Jones v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Jones v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad

37 S.E. 215, 127 N.C. 188, 1900 N.C. LEXIS 51

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedNovember 20, 1900

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 37 S.E. 215 (Jones v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jones v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, 37 S.E. 215, 127 N.C. 188, 1900 N.C. LEXIS 51 (N.C. 1900).

Pincite

Opinion

MoNtgomeby, J.

At tbe September Term, 1899, of tbis Court, a decision was made in tbis case, and tbe opinion duly certified to tbe Superior Court of Cumberland County. In tbat opinion, for errors in certain instructions, given by bis Honor in tbe Court below, a new trial was ordered. The action was begun by tbe plaintiff to recover damages against tbe defendant for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff bad waived examination before the Justice of the Peace, and bad given bond for bis appearance at Court. His Honor refused to instruct tbe jury, unqualifiedly, at tbe defendant’s request, tbat tbe waiving of tbe preliminary examination before tbe Justice of tbe Peace was prima facie evidence of probable cause. It appearing to tbis Court, tbat from tbe whole of the evidence tbe waiver of tbe preliminary examination by tbe plaintiff was voluntary, it was decided tbat tbat act was a confession of probable cause, so far as the action of tbe defendant in procuring the warrant for bis arrest was concerned, and tbis Court further said tbat tbe waiving of tbe examination before tbe Justice was fatal to the plaintiff’s cause of action. At tbe next term of the Superior Court, after tbe opinion of tbis Court bad reached tbe Superior Court, a judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff’s action was tendered to bis Honor for bis signature, and his Honor refused to sign it, and tbe defendant appealed. In our opinion in tbis case, delivered at tbe Pali Term, 1899, we did not undertake to reverse tbe judgment of tbe Court below. That course is never followed when issues have been *190 submitted to tlie jury, and a verdict rendered, unless tbe verdict is a special one. We did intend, however, to intimate that, when tbe case was called again for trial in the Superior Court, tbe jury should be instructed, under our decision, that they should answer the issue against the plaintiff’s claim ; the presumption being, of course, that the plaintiff’s evidence on the waiver of the examination before the Justice of the Peace, and his giving bond for his appearnce at Court, was true.' But the appeal was premature, and must be dismissed. The •defendant should have noted its exception, and gone on with the trial of the case.

Appealed dismissed.

Douglas, J., dissents from the opinion only arguendo.

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MoNtgomeby, J.

At tbe September Term, 1899, of tbis Court, a decision was made in tbis case, and tbe opinion duly certified to tbe Superior Court of Cumberland County. In tbat opinion, for errors in certain instructions, given by bis Honor in tbe Court below, a new trial was ordered. The action was begun by tbe plaintiff to recover damages against tbe defendant for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff bad waived examination before the Justice of the Peace, and bad given bond for bis appearance at Court. His Honor refused to instruct tbe jury, unqualifiedly, at tbe defendant’s request, tbat tbe waiving of tbe preliminary examination before tbe Justice of tbe Peace was prima facie evidence of probable cause. It appearing to tbis Court, tbat from tbe whole of the evidence tbe waiver of tbe preliminary examination by tbe plaintiff was voluntary, it was decided tbat tbat act was a confession of probable cause, so far as the action of tbe defendant in procuring the warrant for bis arrest was concerned, and tbis Court further said tbat tbe waiving of tbe examination before tbe Justice was fatal to the plaintiff’s cause of action. At tbe next term of the Superior Court, after tbe opinion of tbis Court bad reached tbe Superior Court, a judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff’s action was tendered to bis Honor for bis signature, and his Honor refused to sign it, and tbe defendant appealed. In our opinion in tbis case, delivered at tbe Pali Term, 1899, we did not undertake to reverse tbe judgment of tbe Court below. That course is never followed when issues have been *190 submitted to tlie jury, and a verdict rendered, unless tbe verdict is a special one. We did intend, however, to intimate that, when tbe case was called again for trial in the Superior Court, tbe jury should be instructed, under our decision, that they should answer the issue against the plaintiff’s claim ; the presumption being, of course, that the plaintiff’s evidence on the waiver of the examination before the Justice of the Peace, and his giving bond for his appearnce at Court, was true.' But the appeal was premature, and must be dismissed. The •defendant should have noted its exception, and gone on with the trial of the case.

Appealed dismissed.

Douglas, J., dissents from the opinion only arguendo.

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Bluebook (online)

37 S.E. 215, 127 N.C. 188, 1900 N.C. LEXIS 51, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-wilmington-weldon-railroad-nc-1900.

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