Jordan, Leonard v. Smith, Jeffrey

District Court, W.D. Wisconsin·Decided April 4, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-00361·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LEONARD JORDAN,

Plaintiff, OPINION and ORDER v.

23-cv-61-jdp JEFFREY SMITH,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Leonard Jordan is suing defendant Jeffrey Smith under the Eighth Amendment for prolonged exposure to cold temperatures in December 2022 while working outside. Trial is scheduled for May 5. This order addresses the motions in limine, ruling on most of them and identifying issues that require further discussion during the final pretrial conference. ANALYSIS A. Jordan’s motions in limine 1. Evidence of criminal history The parties agree that Jordan has been convicted of two felonies that qualify for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. Jordan moves to limit evidence of his prior convictions to testimony that he has been convicted of two felonies, without any other details. The court will grant this motion. Jordan’s request is consistent with this court’s practice of excluding the details of a prisoner’s prior convictions in civil rights cases: The point of Rule 609 is to allow, but limit, attacks on a witness’s character for truthfulness. In a prisoner civil rights case, the jury will know that the plaintiff is serving a criminal sentence. The nature of the crime of conviction, or the sentence received, doesn't say anything more about a witness’s character for truthfulness— unless it is a crime of dishonesty, which is separately addressed in Rule 609(a)(2). But adding the details of a non-dishonesty conviction, including the name of the crime and the sentence received, impugns the general character of the witness, making him seem dangerous, unlawful, or unsavory in the eyes of the jury. Wynn v. Adams, No. 23-cv-364-jdp, 2024 WL 4589485, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2024). Smith does not identify any reason for providing additional details, so the court will allow defense counsel to ask Jordan whether he has been convicted of felonies and how many times. No other details are allowed. Jordan asks that the same rule be applied to “any other witness’s criminal convictions,” but he does not identify other witnesses or convictions. In his response brief, Smith says that he wants to put in evidence of prior convictions for three other witnesses: Dayna Mason, David Tattum, and Stephen Alexander. The same rule will apply to those witnesses as well. If Jordan believes that evidence about those witnesses should be further limited or excluded, he may raise that issue during the final pretrial conference. 2. References to taxes Jordan moves to preclude Smith from referring to the jury as taxpayers or implying that an award would be funded by taxpayer dollars. The court will grant this motion as unopposed. 3. Clothing and restraints during trial

Jordan moves for permission to wear street clothes during the trial and to appear with non-visible restraints, such as a stun belt. The court will grant this motion as unopposed. It is Jordan’s responsibility to make the necessary arrangements for clothing. Counsel must bring the clothing to the courthouse for inspection by the U.S. Marshals at least one business day before the trial. If either party has remaining concerns about the use of restraints during the trial, those should be raised during the final pretrial conference. 4. Judicial notice of the weather Jordan asks the court to take judicial notice that the temperature in Black River Falls on the morning of December 19, 2022, was one degree Fahrenheit with winds of seven miles

per hour. The court will grant this motion as unopposed. The parties may discuss during the final pretrial conference how they wish to present this information to the jury, such as through a stipulation or a jury instruction. 5. Evidence about DOC’s cold weather policy The parties agree that DOC has a policy regarding outside work in cold weather. Dft.’s Ex. 507. Jordan seeks two rulings about evidence related to that policy. First, he says that details of the policy should be excluded because they aren’t relevant. Second, Jordan says that he should be allowed to “impeach[]” Smith by putting in evidence that “contradict[s]”

Smith’s testimony about the policy. Dkt. 48, at 5. Smith opposes the motion. He says that he should be allowed to introduce the policy itself and to testify that he complied with the policy because such testimony “is relevant to Smith’s subjective knowledge as to whether Jordan was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Dkt. 61, at 3. The parties agree that Jordan’s claim under the Eighth Amendment does not turn on whether Smith complied with DOC policy. In the Fourth Amendment context, the court of appeals has gone even further, holding that “the violation of police regulations or even a state

law is completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been established.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). In the Eighth Amendment context, the rule is more nuanced because policies may be relevant to show intent. For example, in Mays v. Springborn, the court stated that a “violation of the prison’s rule against public searches was not, by itself, a violation of the constitution,” but “it was relevant evidence on which the jury could have relied to conclude that the searches were done with an intent to harass.” 575 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2009). Similarly, in Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc., the court concluded that violations of internal

policies can be “relevant circumstantial evidence to show [the defendant’s] knowledge and state of mind.” 368 F.3d 917, 930 (7th Cir. 2004). These cases suggest that the relevance of evidence about the cold-weather policy is contingent on what Smith knew about it. If Smith did know about the policy, then evidence that he either complied with it or violated it could be evidence that he acted in good faith or that he disregarded a risk of harm. But if he did not know about the policy, it is irrelevant. Smith’s deposition testimony is equivocal about what he knew. Jordan cites the following passage from cross-examination by Jordan’s counsel:

Q.: And then is it accurate too—like we’ve talked about this that— you know, I think you would agree, that you weren’t totally familiar with the policy in terms of temperature thresholds and amount of times for warming breaks, correct? A.: I was unaware of that at the time, yes. Dkt. 18, at 51:15–21. The question and answer are both ambiguous because the question asks whether Smith was “totally familiar” with certain parts of the policy without explaining what that means, and Smith responds that he was unaware of “that,” without specifying what “that” is. For his part, Smith cites the testimony of Robert Mann, who was the buildings and grounds superintendent at the prison. Dkt. 21. Specifically, Mann testified about an email that he wrote to an inmate complaint examiner in response to a grievance Jordan filed. Mann wrote in his email that Smith “was aware of the policy,” but he “did not know the exact working time limits.” Id. at 23:10–13. Mann’s testimony is not helpful because he does not identify the foundation for his testimony. If it is based on a conversation with Smith, then any testimony from Mann is hearsay. So at this point, the relevance of evidence about the cold-weather policy is unclear, and

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