Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 26, 2023
In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-01134-CR
JORDAN CHRISTOPHER JACOBS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-84157-2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy Opinion by Justice Carlyle A jury found appellant Jordan Christopher Jacobs guilty of capital murder and
the court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In
three issues, he challenges (1) the legal sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the trial
court’s removal of an equivocating juror, and (3) the trial court’s refusal to charge
the jury concerning the lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery or robbery.
We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
On the evening of July 7, 2021, Jacobs and his then girlfriend visited a local
Mini-Mart and saw Steven Christopher Gambles, II standing next to a white
Mercedes. After they got home, Jacobs told his girlfriend he was going to rob Mr. Gambles. Jacobs’s girlfriend then texted a friend that Jacobs “is out of control,” that
he was “trying to hit a lick on some boy over here in the Mercedes,” and that she
told him “stop trying to rob people.”
Jacobs testified that when he got back to the store, he entered Gambles’
unlocked Mercedes, found a gun, and put it in his jacket without checking to see if
it was loaded. He later admitted he knew the gun was loaded. Jacobs ultimately
approached Gambles, pointed the gun at him, and demanded money; according to
Jacobs, Gambles then “jumped” at him and the gun discharged. The State’s forensic
pathologist testified she performed an autopsy and concluded Gambles died from a
single gunshot wound to the head.
After the trial court empaneled the jury, a juror came forward and
acknowledged he “was uncomfortable with having someone’s life judgment in [his]
hands” and “pretty much just didn’t want to have anything to do with that” based on
his beliefs. When the judge directly asked him if he could listen to the evidence and
render a decision based on her instructions, the juror said that he could do so. Upon
further questioning from the State, however, he acknowledged that his discomfort
would “most likely” prevent him from deliberating. In response to questioning from
defense counsel, he then said he could listen to the evidence and vote his conscience.
After the trial court sought even further clarification, the juror said that he could not
set aside his feelings, regardless of what the State proved. The trial court concluded
the juror was “disqualified as disabled” and dismissed him.
–2– A jury found Jacobs guilty of capital murder and the trial court sentenced him
to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Jacobs timely appealed.
The evidence sufficiently supports the conviction.
In his first issue, Jacobs argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction. We review evidentiary sufficiency under the familiar
Jackson v. Virginia standard. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894, 901–02
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Murphy v. State, 05-19-00886-CR, 2020 WL 7396009, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). We review all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Temple v. State, 390
S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
Here, the crux of Jacobs’s sufficiency challenge is that no rational juror could
have concluded he intentionally caused decedent’s death with a firearm while he was
committing or attempting to commit a robbery. We disagree. The jury heard that he
intended to rob someone in a Mercedes, that he stole a gun from a white Mercedes,
and that the decedent was driving the same white Mercedes from which Jacobs stole
the gun. Jacobs also admitted that he wanted the decedent’s money, that he “had
worked up enough courage to go ahead and try to get the money from him,” that he
“pointed the gun in the window,” that he knew the gun was loaded, and that he told
the decedent to “give it up.” Under the circumstances, a rational juror could have
–3– concluded that “it” was the decedent’s money and that Jacobs therefore admitted to
performing a robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02.
Furthermore, “specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon, unless in the manner of its use it is reasonably apparent that death or serious
bodily injury could not result.” Giles v. State, 05-18-00865-CR, 2019 WL 6486257,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 3, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 580–81 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (citations omitted)). Here, Jacobs used a deadly weapon in a deadly manner,
admitted he was familiar with firearms, admitted he pointed a gun at the decedent,
and admitted he knew the gun was loaded; therefore, the jury could have rationally
concluded he intended to kill. See id. (When “a deadly weapon is used in [a] deadly
manner, the inference is almost conclusive that [the perpetrator] intended to kill.”);
Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
When considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, these facts are
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Jacobs intentionally caused the death of
the decedent by shooting him with a firearm in the course of committing a robbery
or attempting a robbery.
The court did not err when it dismissed a disqualified juror.
In his second issue, Jacobs argues the trial court erred when it dismissed a
juror based on a disability that manifested via contradictory answers. The State
counters that the trial court could not have erred under these facts because juror
–4– disability is only implicated under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.29,
which is only applicable in “(1) the limited circumstances in which less than twelve
jurors can render or return a verdict in felony cases and (2) capital cases in which
the state seeks the death penalty and a juror dies or becomes disabled.” See
Nikmanesh v. State, 05-16-00363-CR, 2017 WL 2774445, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We agree with
the State and conclude article 36.29 is inapplicable in the instant case because neither
of the two conditions identified in Nikmanesh is present. See id. (citing TEX. CODE
CRIM PROC. Art. 33.011(b)). Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err when it
dismissed a juror who provided contradictory responses, one reasonable conclusion
from which was that he expressed a prohibited level of bias. See Hudson v. State,
620 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“When a prospective juror’s answers
concerning his ability to follow the law are vacillating, equivocating, ambiguous,
unclear, or contradictory, we accord particular deference to the trial court’s
decision.”) (cleaned up).
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Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 26, 2023
In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-01134-CR
JORDAN CHRISTOPHER JACOBS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-84157-2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy Opinion by Justice Carlyle A jury found appellant Jordan Christopher Jacobs guilty of capital murder and
the court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In
three issues, he challenges (1) the legal sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the trial
court’s removal of an equivocating juror, and (3) the trial court’s refusal to charge
the jury concerning the lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery or robbery.
We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
On the evening of July 7, 2021, Jacobs and his then girlfriend visited a local
Mini-Mart and saw Steven Christopher Gambles, II standing next to a white
Mercedes. After they got home, Jacobs told his girlfriend he was going to rob Mr. Gambles. Jacobs’s girlfriend then texted a friend that Jacobs “is out of control,” that
he was “trying to hit a lick on some boy over here in the Mercedes,” and that she
told him “stop trying to rob people.”
Jacobs testified that when he got back to the store, he entered Gambles’
unlocked Mercedes, found a gun, and put it in his jacket without checking to see if
it was loaded. He later admitted he knew the gun was loaded. Jacobs ultimately
approached Gambles, pointed the gun at him, and demanded money; according to
Jacobs, Gambles then “jumped” at him and the gun discharged. The State’s forensic
pathologist testified she performed an autopsy and concluded Gambles died from a
single gunshot wound to the head.
After the trial court empaneled the jury, a juror came forward and
acknowledged he “was uncomfortable with having someone’s life judgment in [his]
hands” and “pretty much just didn’t want to have anything to do with that” based on
his beliefs. When the judge directly asked him if he could listen to the evidence and
render a decision based on her instructions, the juror said that he could do so. Upon
further questioning from the State, however, he acknowledged that his discomfort
would “most likely” prevent him from deliberating. In response to questioning from
defense counsel, he then said he could listen to the evidence and vote his conscience.
After the trial court sought even further clarification, the juror said that he could not
set aside his feelings, regardless of what the State proved. The trial court concluded
the juror was “disqualified as disabled” and dismissed him.
–2– A jury found Jacobs guilty of capital murder and the trial court sentenced him
to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Jacobs timely appealed.
The evidence sufficiently supports the conviction.
In his first issue, Jacobs argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction. We review evidentiary sufficiency under the familiar
Jackson v. Virginia standard. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894, 901–02
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Murphy v. State, 05-19-00886-CR, 2020 WL 7396009, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). We review all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Temple v. State, 390
S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
Here, the crux of Jacobs’s sufficiency challenge is that no rational juror could
have concluded he intentionally caused decedent’s death with a firearm while he was
committing or attempting to commit a robbery. We disagree. The jury heard that he
intended to rob someone in a Mercedes, that he stole a gun from a white Mercedes,
and that the decedent was driving the same white Mercedes from which Jacobs stole
the gun. Jacobs also admitted that he wanted the decedent’s money, that he “had
worked up enough courage to go ahead and try to get the money from him,” that he
“pointed the gun in the window,” that he knew the gun was loaded, and that he told
the decedent to “give it up.” Under the circumstances, a rational juror could have
–3– concluded that “it” was the decedent’s money and that Jacobs therefore admitted to
performing a robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02.
Furthermore, “specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon, unless in the manner of its use it is reasonably apparent that death or serious
bodily injury could not result.” Giles v. State, 05-18-00865-CR, 2019 WL 6486257,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 3, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 580–81 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (citations omitted)). Here, Jacobs used a deadly weapon in a deadly manner,
admitted he was familiar with firearms, admitted he pointed a gun at the decedent,
and admitted he knew the gun was loaded; therefore, the jury could have rationally
concluded he intended to kill. See id. (When “a deadly weapon is used in [a] deadly
manner, the inference is almost conclusive that [the perpetrator] intended to kill.”);
Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
When considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, these facts are
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Jacobs intentionally caused the death of
the decedent by shooting him with a firearm in the course of committing a robbery
or attempting a robbery.
The court did not err when it dismissed a disqualified juror.
In his second issue, Jacobs argues the trial court erred when it dismissed a
juror based on a disability that manifested via contradictory answers. The State
counters that the trial court could not have erred under these facts because juror
–4– disability is only implicated under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.29,
which is only applicable in “(1) the limited circumstances in which less than twelve
jurors can render or return a verdict in felony cases and (2) capital cases in which
the state seeks the death penalty and a juror dies or becomes disabled.” See
Nikmanesh v. State, 05-16-00363-CR, 2017 WL 2774445, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We agree with
the State and conclude article 36.29 is inapplicable in the instant case because neither
of the two conditions identified in Nikmanesh is present. See id. (citing TEX. CODE
CRIM PROC. Art. 33.011(b)). Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err when it
dismissed a juror who provided contradictory responses, one reasonable conclusion
from which was that he expressed a prohibited level of bias. See Hudson v. State,
620 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“When a prospective juror’s answers
concerning his ability to follow the law are vacillating, equivocating, ambiguous,
unclear, or contradictory, we accord particular deference to the trial court’s
decision.”) (cleaned up).
Jacobs did not suffer harm based on the absence of lesser-included offenses.
In his third issue, Jacobs argues the trial court erred when it denied his request
for a charge on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery or robbery. We
review a trial court’s decision to refrain from submitting a lesser-included offense
instruction for an abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 574
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “We review alleged jury charge error in two steps.”
–5– McDonald v. State, 05-12-00521-CR, 2013 WL 5774874, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Oct. 23, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Kirsch
v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). First, we decide whether
there was error in the charge. Nikmanesh, 2017 WL 2774445, at *6 (citing Ferguson
v. State, 335 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)).
Based on Jacobs’s timely objection at trial, “only ‘some harm’ is necessary to reverse
the trial court’s judgment.” Id. (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)). When determining whether there was harm under
such circumstances, we examine the jury charge, the evidence, the arguments of
counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a
whole. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 613–
17.
The jury instruction in this case required the jury to find Jacobs guilty of
capital murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally caused the
decedent’s death by shooting him with a firearm in the course of committing a
robbery or attempting a robbery. Although the trial court also charged the jury on
the lesser-included offense of murder, the jury’s rejection of this charge in favor of
capital murder weighs heavily against a finding of harm. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d
at 614 (quoting Masterson v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (A
jury’s “failure to find an intervening lesser-included offense (one that is between the
requested lesser offense and the offense charged) may, in appropriate circumstances,
–6– render a failure to submit the requested lesser offense harmless.”)). The jury was not
placed in the dilemma of either acquitting appellant outright or convicting him of
capital murder. Id. at 614–15. Instead, it had the option of convicting him of murder.
See id. at 615. It is not plausible to believe the jury would have convicted Jacobs of
an even lesser offense like robbery or aggravated robbery. Id. Thus, under the facts
of this case, Jacobs suffered no harm as a result of the trial court’s failure to charge
or instruct the jury on those lesser included offenses. See id.
Jacobs admitted to (1) stealing the decedent’s gun, (2) wanting decedent’s
money, (3) pointing a gun at him, (4) knowing the gun was loaded, (5) demanding
money from him, and (6) pulling the trigger. The evidence also shows Jacobs told
his girlfriend that he intended to rob the decedent. And Jacobs has failed to present
a plausible basis upon which the jury could have determined he was not guilty of
capital murder or murder but was nonetheless guilty of robbery or aggravated
robbery. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 616. We have determined the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to convict appellant of capital murder, and thus the “state of
the evidence” does not favor a finding of harm. See Gray v. State, No. 05-14-00919-
CR, 2015 WL 7282759, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 18, 2015, pet. ref’d).
Finally, Jacobs’s counsel waived opening statements and made it clear during
closing that (1) he was not there “to contest the guilt as far as who it was, what
happened as far as the exact facts of the situation”; (2) “there’s no question that what
–7– happened is Jordan Jacobs’ conduct caused the death of Steven Gambles”; and (3)
“He’s guilty of murder. I told you that in voir dire.”
We reject Jacobs’s contention that the absence of a lesser-included charge was
harmful because there was no realistic possibility that he would have been convicted
of lesser charges under the circumstances. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 617.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
221134f.u05 /Cory L. Carlyle// CORY L. CARLYLE Do Not Publish JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
–8– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JORDAN CHRISTOPHER On Appeal from the 401st Judicial JACOBS, Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-84157- No. 05-22-01134-CR V. 2021. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Smith and Kennedy participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 26th day of October, 2023.
–9–