Jones v. Zoning Hearing Board
This text of 578 A.2d 1369 (Jones v. Zoning Hearing Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Thomas Jones, Sr. (Landowner) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) affirming a decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of the Town of McCandless (Board) upholding the validity of the Planning and Zoning Code of the Codified Ordinances of the Town of McCandless (Ordinance).
In 1987, the Town of McCandless (Town) amended its Ordinance, re-zoning a portion of Town along McKnight Road into a newly created D-Development District (D-Dis *437 trict). The Ordinance employs a zoning technique called “performance zoning” in the D-District. Performance zoning is designed to permit a wide range of uses which gives the developer flexibility in developing land. 1 The zoning technique protects adjacent properties by requiring bufferyards of varying sizes depending on the uses involved. The Ordinance also established standards for the preservation of sensitive natural resources such as woodlands, streams, and steep slopes.
Landowner, who owns land in the D-District, filed a petition with the Board challenging the validity of the Ordinance pursuant to Section 1004 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). 2 The Board, after holding three hearings on the matter, found that the Ordinance was valid, and dismissed the petition for lack of standing because Landowner had allegedly failed to submit plans of construction as required by section 1004 of the MPC. Landowner appealed to the trial court which found, without taking additional evidence, that although Landowner had standing because he had submitted plans as required by the MPC, Landowner’s claims that the Ordinance was invalid were not meritorious.
On appeal to this court, 3 Landowner contends that the Ordinance violates the taking clause of the United States Constitution.
A zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid. Boundary Drive Associates v. Shewsbury Township Board of Supervisors, 507 Pa. 481, 491 A.2d 86 (1985). The party challenging the validity of an ordinance has the heavy burden of *438 proving that the ordinance is invalid. Id. A “land use regulation can effect a taking if it ‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.’ ” Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987), quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980).
The first prong of the taking analysis requires a determination of whether the Ordinance substantially advances a legitimate state interest. An ordinance which promotes the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community and is substantially related to the purpose which it purports to serve substantially advances a legitimate state interest. McClimans v. Board of Supervisors of Shenango Township, 107 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 547, 529 A.2d 562 (1987). However, ordinances may not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or confiscatory. National Land and Investment Company v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
Landowner contends that, although Town has the authority to regulate forests and steep slopes pursuant to Section 604 and 605 of the MPC, the Ordinance is invalid because it is arbitrary, and unreasonable in the manner in which steep slopes 4 and forests 5 are defined and the re *439 strictions placed on them. Landowner contends that there is no scientific or engineering basis for the definitions or the related restrictions.
Prior to amending the Ordinance, Town contracted with UDA Architects (UDA) to conduct the McKnight Road Corridor Study. Based on its study, UDA recommended *440 that Town amend the Ordinance which amendments were adopted. The Board made the following pertinent finding:
That in connection with the development of the [amendment of the Ordinance], a number of different characteristics were examined: the physical land forms and physical conditions along McKnight Road with each of the undeveloped sites in the subject two mile stretch; the surrounding uses and surrounding densities; the relationship to the yet-to-be developed parcels along McKnight Road; traffic patterns; the capacity of the road system; appropriate densities, appropriate uses and appropriate tools.
Finding of Fact 25. The Ordinance was amended as a comprehensive plan to permit development in the D-District while preserving the sensitive natural resources such as the steep slopes, forests, flood plains and streams. The Ordinance weighs the maintenance of the ecological balance in the D-District with the property owner’s right to develop his property. Upon review of the record and the regulations attacked, we conclude that the challenged portions of the Ordinance are not arbitrary or unreasonable, but rather substantially related to the purpose which they purport to serve. McClimans.
Landowner next contends that the Ordinance deprives him of a viable use of his property because Landowner will not be permitted to build on about 70% of his property as a result of the Ordinance. However,
“ ‘[t]aking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with the rights in the parcel as a whole ...”
Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2662, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978).
*441 Landowner concedes that there is no significant difference between the buildable area on his property under the prior Ordinance and the amended Ordinance. The property just cannot be developed as intensively for residential purposes as it could prior to the amendment of the Ordinance. However, Landowner presented evidence that the property could still be developed into 89 residential units 6 or 150,000 square feet of commercial space.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
578 A.2d 1369, 134 Pa. Commw. 435, 1990 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 450, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-zoning-hearing-board-pacommwct-1990.