who could file the claim in that case, and he had been appointed within the

statute of limitations. In this case, there was no estate opened and no administrator appointed until

December 2024, which was five months after Amber’s death and four months after the statute of

limitations had tolled. Amber did not have standing to bring the wrongful death lawsuit in this

case, and her status was never cured prior to her death. Jared also did not have standing until he

was appointed administrator of Julian’s estate four months after the statute of limitations tolled for

any wrongful death claim.

¶ 46 We note that plaintiff’s counsel effectively refers to Amber, as administrator of the

estate, and Jared, administrator of the estate, interchangeably, as if the latter would automatically

replace the former upon Amber’s death. Not only does this overlook the legal implications of the

death of a party during a pending litigation, but it also ignores the fact that there was no estate

opened for Julian and no administrator appointed to represent any estate until December 2024. It

is well settled that an estate is not a natural or artificial person and lacks the legal capacity to sue

or be sued. Castaneda, 2018 IL App (1st) 170065, ¶ 13. Any action must be brought by the

executor or representative of the estate. Id. Jared was not involved in this case in any capacity

when the original complaint was filed and has never been a plaintiff in this case. It bears repeating

that Jared did not have standing to bring a wrongful death claim until he was appointed

administrator of Julian’s estate. He did not seek appointment as administrator in any court until

October 18, 2024, which was over three months after Amber’s death and two months after the

statute of limitations expired for a wrongful death claim. The probate court’s subsequent

appointment of an independent administrator after the tolling of the statute of limitations could not

- 18 - change the fact that there was no valid claim pending in the trial court to relate back to. See

generally Scott v. Skokie Valley Community Hospital, 54 Ill. App. 3d 766, 767-68 (1977) (holding

a probate court lacked the authority to amend the order issuing letters of administration

nunc pro tunc to change the date of issuance of letters to reflect an earlier date upon which a

separate wrongful death complaint had been timely file and noting such an order cannot, “under

the guise of correcting its record, put upon it an order or judgment which never in fact had been

made or entered”).

¶ 47 We acknowledged previously, in agreement with the dissent, that had Amber not

died, she could have been appointed as the administrator of Julian’s estate and her appointment

could have related back to the timely filing of the original complaint. We disagree, however, that

her death did not change anything. Therefore, we find the authority relied upon by the dissent

distinguishable. Although the relation-back doctrine is to be liberally construed in favor of hearing

a plaintiff’s claim, it is inapplicable when a plaintiff dies and her invalid claim becomes void

ab initio. This is more than an “irregularity,” and plaintiff’s law firm’s efforts to find a

“replacement” plaintiff after the tolling of the statute of limitations could not cure it. Because

Amber died before having a valid claim filed against defendant and Jared’s appointment as

independent administrator of Julian’s estate occurred after the statute of limitations tolled, the

relation-back doctrine is inapplicable. We conclude, therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of the

case with prejudice was proper.

¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 49 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 50 Affirmed.

¶ 51 JUSTICE HARRIS, dissenting:

- 19 - ¶ 52 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. In my view, the relation back

doctrine applies to permit the substitution of Jared, as the properly appointed administrator of

Julian’s estate, as plaintiff and the filing of the proposed third amended complaint. Accordingly, I

would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s second amended complaint pursuant to

section 2-619 of the Code and remand with instructions that the court grant Jared’s motion for

leave to substitute plaintiff and for leave to file the proposed third amended complaint.

¶ 53 “The relation back statute permits an amended pleading to relate back to the date

of the original pleading if the original pleading was timely and the amendment grew out of the

same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading.” Lawler, 2017 IL 120745, ¶ 20

(citing 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2010)).

“A liberal construction of the requirements of [the relation back statute] is

necessary ‘to allow the resolution of litigation on the merits and to avoid elevating

questions of form over substance.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the statute is to

preserve causes of action against loss by reason of technical default unrelated to the

merits. [Citation.] *** [T]he ‘rationale behind the same transaction or occurrence

rule is that a defendant will not be prejudiced by an amendment so long as “his

attention was directed, within the time prescribed or limited, to the facts that form

the basis of the claim asserted against him.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 54 “A wrongful-death action must be filed by a representative of the decedent on

behalf of the estate.” Nagel, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 770. “Ideally, the administrator should be appointed

first and the wrongful-death action filed subsequently.” Id. However, the failure to follow that

procedure is not fatal to a cause of action, and “[n]umerous cases have found that where an

administrator is appointed after the suit is filed, the appointment will relate back to the time when

- 20 - the suit was filed.” Id. This is true even when an administrator has not been appointed on behalf

of the estate until well after the statute of limitations for the cause of action has expired. See Pavlov,

113 Ill. App. 3d at 579; Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶ 56.

¶ 55 In Pavlov, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 577, an original complaint was filed, naming William

Pavlov as the administrator of the decedent’s estate, although Pavlov’s appointment as

administrator was improper. More than two years after the decedent’s death, Pavlov was properly

appointed as the administrator and filed an amended complaint. Id. The defendant moved to

dismiss the action, arguing that since Pavlov was not properly appointed as the administrator of

the estate until after the two-year statute of limitations period had expired, he was not a proper

party at the outset of the litigation, the original complaint was “a complete nullity,” and the relation

back doctrine could not apply. Id. On review, the First District found Pavlov’s “proper appointment

*** as administrator did relate back to his initial filing.” Id. at 580. In so holding, the court stated

as follows:

“Both [the original and amended complaint] make substantially the same

allegations and[ ] the cause of action asserted in the amended and original pleadings

arose out of the same occurrence or transaction. In both pleadings the estate of [the]

decedent has been named as the interested party and it has been clear from the start

that Pavlov intended to bring the action as administrator of that estate. That Pavlov

was not properly named administrator on the motion of the decedent’s heirs until

after the limitations period had run is a technical consideration which, in light of

[the relation back doctrine], should not prevent the cause from being decided on its

merits in furtherance of justice.” Id. at 579.

- 21 - ¶ 56 More recently, in Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶ 47, the Second District

reached the same conclusion. There, the original complaint was timely filed but identified the

decedent’s widow as the administrator of the estate when she had never been so appointed. Id.

¶¶ 3-6. Additionally, the record in the case showed no probate estate for the decedent was ever

opened. Id. ¶ 44. More than four years after the decedent’s death, the widow moved for leave to

file a petition for the appointment of a special administrator and requested that the appointment

relate back to the original complaint. Id. ¶ 5. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, asserting

that because no special administrator was appointed before the action was filed, the action was

invalid and “any subsequent attempt to add a special administrator could not relate back and should

fail.” Id. ¶ 6. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, granted the plaintiff’s

motion, and appointed her as special administrator of the estate. Id. ¶ 7. On review, the Second

District affirmed, finding that although the plaintiff in her individual capacity could not maintain

a wrongful death suit, the action was not subject to dismissal and the court’s appointment of the

plaintiff as special administrator “ ‘cured’ ” the procedural defect. Id. ¶ 47.

¶ 57 The majority finds Pavlov and Mankowski (and multiple other similar cases)

distinguishable on the basis that Jared was not “the plaintiff who originally filed the complaint and

was seeking relation back to protect his claim.” Supra ¶ 42. However, in Kleine, 2015 IL App (2d)

150063, ¶ 35, the Second District addressed this precise scenario, holding that “whether the

amended complaint added a new party or the same party in a new capacity does not affect [the]

relation-back analysis.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 58 As discussed by the majority, in Kleine, a husband sued the defendants, in part, for

the wrongful death of his deceased wife. Id. ¶ 4. The husband was named in the complaint both

individually and as special administrator of the decedent’s estate, even though a probate estate had

- 22 - previously been opened and a different individual, Calkins, appointed as the estate’s special

administrator. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. More than two years after the decedent’s death and following the

defendants’ filing of a motion to dismiss, the trial court allowed Calkins to file an amended

complaint as the special administrator of the estate. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

¶ 59 On review, the Second District held that “the relation-back doctrine applies ***

where the original complaint was timely filed by an improperly appointed special administrator

and the amended complaint substituted in the properly appointed administrator after the limitations

period had run.” Id. ¶ 38. As indicated, in reaching its decision, the court rejected the defendants’

contention that the relation back doctrine could not apply when there was a change to the plaintiff’s

identity rather than simply to his capacity. Id. ¶¶ 18, 33-35. The court also found the case before

it was like Pavlov and Mankowski “in that all the amended complaints added a proper plaintiff

after the limitations period.” Id. ¶ 35. In particular, the court noted that for purposes of the

Wrongful Death Act, “the Pavlov plaintiff had the same authority to file the original complaint as

[the husband in the case before it] did: none.” Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 60 The majority finds Jared’s reliance on Kleine is misplaced, noting that, there, “an

estate had been opened and an independent administrator appointed by the probate court *** before

the wrongful death lawsuit was filed and before the statute of limitations had tolled.” Supra ¶ 45.

It emphasizes the fact that, in this case, no estate was opened and no administrator appointed until

December 2024, approximately five months after Amber’s death and nearly four months after the

statute of limitations for a wrongful death action had expired. Supra ¶ 45. However, the majority’s

reasoning ignores the holdings in Pavlov and Mankowski, where no independent administrators

were properly appointed until after the relevant statute of limitations had expired. Significantly, in

Mankowski, no probate estate was ever opened for the decedent and the decedent’s widow did not

- 23 - move for leave to seek the appointment as a special administrator until more than four years after

the decedent’s death. Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶¶ 5, 44. The majority also overlooks

the finding in Kleine that the difference between that case and the circumstances in Pavlov and

Mankowski, i.e., the timing of the proper appointment of a representative for an estate, had no

effect on the application of the relation back doctrine. Kleine, 2015 IL App (2d) 150063, ¶ 35.

¶ 61 Moreover, we note that the majority’s precise rationale was also explicitly rejected

in another Second District case involving similar issues. In Jablonski v. Rothe, 287 Ill. App. 3d

752, 754 (1997), the plaintiffs sued for the wrongful death of a fetus following a motor vehicle

accident. The defendant challenged the complaint “on the ground that [the] plaintiffs failed to bring

the action as representatives of the decedent’s estate,” and the plaintiffs filed an amended pleading

that added an allegation that they had been appointed as the estate’s special administrators. Id. The

defendant then moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis that that the two-year statute

of limitations for wrongful death claims had expired before the amended complaint was filed. Id.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the amended complaint with

prejudice. Id.

¶ 62 On appeal, the Second District reversed, finding “[t]he amended complaint relate[d]

back to the filing of the timely filed original complaint.” Id. at 757. In so holding, the court rejected

the defendant’s argument that other cases applying the relation back doctrine under similar

circumstances were distinguishable because in those prior cases, “a probate estate already existed

at the time the statute of limitations expired.” Id. at 756-57. The court reasoned as follows:

“We consider this a distinction without a difference. [The relation back

statute] clearly provides that a complaint may be amended to cure the omission of

a condition precedent to the right to recover. The statute does not specify a time in

- 24 - which this must be done. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the

[statute’s] purpose to save causes of action from being lost on technical grounds.

***

[The] [d]efendant does not dispute that [the] plaintiffs’ original complaint

was timely filed or that the cause of action alleged in the amended complaint arose

out of the same occurrence as that in the original pleading. [The] [d]efendant does

not claim that he has been prejudiced by the amendment. Under these

circumstances, the [trial] court erred in dismissing the amended complaint as

untimely. The amended complaint relates back to the filing of the timely filed

original complaint.” Id.

¶ 63 Accordingly, the relevant case authority clearly demonstrates that the relation back

doctrine is applicable even under circumstances where no probate estate has been opened and no

representative of an estate is properly appointed before the two-year statute of limitations for

wrongful death claims has expired. Because case authority further shows that “whether the

amended complaint added a new party or the same party in a new capacity does not affect [the]

relation-back analysis” (Kleine, 2015 IL App (2d) 150063, ¶ 35), I find no impediment to applying

the relation back doctrine in this case.

¶ 64 The majority also points out that “Amber died before having a valid claim filed

against defendant.” Supra ¶ 47. It states that because there was “no proper plaintiff” when Amber

died, “Amber’s claims died with her and the proceedings became void ab initio.” Supra ¶ 38. I

disagree that Amber’s death in this case prohibits application of the relation back doctrine. The

relation back statute “specifically precludes amendments to pending complaints from being time-

barred.” (Emphasis added.) Lawler, 2017 IL 120745, ¶ 29. Here, neither Amber’s death in June

- 25 - 2024, nor the defendant’s July 2024 filing suggesting Amber’s death pursuant to section 2-1008(b)

of the Code, abated or terminated the underlying litigation. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b) (West 2024)

(providing for the substitution of a party by court order when that party dies). Instead, the case

remained pending.

¶ 65 Notably, in reaching its decision in Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶ 46,

the Second District cited McMann v. Illinois Midland Coal Co., 149 Ill. App. 427 (1909), as

instructive. In McMann, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries

but then died from unrelated causes. Id. at 427-28. An administrator of the plaintiff’s estate was

appointed and substituted as the party plaintiff. Id. Later, the defendant learned that the deceased

plaintiff had been a minor when the action was originally filed and “objected upon the ground that

it was questionable whether any suit was in existence at the time the administrator was substituted

as party plaintiff.” Id. at 428. Finding no error, the Third District held as follows:

“The suit having been brought in the name of the minor instead of by his next friend

was not subject to be abated or dismissed without leave to amend by substituting

some person as next friend, by whom the suit might be prosecuted for the benefit

of the minor, and the minor having died before his incapacity to bring suit in his

own name was brought to the attention of the court, and an administrator having

been duly appointed and substituted as party plaintiff, the suit was not thereafter

liable to be abated or dismissed. The commencement of the suit by the minor was

a mere irregularity which might have been thereafter cured by the appointment of

a next friend to prosecute the suit.” Id.

¶ 66 I also find McMann instructive to the present case. Amber’s commencement of the

underlying action as the administrator of Julian’s estate when she had never been so appointed was

- 26 - a curable “irregularity.” Had Amber not died, she could have been appointed as the administrator

of Julian’s estate and her appointment would have related back to the timely filing of the original

complaint. See Pavlov, 113 Ill. App. 3d 576; Mankowski, 2014 IL App (2d) 140154, ¶ 56.

Additionally, a “new party” that was the properly appointed administrator of Julian’s estate could

also have been substituted as plaintiff. See Kleine, 2015 IL App (2d) 150063, ¶ 35. Amber’s death

does not change these results where the underlying proceeding remained pending after her death

and at the time Jared was properly appointed the administrator of Julian’s estate and moved for

substitution. See McMann, 149 Ill. App. 427.

¶ 67 Ultimately, in this case, Amber’s original complaint was timely filed. The cause of

action alleged in Jared’s amended complaint arose out of the same occurrence as that in the original

pleading. Both the original and amended complaints were based on Julian’s gun-related death at

defendant’s residence and alleged that defendant was negligent in allowing unlocked and loaded

guns on her property. Finally, defendant identifies no prejudice to her from the substitution of

Jared, as the administrator of Julian’s estate, as the party plaintiff or from the filing of the third

amended complaint. Significantly, the estate and its representative were always identified as

interested parties in this matter, and defendant clearly has had notice from the outset of the

substance of the allegations against her.

¶ 68 Accordingly, as stated, I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s

second amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. Additionally, I would remand

with instructions that the court grant Jared’s motion for leave to substitute plaintiff and for leave

to file the proposed third amended complaint.

- 27 - Jordan v. Jordan, 2026 IL App (4th) 250477

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marshall County, No. 23-LA- 13; the Hon. Paul E. Bauer, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Zane D. Smith, of Zane D. Smith & Associates, of Chicago, and for Lynn D. Dowd and Patrick C. Anderson, of Law Offices of Lynn Appellant: D. Dowd, of Naperville, for appellant.

Attorneys John P. Fleming, of Peoria, for appellee. for Appellee:

- 28 -