Jordan Taylor Hawkes and Brian Roby v. Evan Zwerneman, Individually, and EZ Stay and Play, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 15-25-00185-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00185-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Cause No. 15-25-00185-CV 1/5/2026 5:32 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS FIFTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

Jordan Taylor Hawkes and Brian Roby Appellants, v. Evan Zwerneman, Individually and EZ Stay and Play, LLC Appellees

On Appeal from the 483rd Judicial District Court, Hays County, Texas the Honorable Alicia Key, Presiding Judge Trial Court Cause No. 25-1672-DCF

BRIEF OF APPELLEE EVAN ZWERNEMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND EZ STAY AND PLAY, LLC

L. JAMES WOOD Texas Bar No. 24076785 james@lineofdutylaw.com THE JAMES WOOD LAW FIRM, PLLC 500 W. 2nd St, STE 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 P: 512.692.9266 F: 512.686.3152 W: lineofdutylaw.com CC: natalie@lineofdutylaw.com E-File Service Address: eservice@lineofdutylaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED Cause No. 15-25-00185-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIFTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS

Jordan Taylor Hawkes and Brian Roby Appellants, v. Evan Zwerneman, Individually and EZ Stay and Play, LLC Appellees

On Appeal from the 483rd Judicial District Court, Hays County, Texas the Honorable Alicia Key, Presiding Judge Trial Court Cause No. 25-1672-DCF

BRIEF OF APPELLEE EVAN ZWERNEMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND EZ STAY AND PLAY, LLC

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

Comes now Evan Zwerneman, Individually, and EZ Stay and Play, LLC, Appellees in the above entitled and numbered case, requesting this Honorable Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court and in so doing dismiss Appellants’ motion to dismiss.

The following designations will be used:

References to the record will be “CR” for the Clerk’s Record and “RR” for the Reporter’s Record. References to the Appendix will be “Appx.” Evan Zwerneman will be referred to individually as “Zwerneman”. Evan Zwerneman and EZ Stay and Play, LLC will be referred to as “Appellees.” Jordan Taylor Hawkes and Brian Roby will be referred to collectively as “Appellants”. Jordan Taylor Hawkes will be referred to individually as “Hawkes.” Brian Roby will be referred to individually as “Roby.”

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES, COUNSEL AND TRIAL JUDGE PRESIDING................4 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..........................................................................................5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......................................................................................7 STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................8 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT........................................................................... 11 STANDARDS OF REVIEW........................................................................................12 ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .......................................................................12 ISSUE ONE: a. The trial court did not improperly deny Appellants’ motion to dismiss as Appellants failed to meet the burden of proof required by § 27.005(b).

b. Even if Appellants had met their own burden of proof under TRCP § 27.005(b), Appellees have also met their burden of proof TRCP § 27.005(c) in showing clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for each essential element of their claims.

c. Appellants’ statements regarding animal cruelty are immaterial to this suit, as their unlawful actions are the basis for Appellees’ causes of action against them. Appellants’ fraudulent assumption of Appellees’ identities precludes a TCPA claim, per TRCP § 27.010(a)(12).

ISSUE TWO: a. The trial court did not improperly deny Appellants’ motion to dismiss Appellees’ other tort claims arising out of the same actions by Appellants.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER.................................................................................30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...........................................................................31 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................32 APPENDIX..................................................................................................................33

3 IDENTITY OF PARTIES, COUNSEL, AND TRIAL JUDGE PRESIDING

James Wood 500 W. 2d Street Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 692-9266 Email: james@lineofduty.com Appellees’ Counsel

Evan Zwerneman and EZ Stay and Play, LLC Appellees

Randall E. Turner 2816 Hemphill Street Fort Worth, Texas 76110-3214 Telephone: (817) 420-9690 Fax: (817) 887-5717 Email: randy@randyturner.com Texas State Bar No. 20328310 Appellants’ Lead Counsel

Tiffany Crouch Bartlett 1000 Heritage Center Circle Round Rock, Texas 78664 Telephone: (512) 965-2449 Email: tiffany@crouchbartlettlaw.com Texas State Bar No. SBN 24042601 Appellants’ Additional Counsel

Susan Bleil 5012 Birch Hollow Lane Fort Worth, Texas 76132 Telephone: (817) 680-0228 Email: bleil@charter.net Texas State Bar No. 14056720 Appellants’ Additional Counsel

Jordan Taylor Hawkes and Brian Roby Appellants

Honorable Alicia Key Presiding Judge 483rd Judicial District Court Hays County, Texas Trial Court

4 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Apple Imports, Inc. v. Koole, 945 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, writ denied)...………………………………………………………………………25 Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 355 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)................................18 Cmty. Health Sys. Prof'l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 689 (Tex. 2017)…………………………………………………………………………..26 Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apt. Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 923 (Tex. 2013).............27 Darnell v. Rogers, 588 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.)………15 Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex 2003)…............21 Funes v. Villatoro, 352 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).………………………………………………………………………....7 Hancock v. Variyam, 400 SW 3d 59 - Tex: Supreme Court 2013.………......................22 Hoffmann--La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004)……….....23 Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 794–95 (Tex. 1995)…………………………..25 In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex.2004)................17, 18 In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015)……………………………....20, 21, 22 In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015) (“Lipsky II”)................................18, 19 Innovative Block of South Texas, Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. 2020).................................................................................................21 Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011)…………………………………………………………………….22 Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tex.2008)………………………………..........18 KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 SW 3d 682 – Tex: Court of Appeals 2013.......20 Moore v. Bushman, 559 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)....................................................................................................................26

5 Moore v. Waldrop, 166 SW 3d 380 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 10th Dist. 2005………20 Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Bill's Valves, 974 F. Supp. 979, 982, (S.D. Tex. 1997).......25 Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71, 80 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)..............................................17 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000)…………………………………………………………………….26 Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 725 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).....................................................................................18 Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 475-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)....................................................27 Serafine v. Blunt, 466 SW 3d 352, 358 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 3rd Dist. 2015............18 Teachers Federal Credit Union v. Esquivel, 621 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2021, no pet.) ..............................................................................................12, 14 Whitaker v. Bank of El Paso, 850 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, no writ)...................................................................................................................25 Constitutions, Statutes, Rules and Other Authorities

Texas Citizens Participation Act, (TCPA). Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, §§ 1-2, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 960, 960-963..........12, 18, 19, 22, 27, 29

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002(b)...........................................................13

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b)...............................................13, 16, 17

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c).....................................................17, 29

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a)...............................................13, 14, 29

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(a)(12)..............................................27, 28

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.001..........................................................19, 20

6 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Appellants, Jordan Taylor Hawkes and Brian Roby, have a fundamental misunderstanding of this case. While the defamatory states made on social media were libelous, Appellants fraud and identity theft are the cause, and the nature of this case is fundamentally business disparagement, tortious interference with existing and prospective contracts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from Appellants’ unlawful actions.

Course of Proceeding: Appellants filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act which the trial court denied. [CR 308] Appellants then filed their interlocutory appeal. [CR 310]. Appellees now file this responsive brief.

Disposition of the Case: The trial court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. [CR 308]

7 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Introduction On or about August 20, 2024, a dog (“Kali”) owned by the Appellants passed

away while being boarded by Appellees. Appellant Hawkes reported the animal cruelty

to the Hays County Sheriff’s department which began a criminal investigation; said

found no animal cruelty on the part of Appellees [CR 84]. Hawkes then gave an

interview to KXAN, who was doing a news story about a new animal cruelty bill, which

was published on May 29, 2025. Around that same time, Hawkes posted defamatory

and libelous statements on websites Reddit.com and Facebook.com, in addition to a

website and Google Business listing she created with the purpose of impersonating

Appellees. Appellees filed suit against Appellants, alleging: Libel and Libel per se,

Business Disparagement, Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Theft of

Identity Cyber Property, Tortious Interference with an Existing Contract, and Tortious

Interference with Prospective Contracts.

Factual Background

On or about August 20, 2024, Appellants made use of Appellees’ business

services of dog boarding while out of town. The dog they boarded, “Kali,” was

approximately 13 years old, was known to having pre-existing severe car anxiety, and

was known to require multiple medications—including gabapentin and fluoxetine

hydrochloride—which are both known to be used in dogs to relieve fear and anxiety

8 during stressful events. While being boarded, the dog passed away; overheating was

determined to be one cause of death, but an animal necropsy is not known to have been

performed, and no tests are known to have been used to determine whether the heat

alone was the cause of the dog’s death, or if one of its multiple preexisting conditions

(or simply age) contributed or caused the death of the Appellants’ dog. Nevertheless,

Appellants took a position that Appellees “killed” their dog and began an endless

barrage of illegal and fraudulent defamatory tactics against Zwerneman and his

business (herein named Appellee EZ Stay and Play, LLC).

Hawkes began with an interview with KXAN, published on May 29, 2025.

Around that same time, Hawkes posted a thread on Reddit.com titled “Doggie Daycare

Killed my Dog,” linking to the article by KXAN. May 31, 2025, Hawkes also posted a

nearly identical defamatory and libelous statement, this time on Facebook.com, also

linking to the KXAN article. On June 1, 2025, when Zwerneman received a voicemail

calling him a “murderer,” he ran a Google search on himself and his business. At that

time, Zwerneman discovered a fraudulent and impersonating copy of his business

website, created by Appellants. Rather than the Appellees’ genuine business website

“ezdogplayandstay.com”, Appellants had created “ezdogplaynstay.com”. The caption

on the website read, “KILLING YOUR DOG SO YOU DON’T HAVE TO.” On their

website, Appellants proclaim, “We notified the Hays County Animal Abuse department

9 who investigated and interviewed all parties.” Said investigation led to no findings or

charges against Appellees.

On June 3, 2025, Zwerneman became aware that Appelles had not only created

a fraudulent website in his LLC’s name, but they had also stolen his identity and

fraudulently assumed control of his Google business page for EZ Dog Stay and Play.

Google identified to Zwerneman that the person who had assumed control of his

Google business page was registered to an e-mail of “jo…@gmail.com.” This matches

a verified email address for Jordan Hawkes. Not only had Appellees stolen his business

identity online and claimed his Google business profile as their own, they also changed

the photo of his business to a photo of their deceased dog. Zwerneman was then

informed by Google, about his own business, that “This business already has a profile

on Google. You can request access to become a manager.” The fraudulent website and

business listing were clearly created with the express intention of misleading and

confusing the public by impersonating Appellants’ business.

Appellees’ extreme focus on the events of August 20, 2024 in their own brief’s

factual background is wholly inappropriate and off-topic. They describe extensively

the death of their dog, as well as another unrelated animal that was also in possession

of Appellant’s business. They cite veterinary records that are suspected of falsification

or tampering, with no affidavit to prove them up. They use hearsay in quoting a

veterinary technician who is never identified in any pleading, and who has not been

10 deposed. They use statements made by anonymous users on the Reddit post made by

Hawkes, offering these unsubstantiated and anonymous allegations as fact. They insist

that Zwerneman, himself, commented on these posts and fraudulently misrepresented

what happened, without showing any of the supposed comments that he made.

Appellants are focusing on “animal cruelty” that never happened—a fact substantiated

by the Hay’s County Sheriff’s department when they cleared Zwerneman and his

business of any wrong-doing.

This is not an animal rights case. The merits of this case revolve around long

standing business protection causes of action. No cause of action in this case involves

animal cruelty, yet, animal cruelty is the Appellants’ focus, both in their previously

denied motion to dismiss, and in this appeal. As in their original motion to dismiss,

Appellants continue to offer nothing but hearsay, unsubstantiated allegations, and

blatantly falsified records which are wholly missing affidavits to prove up their

authenticity.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss Under the Texas

Citizens Participation Act (improperly stated as “Appellants’ motion to dismiss as to

defamation” in Appellants’ brief) because the Appellants failed to meet the burden of

proof for dismissal as ascribed by the Texas Citizens Participation Act and because

11 Appellants’ actions are not protected by the Texas Citizens Participation Act or Anti-

SLAPP laws in this case.

Likewise, the trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss as to

business disparagement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, tortious

interference with past and future contracts, and identity theft, as these torts were not

related to Appellants’ First Amendment right to free speech, but rather their unlawful

actions in impersonating and disparaging Appellee’s business, and Appellee, himself.

The trial court, by denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens

Participation Act, implicitly allows that the “tag-along torts” (as Appellants describe

them) are valid causes of action that merit adjudication.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Appellees agree with Appellants, in that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

dismiss under the TCPA is reviewed by this Court de novo, as is the court’s

determination on the statutory interpretation of the TCPA. Teachers Federal Credit

Union v. Esquivel, 621 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2021, no pet.). As in

Esquivel, the parties disagree about the applicability of the Act to this lawsuit, which

necessitates this review of the case.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Appellants foundationally cite the Texas Citizens Participation Act—codified in

TRCP § 27—as the governing authority on this matter in their brief. The purpose of

12 TRCP § 27 is “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to

petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the

maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person

to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury,” (TRCP § 27.002.) As the

Appellants’ original Motion specifically concerns itself with the perceived “retaliation”

of the Appellees against the Appellants (rather than the truth of this suit—the Appellees

seeking civil remedies against Appellants who have materially harmed them), this

chapter is specifically relevant to Appellants’ reason for contesting the decision of the

lower court. This brief will concern itself with the standards of review and burdens of

proof imposed by TRCP § 27, both on movants and non-movants.

ISSUE ONE:

a. The trial court did not improperly deny Appellants’ motion to dismiss as Appellants failed to meet the burden of proof required by § 27.005(b).

Per TRCP § 27.005 (b), the Appellants, as movants, were required to show the

trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim was "based on or is in

response to" their exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right

of association. The Appellants have failed to do this first and most basic step, rendering

any other subsequent argument or claim moot as a matter of law.

TRCP § 27.006 states:

PROOF. (a) In determining whether a legal action is subject to or should be dismissed under this chapter,

13 the court shall consider the pleadings, evidence a court could consider under Rule 166a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based. (b) On a motion by a party or on the court's own motion and on a showing of good cause, the court may allow specified and limited discovery relevant to the motion.

(Emphasis added)

The Appellants’ original Motion failed to provide any kind of proof demanded

by TRCP 27; they offered nothing but hearsay, unsubstantiated allegations, and

blatantly falsified records which are wholly missing affidavits to prove up their

authenticity. The standard of review for the Texas Citizens Participation Act was

described in Teachers Federal Credit Union v. Esquivel: “in deciding the applicability

of the Act and, if necessary, whether the nonmovant has met its burden of producing

clear and specific evidence of each essential element of its claim, a court is required to

look to the pleadings and all affidavits, both supportive and opposing, which state

the facts supporting the liability or defense at issue. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE

ANN. § 27.006(a),” Teachers Federal Credit Union v. Esquivel, 621 S.W.3d 786, 792

(Tex. App.–El Paso 2021, no pet.)(emphasis added).

In the Appellants’ original motion to dismiss, they offered into record:

- Exhibit 1: Clinical Summary from Central Texas Veterinary Specialty &

Emergency Hospital for animal “Kali.”

14 - Exhibit 2: Clinical Summary from Central Texas Veterinary Specialty &

Emergency Hospital for animal “Esmee.”

- Exhibit 3: Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition, including Affidavit of Evan

Zwerneman in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Claims.

Exhibits 1 and 2, crucially, are not proven up in any way. They offer no

supporting or corroborating affidavits, they do not provide context as to the original

creation of the documents and/or subsequent alterations or edits, and Exhibit 2 is

completely unrelated to the matter at hand, being a document related to an animal that

was not owned by the Appellants.

The Appellees’ original response in opposition to dismissal offered into record:

- Exhibit A: Affidavit of Factual Rebuttal by Evan Zwerneman.

The Appellants have not demonstrated, by any measure, that the Appellees filed

suit against them with the purpose of infringing upon their protected First Amendment

right to free speech. "The court first examines whether the defendant invoked the [Act]

by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff's claim `is based

on, relates to, or is in response to the [Defendant's] exercise of: (1) the right of free

speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.'" (Darnell v. Rogers, 588

S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (citing Dallas Morning News, Inc.

v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019)); Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680

15 (Tex. 2018); TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 27.005(b)).) (emphasis added).

The Appellants have failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the Appellees’

suit was based on or relating to their exercise of their First Amendment rights.

The lower court ruled against the Appellants’ motion for a reason: Zwerneman

and EZ Dog Stay and Play did not file suit against the Appellants because of Facebook

posts or Reddit comments, they filed suit because the Appellants stole their Google

Business listing and created a fraudulent website made with the purpose of misleading

the public. After suit was filed, Appellants removed from the fraudulent website the

incendiary phrase “KILLING YOUR DOG SO YOU DON’T HAVE TO,” but left the

rest of the website up in its native form, which falsely accused Zwerneman and his

business of a whole host of wrong-doings—the fraudulent website’s web URL was

“ezdogstaynplay.com” (with the actual website for EZ Dog Stay and Play being located

at “ezdogstayandplay.com”). In addition to creating the website, Hawkes also set up a

Google Business Profile for the clearly imitation “EZ Dog Stay and Play.” When

Zwerneman contacted Google regarding the fraudulent account, Google responded

saying the account was managed by “jo…@gmail.com.” A background search

confirmed that this corresponds to an email Hawkes uses, and Counsel for Hawkes

verified the removal of the Google Business listing and fraudulent website on

November 9, 2025—54 days after the original hearing on their motion and 27 days

after their motion was denied by the lower court. This further shows that both the

16 fraudulent website and the stolen Google Business listing were in the possession,

custody, and control of the Appellants.

It is demonstrably true that the Appellants owned and operated both the

fraudulent website and the Google Business listing that they stole from Zwerneman;

they later deleted the website and relinquished control of the business listing. Appellees

have made no mention of the removal of the incendiary Facebook and Reddit posts,

nor have they demanded a retraction of the interview given to KXAN. Appellees are

not and have not been concerned about silencing the Appellants, they are concerned

with the actual, material harm the Appellants’ interference with their business has

caused.

b. Even if Appellants had met their own burden of proof under TRCP § 27.005(b), Appellees have also met their burden of proof TRCP § 27.005(c) in showing clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for each essential element of their claims.

For the sake of argument, had the Appellants succeeded in meeting the burden

of proof ascribed by TRCP § 27.005(b), then the second step shifts the burden to the

Appellees to "establish[] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each

essential element of the claim in question." TRCP § 27.005(c).

A prima facie standard generally "requires only the minimum quantum of

evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true." In

re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g., Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v.

17 Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71, 80 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]

2013, pet. denied) (applying standard in Chapter 27 case and explaining that

Legislature's use of "prima facie case" implies imposition of minimal factual burden).

"Prima facie evidence is evidence that, until its effect is overcome by other evidence,

will suffice as proof of a fact in issue. In other words, a prima facie case is one that will

entitle a party to recover if no evidence to the contrary is offered by the opposite party."

See Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 725 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citation omitted); cf. Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666, 668

(Tex.2008) (per curiam) (explaining that summary-judgment movant's presentation of

prima facie evidence of deed's validity established his right to summary judgment

unless nonmovants presented evidence raising fact issue related to validity).

"Conclusory statements are not probative and accordingly will not suffice to establish

a prima facie case." Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs.,

Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 355 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citing In

re E.I. DuPont, 136 S.W.3d at 223-34); see also Lipsky II, 460 S.W.3d at 592

(explaining that "bare, baseless opinions" are not "a sufficient substitute for the clear

and specific evidence required to establish a prima facie case" under the Act) Serafine

v. Blunt, 466 SW 3d 352, 358 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 3rd Dist. 2015. Further, "a

plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim. In a

defamation case that implicates the TCPA, pleadings and evidence that establishes the

18 facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and

how they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient to resist a TCPA motion to dismiss,"

Lipsky II at 591. Appellees have offered proof in all live pleadings for the duration of

this case that Appellants took control of the online identities of EZ Dog Stay and Play,

that the theft of these online identities was done with the purpose of misleading and

defrauding the public, and that the theft was carried out with malicious intention.

The Appellees have shown clear and specific evidence of every claim asserted

by them, both in their original and first amended petitions, as well as in their response

in opposition to Appellants’ motion to dismiss. The evidence they offered was factual,

and proven up by affidavits.

The claims asserted by the Appellees are:

1. Libel and Libel per se;

2. Business Disparagement;

3. Fraud;

4. Intention Infliction of Emotional Distress;

5. Theft of Identity and Cyber Property;

6. Tortious Interference with Existing Contracts; and

7. Tortious Interference with Prospective Contracts.

The elements of libel, as defined by TRCP § 73.001 are:

19 A libel is a defamation expressed in written or other graphic form that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.

Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.

(emphasis added). To be classified as ‘defamation per se’, a statement’s defamatory nature must

be apparent on its face—without reference to outside facts or “innuendo.” KTRK

Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 SW 3d 682 – Tex: Court of Appeals 2013. See also

Moore v. Waldrop, 166 SW 3d 380 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 10th Dist. 2005. The libel

made the basis of this suit clearly fits the categorization of not only reckless publication,

but extends to libel and slander per se. Examples of statements that are defamatory per

se include those accusing someone of a crime or those that tend to injure a person in

his office, profession, or occupation. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 596. In this lawsuit,

Appellants’ impersonation of Appellees via their fraudulent and misleading website and

theft of his Google Business in no way served their rights to free publication or free

speech. Fraudulently impersonating to be the owner of Appellants’ business is illegal,

and does not serve the Appellees’ rights to association, free speech, or petition.

Appellants’ business disparagement claim is similar to their defamation claim.

However, the two torts differ in that a defamation claim serves to protect the personal

20 reputation of an injured party, while a business disparagement claim protects economic

interests. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex

2003); Innovative Block of South Texas, Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603

S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. 2020). The torts are not mutually exclusive in that a plaintiff

may have a claim for defamation, or for business disparagement, or both. In re Lipsky,

460 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015). To prevail on a business disparagement claim, a

plaintiff must establish the following elements: 1) the defendant published false and

disparaging information about it, 2) with malice, 3) without privilege, 4) that resulted

in special damages to the plaintiff. Id. A business disparagement defendant may be held

liable "only if he knew of the falsity or acted with reckless disregard concerning it, or

if he acted with ill will or intended to interfere in the economic interest of the plaintiff

in an unprivileged fashion." Forbes at 170 (citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749

S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). Appellees in this case 1.) published false and disparaging

information about Appellants’ business in stating “KILLING YOUR DOG SO YOU

DON’T HAVE TO” using a website created with the purpose of impersonating

Appellees’ business; 2.) Clearly, the Appellants were acting with malice toward

Appellees; 3.) Appellants have absolutely no privilege with Appellees’ business; and

4.) have caused economic damage to Appellees’ business. Remarks that adversely

reflect on a person's fitness to conduct his or her business or trade are also deemed

defamatory per se. And whether a statement qualifies as defamation per se is generally

21 a question of law. Lipsky, at 596, citing Hancock v. Variyam, 400 SW 3d 59 - Tex:

Supreme Court 2013. To qualify as defamation per se under this category the

disparaging words must affect the plaintiff in some manner that is peculiarly harmful

to the plaintiff's trade, business, or profession and not merely upon the plaintiff's

general characteristics. Id. The Appellants posing as Zwerneman with the purpose of

portraying him as unfit in his role as an animal caregiver clearly affects his business—

up to and including total strangers calling him, texting him, and sending letters to his

address that accuse him of murder and saying that he should be ashamed; screen shots

of several of these messages appear in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition. Pleading and

proof of particular damage is not required to prevail on a claim of defamation per se,

and thus actual damage is not an essential element of the claim to which the TCPA's

burden of clear and specific evidence might apply. Id. Though not required,

Zwerneman has a bevy of proof of his actual damages.

In regard to Appellees’ fraud claim; there are six elements required to prove a

fraud claim: (1) a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false;

(3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it

recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the

representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the other party; (5)

the party acted in reliance upon the representation; and (6) the party suffered damages.

Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex.

22 2011). Here, Appellees acted with a clear intent to commit fraud in pretending to be the

Appellants online. Appellees created a false website copying an active Texas limited

liability company recognized by the Texas Secretary of State. This was a large material

misrepresentation to the public, and certifiably false. Appellees know they are not the

Appellants, and they know they do not own EZ Play and Stay, LLC or its online

business profiles. This fraud was committed with the intention to defraud the public

into forming ill will and causing economic damage to the Appellants. Said fraud also

led to the Appellants suffering economic damages and business losses which have been

described in the pleadings of this matter, including, but not limited to the proven loss

of previously engaged clients and the cancellation of media appearances for the

Appellees, based solely on the fraudulent misrepresentations of the Appellants.

Appellants’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims is absolutely

proven up, both by the unambiguous and audacious actions of the Appellants, and by

the resulting harm and damages to the Appellees. The intentional infliction of emotional

distress is a tort applicable only when "a defendant intentionally inflicts severe

emotional distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory

of redress." Hoffmann--La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex.

2004). The elements of the tort are: 1.) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;

2.) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; 3.) the conduct caused the

plaintiff emotional distress; and 4.) the emotional distress was severe. Id. "Extreme

23 and outrageous" conduct means conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id at 445, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d

605, 611 (Tex. 1999). Here, the Appellants’ actions are so unusual and absurd that this

reaches far beyond Texas civil laws and into the Penal Code. Any other sane individual

with a grudge against a business would have left a bad Google review. Someone who

is even angrier may exercise their right to free speech by giving interviews to news

outlets—as the Appellees did in this case, and a matter that the Appellants concede is

protected speech. But to create a deliberately misleading website impersonating said

business and to outright steal that business’ online identity via their Google Business

listing in the pursuit of material harm against said business is such a preposterous and

malicious overreaction that it boggles the mind. All of Appellants’ actions were taken

with malice toward the Appellees and expressed publicly with the clear intent to cause

emotional and economic damages to Zwerneman.

Said actions bring us to the Appellants’ claims of theft of identity and cyber

property. There are four elements to a claim for theft: (1) Plaintiff owned, had

legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) Defendant

assumed and exercised dominion and control over the property in an unlawful and

unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with plaintiff’s rights; (3)

Plaintiff made a demand for the property; (4) Defendant refused to return the

24 property. Apple Imports, Inc. v. Koole, 945 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997,

writ denied); see also Whitaker v. Bank of El Paso, 850 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.--

El Paso 1993, no writ). Conversion of intangible property is limited to cases "where the

underlying intangible right has been merged into a document." Neles-Jamesbury, Inc.

v. Bill's Valves, 974 F. Supp. 979, 982, (S.D. Tex. 1997). The limitations period for a

claim of conversion is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a).

Zwerneman is the sole owner of his identity and the sole owner of EZ Stay and Play,

LLC. Appellants 1.) stole Appellees’ identity online by creating a fraudulent website in

Appellees’ name, and 2.) exercised control over Appellees’ identity and online profiles

with blatant disregard for Appellees’ rightful ownership. Zwerneman presented

Appellants with a cease and desist letter on these very topics, and Appellants confirmed

their receipt of the notice on June 3, 2025. Nevertheless, Appellants continued to

perpetuate their theft of Appellees’ identity and online business pages, up until

November 9, 2025, 159 days after Appellant Hawkes confirmed receipt of Appellees’

cease and desist letter.

The unlawful actions undertaken by the Appellees directly and materially led to

the tortious interference with existing contracts held by the Appellants. A party to a

contract has a cause of action against any third party for tortious interference of a

contract where that third party wrongly induces another contracting party to breach the

contract. Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 794–95 (Tex. 1995). The elements of

25 tortious interference with an existing contract are: 1.) an existing contract subject to

interference; 2.) a willful and intentional act of interference with the contract; 3.) that

proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and 4.) caused actual damages or

loss. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex.

2000); Cmty. Health Sys. Prof'l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 689 (Tex.

2017). Actionable interference with a contract includes any act which retards, makes

more difficult, or prevents performance. Moore v. Bushman, 559 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). To prevail on this claim, a plaintiff must

present evidence that the defendant interfered with a specific contract. Funes v.

Villatoro, 352 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet.

denied). Here, Appellees received cancellations of bookings (contracts) from existing

clients due to false information intentionally distributed by Appellants.

Moreover, these unlawful actions also constitute tortious interference with

prospective contracts. To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with prospective

business relations, the plaintiff must establish: (1) there was a reasonable probability

that the plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship with a third party; (2)

the defendant either acted with a conscious desire to prevent the relationship from

occurring or knew the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a

result of the conduct; (3) the defendant's conduct was independently tortious or

unlawful; (4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (5) the

26 plaintiff suffered actual damage or loss as a result. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apt.

Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 923 (Tex. 2013). A plaintiff does need to prove that the

contract would have certainly been made but-for the alleged interference, but there

must be evidence that it was reasonably probable that the prospective contract or

business relationship would have resulted but-for the alleged interference, considering

all of the facts and circumstances surrounding that transaction. Richardson-Eagle, Inc.

v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 475-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006, pet. denied). As it pertains to this matter, Appellees do have proof of canceled

contracts—a podcast appearance with media vendor American Operator was canceled

on October 29, 2025, and the cancellation email directly cited links and search results

on Google that could potentially distract from the story. This is unambiguous and clear

interference with potential contracts. In fact, on the fraudulent website created by

Appellants, they state: “I implore any current or potential client to seek dog care

elsewhere” demonstrating a clear intent to disrupt prospective contracts. Existing

customers and even random strangers contacted Appellees informing them that they

had heard of or seen the Appellants statements.

c. Appellants’ statements regarding animal cruelty are immaterial to this suit, as their unlawful actions are the basis for Appellees’ causes of action against them. Appellants’ fraudulent assumption of Appellees’ identities preclude a TCPA claim, per TRCP § 27.010(a)(12).

Even though they have already been proven false, the Appellants’ spurious

accusations and maliciously circulated negative opinions may have constituted

27 protected speech, had they confined these accusations and opinions to social media

sites and news interviews; this is not the case here. Instead, Appellants resorted to

identity and cyber theft to mislead and defraud the public. TRCP § 27.010(a)(12) states:

EXEMPTIONS. (a) This chapter does not apply to: (12) a legal action based on a common law fraud claim;

Appellees have plead and proven that (1) a material representation was made

(Appellees creating a fraudulent and misleading website with the intention of

impersonating Zwerneman’s business, and taking control of EZ Dog Stay and Play’s

Google Business listing); (2) the representation was false (Appellees knew that they

were not Zwerneman and did not have legal ownership of his business); (3) Appellees

knew the representation was false and made it recklessly without any knowledge of the

truth and as a positive assertion (there was no animal necropsy performed to verify their

allegations, and the criminal investigation into Zwerneman and his business found no

signs of animal abuse); (4) the representation was made with the intention that it be

acted upon by another party (Appellees stated on the fraudulent website: “I implore any

current or potential client to seek dog care elsewhere”); (5) other parties acted in

reliance upon the representation (Zwerneman had existing contracts terminated and

potential contracts canceled, explicitly because of the Appellants’ misrepresentations);

and (6) damages were suffered.

28 Not only is a TCPA dismissal inappropriate because the Appellants failed to

meet to burden of proof demanded by TRCP § 27, but because the statute explicitly

exempts legal actions based on fraud claims.

ISSUE TWO:

a. The trial court did not improperly deny Appellants’ motion to dismiss Appellees’ other tort claims arising out of the same actions by Appellants.

The standard of review for a TCPA dismissal is clear. The Appellants, as

movants, were required to show the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that

the claim was "based on or is in response to" their exercise of the right of free speech,

the right to petition, or the right of association. The evidence that the Court may review

includes “the pleadings, evidence a court could consider under Rule 166a, Texas Rules

of Civil Procedure, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which

the liability or defense is based.” TRCP § 27.006. Appellants have not offered into

record sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden imposed by TRCP § 27.006. Even if

they had met their burden, Appellees have offered into record “clear and specific

evidence” to establish “a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in

question." TRCP § 27.005(c). And, failing all else, Appellants TCPA claim is precluded

by the fact that Appellees legal action was based on a common law fraud claim. As

Appellants have failed to meet the burden demanded by the TCPA for dismissal,

Appellees claims, in their entirety, merit adjudication by the Court.

29 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For all of the above reasons, Appellants respectfully request that this Court affirm

the judgment of the trial court. Appellees request such other and further relief as to

which they may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

By:

L. JAMES WOOD Texas Bar No. 24076785 james@lineofdutylaw.com

THE JAMES WOOD LAW FIRM, PLLC 500 W. 2nd St, STE 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 P: 512.692.9266 F: 512.686.3152 W: lineofdutylaw.com CC: natalie@lineofdutylaw.com nicole@lineofdutylaw.com

E-File Service Address: eservice@lineofdutylaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document complies with the word count limitations of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(I) because it contains 5,485 words, excluding the parts exempted by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(I).

31 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellee Evan Zwerneman Individually And EZ Stay And Play, LLC has been served on all parties in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure this 5th day of January, 2026 as follows:

Via Texas E-filing to Randy@randyturner.com Law Offices of Randall E. Turner, PLLC ATTN: Randy Turner 2816 Hemphill Street Fort Worth, Texas 76110

and

Tiffany Crouch Bartlett 1000 Heritage Center Circle Round Rock, Texas 78664 Telephone: (512) 965-2449 Email: tiffany@crouchbartlettlaw.com Texas State Bar No. SBN 24042601

Susan Bleil 5012 Birch Hollow Lane Fort Worth, Texas 76132 Telephone: (817) 680-0228 Email: bleil@charter.net Texas State Bar No. 14056720

_________________________ L. James Wood

32 APPENDIX

1. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 27

2. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 73 CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE

TITLE 2. TRIAL, JUDGMENT, AND APPEAL

SUBTITLE B. TRIAL MATTERS

CHAPTER 27. ACTIONS INVOLVING THE EXERCISE OF CERTAIN

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Sec.A27.001.AADEFINITIONS.AAIn this chapter:

(1)AA"Communication" includes the making or submitting

of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral,

visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.

(2)AA"Exercise of the right of association" means to

join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend

common interests relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter

of public concern.

(3)AA"Exercise of the right of free speech" means a

communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.

(4)AA"Exercise of the right to petition" means any of

the following:

(A)AAa communication in or pertaining to:

(i)AAa judicial proceeding;

(ii)AAan official proceeding, other than a

judicial proceeding, to administer the law;

(iii)AAan executive or other proceeding

before a department of the state or federal government or a

subdivision of the state or federal government;

(iv)AAa legislative proceeding, including a

proceeding of a legislative committee;

(v)AAa proceeding before an entity that

requires by rule that public notice be given before proceedings of

that entity;

(vi)AAa proceeding in or before a managing

board of an educational or eleemosynary institution supported

directly or indirectly from public revenue;

(vii)AAa proceeding of the governing body of

any political subdivision of this state;

(viii)AAa report of or debate and statements

made in a proceeding described by Subparagraph (iii), (iv), (v),

1 (vi), or (vii); or

(ix)AAa public meeting dealing with a public

purpose, including statements and discussions at the meeting or

other matters of public concern occurring at the meeting;

(B)AAa communication in connection with an issue

under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,

judicial, or other governmental body or in another governmental or

official proceeding;

(C)AAa communication that is reasonably likely to

encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative,

executive, judicial, or other governmental body or in another

governmental or official proceeding;

(D)AAa communication reasonably likely to enlist

public participation in an effort to effect consideration of an

issue by a legislative, executive, judicial, or other governmental

body or in another governmental or official proceeding; and

(E)AAany other communication that falls within the

protection of the right to petition government under the

Constitution of the United States or the constitution of this

state.

(5)AA"Governmental proceeding" means a proceeding,

other than a judicial proceeding, by an officer, official, or body

of this state or a political subdivision of this state, including a

board or commission, or by an officer, official, or body of the

federal government.

(6)AA"Legal action" means a lawsuit, cause of action,

petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other

judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or

equitable relief.AAThe term does not include:

(A)AAa procedural action taken or motion made in

an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable,

or declaratory relief;

(B)AAalternative dispute resolution proceedings;

or

(C)AApost-judgment enforcement actions.

(7)AA"Matter of public concern" means a statement or

activity regarding:

2 (A)AAa public official, public figure, or other

person who has drawn substantial public attention due to the

person ’s official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity;

(B)AAa matter of political, social, or other

interest to the community; or

(C)AAa subject of concern to the public.

(8)AA"Official proceeding" means any type of

administrative, executive, legislative, or judicial proceeding

that may be conducted before a public servant.

(9)AA"Public servant" means a person elected, selected,

appointed, employed, or otherwise designated as one of the

following, even if the person has not yet qualified for office or

assumed the person ’s duties:

(A)AAan officer, employee, or agent of government;

(B)AAa juror;

(C)AAan arbitrator, referee, or other person who

is authorized by law or private written agreement to hear or

determine a cause or controversy;

(D)AAan attorney or notary public when

participating in the performance of a governmental function; or

(E)AAa person who is performing a governmental

function under a claim of right but is not legally qualified to do

so.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

eff. June 17, 2011.

Amended by:

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 1, eff.

September 1, 2019.

Sec.A27.002.AAPURPOSE.AAThe purpose of this chapter is to

encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to

petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise

participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law

and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file

meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

3 Sec.A27.003.AAMOTION TO DISMISS. (a)AAIf a legal action is

based on or is in response to a party ’s exercise of the right of free

speech, right to petition, or right of association or arises from

any act of that party in furtherance of the party ’s communication or

conduct described by Section 27.010(b), that party may file a

motion to dismiss the legal action.AAA party under this section

does not include a government entity, agency, or an official or

employee acting in an official capacity.

(b)AAA motion to dismiss a legal action under this section

must be filed not later than the 60th day after the date of service

of the legal action.AAThe parties, upon mutual agreement, may

extend the time to file a motion under this section or the court may

extend the time to file a motion under this section on a showing of

good cause.

(c)AAExcept as provided by Section 27.006(b), on the filing

of a motion under this section, all discovery in the legal action is

suspended until the court has ruled on the motion to dismiss.

(d)AAThe moving party shall provide written notice of the

date and time of the hearing under Section 27.004 not later than 21

days before the date of the hearing unless otherwise provided by

agreement of the parties or an order of the court.

(e)AAA party responding to the motion to dismiss shall file

the response, if any, not later than seven days before the date of

the hearing on the motion to dismiss unless otherwise provided by an

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 2, eff.

Sec.A27.004.AAHEARING. (a)AAA hearing on a motion under

Section 27.003 must be set not later than the 60th day after the

date of service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the

court require a later hearing, upon a showing of good cause, or by

agreement of the parties, but in no event shall the hearing occur

4 more than 90 days after service of the motion under Section 27.003,

except as provided by Subsection (c).

(b)AAIn the event that the court cannot hold a hearing in the

time required by Subsection (a), the court may take judicial notice

that the court ’s docket conditions required a hearing at a later

date, but in no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days

after service of the motion under Section 27.003, except as

provided by Subsection (c).

(c)AAIf the court allows discovery under Section 27.006(b),

the court may extend the hearing date to allow discovery under that

subsection, but in no event shall the hearing occur more than 120

days after the service of the motion under Section 27.003.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1042 (H.B. 2935), Sec. 1, eff.

June 14, 2013.

Sec.A27.005.AARULING. (a)AAThe court must rule on a motion

under Section 27.003 not later than the 30th day following the date

the hearing on the motion concludes.

(b)AAExcept as provided by Subsection (c), on the motion of a

party under Section 27.003, a court shall dismiss a legal action

against the moving party if the moving party demonstrates that the

legal action is based on or is in response to:

(1)AAthe party ’s exercise of:

(A)AAthe right of free speech;

(B)AAthe right to petition; or

(C)AAthe right of association; or

(2)AAthe act of a party described by Section 27.010(b).

(c)AAThe court may not dismiss a legal action under this

section if the party bringing the legal action establishes by clear

and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element

of the claim in question.

(d)AANotwithstanding the provisions of Subsection (c), the

court shall dismiss a legal action against the moving party if the

moving party establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on

5 which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1042 (H.B. 2935), Sec. 2, eff.

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 3, eff.

Sec.A27.006.AAPROOF. (a) In determining whether a legal

action is subject to or should be dismissed under this chapter, the

court shall consider the pleadings, evidence a court could consider

under Rule 166a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and supporting and

opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or

defense is based.

(b)AAOn a motion by a party or on the court ’s own motion and

on a showing of good cause, the court may allow specified and

limited discovery relevant to the motion.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 4, eff.

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 5, eff.

Sec.A27.007.AAADDITIONAL FINDINGS. (a)AAIf the court awards

sanctions under Section 27.009(b), the court shall issue findings

regarding whether the legal action was brought to deter or prevent

the moving party from exercising constitutional rights and is

brought for an improper purpose, including to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or to increase the cost of litigation.

(b)AAThe court must issue findings under Subsection (a) not

later than the 30th day after the date a request under that

subsection is made.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

6 Amended by:

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 6, eff.

Sec.A27.0075.AAEFFECT OF RULING.AANeither the court ’s ruling

on the motion nor the fact that it made such a ruling shall be

admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden

of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected

by the ruling.

Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 7,

eff. September 1, 2019.

Sec.A27.008.AAAPPEAL. (a)AAIf a court does not rule on a

motion to dismiss under Section 27.003 in the time prescribed by

Section 27.005, the motion is considered to have been denied by

operation of law and the moving party may appeal.

(b)AAAn appellate court shall expedite an appeal or other

writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order on a

motion to dismiss a legal action under Section 27.003 or from a

trial court ’s failure to rule on that motion in the time prescribed

by Section 27.005.

(c)AARepealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1042, Sec.

5, eff. June 14, 2013.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1042 (H.B. 2935), Sec. 5, eff.

Sec.A27.009.AADAMAGES AND COSTS. (a)AAExcept as provided by

Subsection (c), if the court orders dismissal of a legal action

under this chapter, the court:

(1)AAshall award to the moving party court costs and

reasonable attorney ’s fees incurred in defending against the legal

action; and

(2)AAmay award to the moving party sanctions against

the party who brought the legal action as the court determines

7 sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from

bringing similar actions described in this chapter.

(b)AAIf the court finds that a motion to dismiss filed under

this chapter is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court may

award court costs and reasonable attorney ’s fees to the responding

party.

(c)AAIf the court orders dismissal of a compulsory

counterclaim under this chapter, the court may award to the moving

party reasonable attorney ’s fees incurred in defending against the

counterclaim if the court finds that the counterclaim is frivolous

or solely intended for delay.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 8, eff.

Sec.A27.010.AAEXEMPTIONS. (a)AAThis chapter does not apply

to:

(1)AAan enforcement action that is brought in the name

of this state or a political subdivision of this state by the

attorney general, a district attorney, a criminal district

attorney, or a county attorney;

(2)AAa legal action brought against a person primarily

engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, if

the statement or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods,

services, or an insurance product, insurance services, or a

commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual

or potential buyer or customer;

(3)AAa legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury,

wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that

legal action;

(4)AAa legal action brought under the Insurance Code or

arising out of an insurance contract;

(5)AAa legal action arising from an officer-director,

employee-employer, or independent contractor relationship that:

(A)AAseeks recovery for misappropriation of trade

8 secrets or corporate opportunities; or

(B)AAseeks to enforce a non-disparagement

agreement or a covenant not to compete;

(6)AAa legal action filed under Title 1, 2, 4, or 5,

Family Code, or an application for a protective order under

Subchapter A, Chapter 7B, Code of Criminal Procedure;

(7)AAa legal action brought under Chapter 17, Business

& Commerce Code, other than an action governed by Section 17.49(a)

of that chapter;

(8)AAa legal action in which a moving party raises a

defense pursuant to Section 160.010, Occupations Code, Section

161.033, Health and Safety Code, or the Health Care Quality

Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq.);

(9)AAan eviction suit brought under Chapter 24,

Property Code;

(10)AAa disciplinary action or disciplinary proceeding

brought under Chapter 81, Government Code, or the Texas Rules of

Disciplinary Procedure;

(11)AAa legal action brought under Chapter 554,

Government Code;

(12)AAa legal action based on a common law fraud claim;

(13)AAa legal malpractice claim brought by a client or

former client.

(b)AANotwithstanding Subsections (a)(2), (7), and (12), this

chapter applies to:

(1)AAa legal action against a person arising from any

act of that person, whether public or private, related to the

gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of information for

communication to the public, whether or not the information is

actually communicated to the public, for the creation,

dissemination, exhibition, or advertisement or other similar

promotion of a dramatic, literary, musical, political,

journalistic, or otherwise artistic work, including audio-visual

work regardless of the means of distribution, a motion picture, a

television or radio program, or an article published in a

newspaper, website, magazine, or other platform, no matter the

9 method or extent of distribution; and

(2)AAa legal action against a person related to the

communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of

consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer

complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses.

(c)AAThis chapter applies to a legal action against a victim

or alleged victim of family violence or dating violence as defined

in Chapter 71, Family Code, or an offense under Chapter 20, 20A, 21,

or 22, Penal Code, based on or in response to a public or private

communication.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1042 (H.B. 2935), Sec. 3, eff.

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), Sec. 9, eff.

Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 915 (H.B. 3607), Sec. 3.001,

eff. September 1, 2021.

Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 804 (H.B. 527), Sec. 1, eff.

September 1, 2023.

Sec.A27.011.AACONSTRUCTION. (a)AAThis chapter does not

abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or

privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case,

or common law or rule provisions.

(b)AAThis chapter shall be construed liberally to effectuate

its purpose and intent fully.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), Sec. 2,

10 CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE

TITLE 4. LIABILITY IN TORT

CHAPTER 73. LIBEL

SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec.A73.001.AAELEMENTS OF LIBEL. A libel is a defamation

expressed in written or other graphic form that tends to blacken the

memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living person ’s

reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt

or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person ’s

honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural

defects of anyone and thereby expose the person to public hatred,

ridicule, or financial injury.

Sec.A73.002.AAPRIVILEGED MATTERS. (a) The publication by a

newspaper or other periodical of a matter covered by this section is

privileged and is not a ground for a libel action. This privilege

does not extend to the republication of a matter if it is proved

that the matter was republished with actual malice after it had

ceased to be of public concern.

(b)AAThis section applies to:

(1)AAa fair, true, and impartial account of:

(A)AAa judicial proceeding, unless the court has

prohibited publication of a matter because in its judgment the

interests of justice demand that the matter not be published;

(B)AAan official proceeding, other than a judicial

proceeding, to administer the law;

(C)AAan executive or legislative proceeding

(including a proceeding of a legislative committee), a proceeding

in or before a managing board of an educational or eleemosynary

institution supported from the public revenue, of the governing

body of a city or town, of a county commissioners court, and of a

public school board or a report of or debate and statements made in

any of those proceedings; or

(D)AAthe proceedings of a public meeting dealing

1 with a public purpose, including statements and discussion at the

meeting or other matters of public concern occurring at the

meeting; and

(2)AAreasonable and fair comment on or criticism of an

official act of a public official or other matter of public concern

published for general information.

Sec.A73.003.AAMITIGATING FACTORS. (a) To determine the

extent and source of actual damages and to mitigate exemplary

damages, the defendant in a libel action may give evidence of the

following matters if they have been specially pleaded:

(1)AAall material facts and circumstances surrounding

the claim for damages and defenses to the claim;

(2)AAall facts and circumstances under which the

libelous publication was made; and

(3)AAany public apology, correction, or retraction of

the libelous matter made and published by the defendant.

(b)AATo mitigate exemplary damages, the defendant in a libel

action may give evidence of the intention with which the libelous

publication was made if the matter has been specially pleaded.

Sec.A73.004.AALIABILITY OF BROADCASTER. (a) A broadcaster

is not liable in damages for a defamatory statement published or

uttered in or as a part of a radio or television broadcast by one

other than the broadcaster unless the complaining party proves that

the broadcaster failed to exercise due care to prevent the

publication or utterance of the statement in the broadcast.

(b)AAIn this section, "broadcaster" means an owner,

licensee, or operator of a radio or television station or network of

stations and the agents and employees of the owner, licensee, or

operator.

Sec.A73.005.AATRUTH A DEFENSE. (a)AAThe truth of the

statement in the publication on which an action for libel is based

2 is a defense to the action.

(b)AAIn an action brought against a newspaper or other

periodical or broadcaster, the defense described by Subsection (a)

applies to an accurate reporting of allegations made by a third

party regarding a matter of public concern.

(c)AAThis section does not abrogate or lessen any other

remedy, right, cause of action, defense, immunity, or privilege

available under the Constitution of the United States or this state

or as provided by any statute, case, or common law or rule.

Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 191 (S.B. 627), Sec. 1, eff.

May 28, 2015.

Sec.A73.006.AAOTHER DEFENSES. This chapter does not affect

the existence of common law, statutory law, or other defenses to

libel.

SUBCHAPTER B. CORRECTION, CLARIFICATION, OR RETRACTION BY

PUBLISHER

Sec.A73.051.AASHORT TITLE.AAThis subchapter may be cited as

the Defamation Mitigation Act.AAThis subchapter shall be liberally

construed.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

eff. June 14, 2013.

Sec.A73.052.AAPURPOSE.AAThe purpose of this subchapter is to

provide a method for a person who has been defamed by a publication

or broadcast to mitigate any perceived damage or injury.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.053.AADEFINITION.AAIn this subchapter, "person"

means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,

partnership, association, joint venture, or other legal or

3 commercial entity.AAThe term does not include a government or

governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.054.AAAPPLICABILITY. (a)AAThis subchapter applies

to a claim for relief, however characterized, from damages arising

out of harm to personal reputation caused by the false content of a

publication.

(b)AAThis subchapter applies to all publications, including

writings, broadcasts, oral communications, electronic

transmissions, or other forms of transmitting information.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.055.AAREQUEST FOR CORRECTION, CLARIFICATION, OR

RETRACTION. (a)AAA person may maintain an action for defamation

only if:

(1)AAthe person has made a timely and sufficient

request for a correction, clarification, or retraction from the

defendant; or

(2)AAthe defendant has made a correction,

clarification, or retraction.

(b)AAA request for a correction, clarification, or

retraction is timely if made during the period of limitation for

commencement of an action for defamation.

(c)AAIf not later than the 90th day after receiving knowledge

of the publication, the person does not request a correction,

clarification, or retraction, the person may not recover exemplary

damages.

(d)AAA request for a correction, clarification, or

retraction is sufficient if it:

(1)AAis served on the publisher;

(2)AAis made in writing, reasonably identifies the

person making the request, and is signed by the individual claiming

to have been defamed or by the person ’s authorized attorney or

agent;

4 (3)AAstates with particularity the statement alleged to

be false and defamatory and, to the extent known, the time and place

of publication;

(4)AAalleges the defamatory meaning of the statement;

(5)AAspecifies the circumstances causing a defamatory

meaning of the statement if it arises from something other than the

express language of the publication.

(e)AAA period of limitation for commencement of an action

under this section is tolled during the period allowed by Sections

73.056 and 73.057.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.056.AADISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE OF FALSITY. (a)AAA

person who has been requested to make a correction, clarification,

or retraction may ask the person making the request to provide

reasonably available information regarding the falsity of the

allegedly defamatory statement not later than the 30th day after

the date the person receives the request.AAAny information

requested under this section must be provided by the person seeking

the correction, clarification, or retraction not later than the

30th day after the date the person receives the request.

(b)AAIf a correction, clarification, or retraction is not

made, a person who, without good cause, fails to disclose the

information requested under Subsection (a) may not recover

exemplary damages, unless the publication was made with actual

malice.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.057.AATIMELY AND SUFFICIENT CORRECTION,

CLARIFICATION, OR RETRACTION. (a)AAA correction, clarification,

or retraction is timely if it is made not later than the 30th day

after receipt of:

(1)AAthe request for the correction, clarification, or

retraction; or

5 (2)AAthe information requested under Section

73.056(a).

(b)AAA correction, clarification, or retraction is

sufficient if it is published in the same manner and medium as the

original publication or, if that is not possible, with a prominence

and in a manner and medium reasonably likely to reach substantially

the same audience as the publication complained of and:

(1)AAis publication of an acknowledgment that the

statement specified as false and defamatory is erroneous;

(2)AAis an allegation that the defamatory meaning

arises from other than the express language of the publication and

the publisher disclaims an intent to communicate that meaning or to

assert its truth;

(3)AAis a statement attributed to another person whom

the publisher identifies and the publisher disclaims an intent to

assert the truth of the statement; or

(4)AAis publication of the requestor ’s statement of the

facts, as set forth in a request for correction, clarification, or

retraction, or a fair summary of the statement, exclusive of any

portion that is defamatory of another, obscene, or otherwise

improper for publication.

(c)AAIf a request for correction, clarification, or

retraction has specified two or more statements as false and

defamatory, the correction, clarification, or retraction may deal

with the statements individually in any manner provided by

Subsection (b).

(d)AAExcept as provided by Subsection (e), a correction,

clarification, or retraction is published with a prominence and in

a manner and medium reasonably likely to reach substantially the

same audience as the publication complained of if:

(1)AAit is published in a later issue, edition, or

broadcast of the original publication;

(2)AApublication is in the next practicable issue,

edition, or broadcast of the original publication because the

publication will not be published within the time limits

established for a timely correction, clarification, or retraction;

6 (3)AAthe original publication no longer exists and if

the correction, clarification, or retraction is published in the

newspaper with the largest general circulation in the region in

which the original publication was distributed.

(e)AAIf the original publication was on the Internet, a

correction, clarification, or retraction is published with a

prominence and in a manner and medium reasonably likely to reach

substantially the same audience as the publication complained of if

the publisher appends to the original publication the correction,

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.058.AACHALLENGES TO CORRECTION, CLARIFICATION, OR

RETRACTION OR TO REQUEST FOR CORRECTION, CLARIFICATION, OR

RETRACTION. (a)AAIf a defendant in an action under this subchapter

intends to rely on a timely and sufficient correction,

clarification, or retraction, the defendant ’s intention to do so,

and the correction, clarification, or retraction relied on, must be

stated in a notice served on the plaintiff on the later of:

(1)AAthe 60th day after service of the citation; or

(2)AAthe 10th day after the date the correction,

clarification, or retraction is made.

(b)AAA correction, clarification, or retraction is timely

and sufficient unless the plaintiff challenges the timeliness or

sufficiency not later than the 20th day after the date notice under

Subsection (a) is served.AAIf a plaintiff challenges the timeliness

or sufficiency, the plaintiff must state the challenge in a motion

to declare the correction, clarification, or retraction untimely or

insufficient served not later than the 30th day after the date

notice under Subsection (a) is served on the plaintiff or the 30th

day after the date the correction, clarification, or retraction is

made, whichever is later.

(c)AAIf a defendant intends to challenge the sufficiency or

timeliness of a request for a correction, clarification, or

retraction, the defendant must state the challenge in a motion to

declare the request insufficient or untimely served not later than

7 the 60th day after the date of service of the citation.

(d)AAUnless there is a reasonable dispute regarding the

actual contents of the request for correction, clarification, or

retraction, the sufficiency and timeliness of a request for

correction, clarification, or retraction is a question of law.AAAt

the earliest appropriate time before trial, the court shall rule,

as a matter of law, whether the request for correction,

clarification, or retraction meets the requirements of this

subchapter.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.059.AAEFFECT OF CORRECTION, CLARIFICATION, OR

RETRACTION.AAIf a correction, clarification, or retraction is made

in accordance with this subchapter, regardless of whether the

person claiming harm made a request, a person may not recover

exemplary damages unless the publication was made with actual

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.060.AASCOPE OF PROTECTION.AAA timely and sufficient

correction, clarification, or retraction made by a person

responsible for a publication constitutes a correction,

clarification, or retraction made by all persons responsible for

that publication but does not extend to an entity that republished

the information.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.061.AAADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF CORRECTION,

CLARIFICATION, OR RETRACTION. (a)AAA request for a correction,

clarification, or retraction, the contents of the request, and the

acceptance or refusal of the request are not admissible evidence at

a trial.

(b)AAThe fact that a correction, clarification, or

retraction was made and the contents of the correction,

8 clarification, or retraction are not admissible in evidence at

trial except in mitigation of damages under Section

73.003(a)(3).AAIf a correction, clarification, or retraction is

received into evidence, the request for the correction,

clarification, or retraction may also be received into evidence.

(c)AAThe fact that an offer of a correction, clarification,

or retraction was made and the contents of the offer, and the fact

that the correction, clarification, or retraction was refused, are

not admissible in evidence at trial.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

Sec.A73.062.AAABATEMENT. (a)AAA person against whom a suit

is pending who does not receive a written request for a correction,

clarification, or retraction, as required by Section 73.055, may

file a plea in abatement not later than the 30th day after the date

the person files an original answer in the court in which the suit

is pending.

(b)AAA suit is automatically abated, in its entirety, without

the order of the court, beginning on the 11th day after the date a

plea in abatement is filed under Subsection (a) if the plea in

abatement:

(1)AAis verified and alleges that the person against

whom the suit is pending did not receive the written request as

required by Section 73.055; and

(2)AAis not controverted in an affidavit filed by the

person bringing the claim before the 11th day after the date on

which the plea in abatement is filed.

(c)AAAn abatement under Subsection (b) continues until the

60th day after the date that the written request is served or a

later date agreed to by the parties.AAIf a controverting affidavit

is filed under Subsection (b)(2), a hearing on the plea in abatement

will take place as soon as practical considering the court ’s

docket.

(d)AAAll statutory and judicial deadlines under the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure relating to a suit abated under Subsection

(b), other than those provided in this section, will be stayed

9 during the pendency of the abatement period under this section.

Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 950 (H.B. 1759), Sec. 2,

10 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Natalie Jordan on behalf of Lewis Wood Bar No. 24076785 natalie@lineofdutylaw.com Envelope ID: 109677655 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief of Appellee Even Zwerneman, Individually and EZ Stay and Play, LLC Status as of 1/5/2026 8:28 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Susan Bleil bleil@charter.net 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Tiffany CrouchBartlett tiffany@crouchbartlettlaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Tiffany CrouchBartlett tiffany@crouchbartlettlaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Randall E.Turner Randy@randyturner.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Randall E.Turner Randy@randyturner.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

James Wood contact@lineofdutylaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Nicole Regan nicole@lineofdutylaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Natalie Jordan natalie@lineofdutylaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Denise Cavazos denise@lineofdutylaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT

Lewis JamesWood james@lineofdutylaw.com 1/5/2026 5:32:08 PM SENT