Jones v. Wilson

2023 IL App (2d) 210784-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 1, 2023
• Docket: 2-21-0784
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (2d) 210784-U No. 2-21-0784 Order filed May 1, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

CARSON JONES, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 21-OP-1961 ) TIMOTHY WILSON, ) Honorable ) Reginald Mathews ) and Jacquelyn D. Melius, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: In petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his petition for a plenary stalking-no- contact order, we reach the merits despite the deficiencies in petitioner’s brief and hold that (1) the trial court properly continued to another date the evidentiary hearing on the petition, (2) the court did not err by requiring petitioner to serve respondent with a copy of the continuance order, (3) the evidence supported the denial of a plenary order, and (4) the court did not err in ruling on petitioner’s motion to vacate the denial, despite respondent’s absence at the motion hearing.

¶2 Pro se petitioner, Carson Jones, appeals a judgment denying his petition, under the Stalking

No Contact Order Act (Act) (see 740 ILCS 21/1 et seq. (West 2020)), for a plenary stalking-no-

contact order against respondent, Timothy Wilson. We affirm. 2023 IL App (2d) 210784-U

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 6, 2021, petitioner applied for an emergency stalking-no-contact order against

respondent, alleging as follows. The parties lived in the same apartment building. On April 1,

2021, respondent “got in [petitioner’s] face” and yelled that he had a gun and wanted to shoot

petitioner. On October 5, 2021, petitioner knocked on the door of a bathroom that all residents

shared; respondent yelled at him and threatened to hurt him. On October 6, 2021—the day

petitioner applied for the stalking-no-contact order—petitioner “opened the screen door.”1 In

response, respondent said that he would kill petitioner. Respondent then ran to his apartment,

returned with what looked like a gun, and yelled at petitioner.

¶5 On October 6, 2021, the trial court entered an emergency stalking-no-contact order,

effective through October 27, 2021, and set that date for a hearing on a plenary order.

¶6 On October 27, 2021, the trial court held a virtual hearing. Petitioner answered ready.

Respondent said he was calling from a hospital where he had been admitted, but claimed he was

still ready to proceed. He acknowledged that he had been served with the emergency order. Judge

Mathews initially presided but turned the hearing over to Judge Melius. The court decided to

postpone the hearing because defendant had several witnesses but was experiencing “connection

issues” and was currently hospitalized. The court continued the hearing to November 18, 2021,

and extended the emergency order to that date. The court’s written order noted that respondent

had been disconnected from the proceeding before it finalized the new hearing date. The order

required petitioner to certify that he mailed the order to respondent.

1 As the record elsewhere indicates, the screen door was one of the doors into the apartment

building.

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¶7 On November 8, 2021, petitioner filed a motion for clarification, inquiring why he was

required to serve the October 27, 2021, order on respondent when he had served respondent with

the initial emergency order. On November 18, 2021, the trial court heard the case remotely.

Petitioner, per his motion, asked why he had to serve respondent with the October 27, 2021, order,

given that he had already served respondent in the case. The court confirmed with respondent that

he was served with the October 6, 2021, stalking-no-contact order and was ready to proceed with

the evidentiary hearing. The hearing commenced, and the court conducted all the examinations.

We summarize the evidence.

¶8 Petitioner testified as follows. He and respondent met in March or early April 2021. They

resided on the same floor of the apartment building. On April 1, 2021, they were standing in a

corridor about 15 to 20 feet apart; petitioner was about to enter his apartment and respondent was

near the common bathroom. Respondent spoke to petitioner about a mess someone else had made

in the bathroom. Respondent became “belligerent” and used “profound [sic] language towards

[petitioner], which escalated into him saying that he had a gun.”

¶9 After refreshing his memory by rereading his petition’s account of the April 1, 2021,

encounter, petitioner testified that respondent “started to tell [petitioner] that [petitioner] had done

something to the bathroom.” Respondent then “said that he [was] going to f***ing get

[petitioner].” Respondent “started yelling many loud, abusive things.” As petitioner was closing

his door, respondent said (as best petitioner could recall) that “he had a gun and that if [petitioner]

wanted something, to come back into the hallway.”

¶ 10 The court asked petitioner about the October 5, 2021, incident. Petitioner played a video

that he claimed depicted his encounter with respondent outside the building on the evening of

October 5, 2021. According to petitioner’s narration of the video, respondent said he was going

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to “kill this n*** tonight.” Respondent then approached petitioner and “got in [his] face.”

Petitioner went inside the building. Respondent followed him inside and up the stairs, shouting in

the hallway even after petitioner closed his apartment door.

¶ 11 We note that the only video in the record on appeal shows a sidewalk and a streetlight. It

contains no audio except an unknown person saying, “on the f***ing ground, n***.”

¶ 12 The court examined petitioner about the October 6, 2021, incident. Petitioner testified that

respondent yelled at him for keeping the screen door open and said he would kill petitioner.

Petitioner saw respondent grab something from his room.

¶ 13 Respondent testified as follows. Petitioner had repeatedly locked the door to the shared

bathroom so that other people could not use it and had repeatedly left the building’s screen door

open. When respondent told him to stop doing these things, petitioner answered with obscenities.

As a result, respondent tried to avoid petitioner.

¶ 14 Respondent testified that, on the evening of October 5, 2021, he was outside conversing

with another resident when petitioner appeared and approached him. Respondent repeatedly told

petitioner to leave him alone, but petitioner kept circling him, knowing that he was subject to panic

attacks. Respondent attempted to introduce a video that he claimed showed petitioner stalking

him, but he could not get the video to play.

¶ 15 Respondent called two witnesses: Jose Barraza and Dolly Voley. Barraza, a building

resident, testified that, on October 5, 2021, he and respondent were outside conversing.

Respondent had recently been released from the hospital and “wasn’t in good condition.” He was

also emotionally distressed because his mother would be disconnected from life support.

Petitioner came outside and stood “very close” to respondent. Respondent told him to leave him

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alone. Petitioner walked a few feet away but then came back. Barraza left to get his phone to call

the police if needed. However, when he came back a minute later, petitioner had left.

¶ 16 Voley, the building owner, testified that petitioner had been harassing respondent and other

residents. For example, petitioner followed respondent and hid in the shared bathroom outside

respondent’s door. Petitioner had also locked the bathroom door, left the building doors open, and

pressured residents for food and money. Currently, Voley was trying to evict him for nonpayment

of rent.

¶ 17 Petitioner objected to the testimony of both Barraza and Voley as irrelevant to the issues

he raised in his petition. The trial court overruled the objection but asked petitioner if he wanted

to say anything else about Barraza’s and Voley’s testimony. Petitioner testified that the video he

showed the court depicted what happened on the evening of October 5, 2021, after he left the

¶ 18 Petitioner then called Tiffany Greenwald. She testified that she was dating petitioner. She

had visited his building numerous times, including when “there was some bathroom issue going

on.” Greenwald heard respondent “say something about a gun,” but she “[did not] know what he

said. [She] just heard the word gun.” She was not there on the dates of the other incidents at issue.

At times, respondent had been “pretty obnoxious” to her, but when the court asked her what he

said, she testified, “I don’t know. I just—you know, I’m like nope, nope. Something like trying

to, I don’t know, call [petitioner] out on things, like maybe—I don’t know.”

¶ 19 The parties rested. The court held that petitioner had not met his burden of proof. Even

after refreshing his recollection with the petition, petitioner never said “what happened with the

gun on April 1.” This lapse caused the court “to question the voracity [sic] of his testimony to

some degree.” Further, although the video showed respondent using abusive language toward

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petitioner, the remaining evidence placed the outbursts in context. Specifically, Barraza testified

that, before petitioner started recording the encounter, respondent had come home from the

hospital extremely upset because his mother was being taken off life support. Yet petitioner

repeatedly antagonized him and then started filming after respondent started cursing. Moreover,

Voley, an independent witness, testified that petitioner had repeatedly antagonized respondent and

others. Finally, Greenwald was biased and remembered only that respondent said something about

a gun.

¶ 20 Petitioner moved to reconsider the court’s ruling. The trial court denied the motion at a

remote hearing where respondent did not appear. Petitioner timely appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, petitioner attempts to raise a variety of issues. Respondent has not filed an

appellee’s brief, but we may nonetheless reach the merits of this relatively simple case. See First

Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

¶ 23 First, however, we must note that petitioner’s brief does not adhere to certain rules for

briefing. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires an appellant’s brief to

contain a “Statement of Facts, which shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the

case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to

the pages of the record on appeal.” Arguments based on nonrecord facts do not deserve

consideration. See Paluch v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 130621, ¶ 23.

Petitioner’s statement of facts partly conforms to these rules but also contains numerous facts not

supported by citations to the record and some that are not drawn from the record at all.

¶ 24 Further, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires an appellant’s

brief to contain an “Argument” section, “which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and

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the reasons therefore, with citations of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Points

not argued are forfeited (id.) and arguments that are insufficiently developed are also forfeited

(Holmstrom v. Kunis, 221 Ill. App. 3d 317, 325 (1991)). Respondent raises five one-paragraph

arguments, but the sole citations to legal authority are two sections of the Act, with minimal

argument based on them. There are no citations to case authority. 2

¶ 25 A court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited

and is not a depository into which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.

Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality, LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 13. Because petitioner’s brief

fails to comply with basic briefing rules, we would be within our prerogative to dismiss this appeal.

See Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill. App. 3d 36, 42 (2005). However, as the issues are not difficult,

we shall address the merits where we can discern cohesive arguments.

¶ 26 Petitioner contends first that, at the October 27, 2021, hearing, the trial court erred in

continuing the cause even though both parties answered ready. A trial court has the discretion to

order a continuance, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 125 (2009). We cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in affording the pro se respondent more time, as he had witnesses. Further, the court

was rightfully concerned about his ability to proceed, given his medical condition.

¶ 27 Petitioner’s second argument appears to be that the trial court abused its discretion in

requiring that respondent be served with a copy of the October 27, 2021, continuance order, given

2 The brief contains a separate section, “Statutes and Rules Involved,” which lists numerous

statutory and constitutional provisions, but the “Argument” section cites only two of these

authorities.

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that he had already been served with the emergency stalking-no-contact order. The defect in this

reasoning is obvious. The court noted in the October 27, 2021, order that respondent was

disconnected from the hearing before the court finalized the continued date. Serving the

emergency order on respondent before the October 27 hearing did not give him notice of the

continuance ordered at the October 27 hearing. Further, petitioner does not argue that the alleged

error prejudiced him in any way.

¶ 28 Petitioner’s third and fourth arguments essentially contend that the evidence did not

support the judgment. Petitioner appears to argue that the video he played in court proved that

respondent’s acts met the statutory definition of “stalking,” i.e., respondent “engag[ed] in a course

of conduct directed at a specific person [(petitioner)], and *** [knew] or should [have known] that

this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his *** safety” 3 (740 ILCS

21/10 (West 2020)). He also argues that the trial court erred in crediting respondent’s “biased”

witnesses.

¶ 29 Two principles dispose of these arguments. First, it is the appellant’s burden to supply a

record sufficient to support a claim of error, and any doubts arising from the record’s

incompleteness will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92

(1984). Second, our review is deferential. Petitioner was required to prove his cause of action by

a preponderance of the evidence. Piester v. Escobar, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12. On appeal,

we will not reverse the judgment unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Under

3 Petitioner also makes some assertions about where respondent and his witnesses were

situated during the virtual evidentiary hearing. Aside from being unsupported by the record, these

purported facts are of no importance to our review.

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this standard, the fact finder (here, the trial court) had the prerogative to decide the credibility of

the witnesses, the weight given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to draw from the

evidence. Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 131529, ¶ 118.

¶ 30 Given these constraints, we shall not disturb the judgment. Petitioner relies predominantly

on the four-minute video he played in the trial court. However, we have only a shorter video with

no people visible and approximately two seconds of recorded speech. We cannot base a reversal

on evidence that petitioner failed to supply us. Further, it was for the trial court to evaluate

whether—as petitioner asserts—respondent’s witnesses were incredible because of their biases.

The court found that they were credible. (Moreover, petitioner’s witnesses (himself and his

girlfriend) were clearly biased also.) The witnesses’ testimony persuaded the court that petitioner

had not proved his case, and we have no basis to overturn that conclusion.

¶ 31 Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate.

Petitioner argues that it was improper for the court to rule on the motion without respondent

present. Petitioner does not explain, and we cannot imagine, what prejudice he suffered from

respondent’s absence. Petitioner also contends that the court should have continued the hearing

on his motion to vacate, but the record does not show that he ever requested a continuance.

Therefore, we reject the contention.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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