Jordan Isaiah Webber v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 10-25-00362-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00360-CR 10-25-00361-CR 10-25-00362-CR

Jordan Isiah Webber, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On appeal from the 361st District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge David G. Hilburn, presiding Trial Court Cause Nos. 23-04843-CRF, 22-02685-CRM, 23-03801-CRM

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Jordan Isiah Webber, was sentenced in these proceedings on

June 4, 2025. The Certification of the Defendant’s Right of Appeal, signed by

the appellant, his trial counsel, and the trial court on June 5, 2025, indicate that Webber has the right to appeal. 1 Webber’s trial counsel filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel for purposes of appeal, which was granted by the trial

court. The trial court conducted a ”Status of Appeal” hearing on June 20, 2025,

at which time Webber was found to be indigent, and appellate counsel was

appointed on June 24, 2025. Neither Webber’s trial counsel nor his appellate

counsel filed a written notice of appeal or other post-trial motion within 30

days of the imposition of Webber’s sentence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a).

Webber’s appellate counsel filed a document entitled “Motion to

Construe Notice of Appeal” with this Court on October 16, 2025, listing the

three cause numbers in the same document. In the motion, Webber asks that

the assertions in the motion to withdraw by trial counsel, the certification of

the defendant’s right of appeal, and the appointment of counsel for purposes of

appeal should be adequate to constitute an informal notice of appeal sufficient

to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.

A defendant perfects an appeal by filing a written notice of appeal

showing his desire to appeal with the trial court clerk within thirty days after

the date sentence was imposed or within ninety days after sentencing if the

defendant timely filed a motion for a new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(b), (c),

1 Webber’s motion lists three separate cause numbers, and three separate judgments of conviction were entered. Because of the unique posture of this proceeding, and in order to be able to proceed to a disposition, we filed the motion as three separate notices of appeal, one for each cause number. Any reference to a singular motion is intended to refer to each cause number.

Webber v. State Page 2 26.2(a), (b). Appellate counsel for Webber acknowledges that a separate

written notice of appeal was not filed; however, the motion alleges that a formal

notice was not necessary and that we should construe the various filings as

sufficient to constitute a notice of appeal. We decline to adopt Webber’s theory.

Nothing in the various written documents before this Court indicate that

Webber intended to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction through those

documents.

In his motion, Webber cites to Harkom v. State, 484 S.W.3d 432 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

We do not require "magic words" or a separate instrument to constitute notice of appeal. All that is required is that the notice be in writing, be submitted within thirty days or ninety days after sentencing, as appropriate, and show the party's desire to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order.

Harkom v. State, 484 S.W.3d 432, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In Harkom,

however, the defendant had written the word “APPEAL” on the top of a motion

requesting the appointment of counsel, which was construed to be written

evidence of the defendant’s desire to appeal in the only way that defendant had

available to her. See id.

There is no comparative evidence of Webber’s written desire to appeal in

this proceeding. The motion to withdraw filed by trial counsel does not state

that Webber wishes to appeal, merely that he sought withdrawal “because of

Webber v. State Page 3 the appeal status of his case” and that Webber would like to obtain new counsel

“for the appeal process.” The order appointing counsel is conditionally worded

as well, appointing counsel for “appeal, if any, …”

We deny Webber’s “Motion to Construe Notice of Appeal,” file the motion

as a notice of appeal, and dismiss each appeal for want of jurisdiction because

they were not timely filed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1).

STEVE SMITH Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 23, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Appeals dismissed Do not publish CRPM

Webber v. State Page 4