UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 7/30/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JAMES JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 95-5263 (D.C. No. 94-C-867-K) WAL-MART STORES, INC., doing (N.D. Okla.) business as Sam’s Club, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff James Jones appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. on his employment discrimina-
tion claims, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f). Because plaintiff raised a triable issue as to whether discrimination
motivated defendant’s decisions regarding his work assignments, but not his lack
of promotion or layoff, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff, an African-American, was employed as a stockperson at Sam’s
Club in Tulsa, Oklahoma, from May 1992 to December 1992. Plaintiff alleges he
was treated less favorably than his white coworkers in his job assignments, in his
failure to receive a promotion to team leader, and in his eventual layoff at the end
of the Christmas shopping season. The district court granted summary judgment
in defendant’s favor, finding that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence of
race discrimination or show that defendant’s stated reasons for its decisions were
pretextual. Plaintiff appealed.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard
applied by the district court. Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). We examine the record and reasonable inferences therefrom in
-2- the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v.
First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990).
In race discrimination cases, we apply the three-part burden shifting
analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and
its progeny. See Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1995).
Under this analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a facially
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Id. at 530. Upon such a
showing, the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie
showing “simply drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993). The plaintiff then carries the full burden of showing
that defendant discriminated on the basis of race, “either directly by proving the
employer acted with a discriminatory motive,” or indirectly by showing the
employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual. Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530 (citation
omitted).
We first address plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim. Plaintiff met
his burden of showing a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge through
evidence that he is a member of a protected class, was adversely affected by
defendant’s decision, was qualified for his position, and was laid off when less
qualified white coworkers were retained. See Bell v. American Tel. & Tel. Co,
-3- 946 F.2d 1507, 1510 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991). Defendant, in turn, met its burden of
producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination by
showing that he was included in a group of twelve employees laid off because of
the post-Christmas slowdown, and because he was one of the least productive
workers. This shifted the burden back to plaintiff to demonstrate that his termina-
tion was motivated by racial discrimination.
Plaintiff did not submit any direct evidence of discrimination. His indirect
evidence consisted of (1) evidence that when another employee made a racial
statement in supervisor Palmer’s presence, Palmer did not express disapproval,
and (2) observations that plaintiff was a good worker and that his performance
was equal to or better than that of white workers who were retained. We agree
with the district court that this evidence did not raise a factual issue regarding
pretext. Supervisor Palmer’s failure to express public disapproval of the racial
statement does not mean that he shared its sentiment. Palmer, in fact, contended
that he never heard the statement, and that if he had, he would have disciplined
the employee. Because the statement was not made by Palmer, the decision maker
in this case, and did not relate to plaintiff, his position, or the employment
decision, it does not raise the inference of discrimination. See Cone v. Longmont
United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 531-32 (10th Cir. 1994).
-4- Plaintiff’s evidence regarding his performance shows, at most, that defen-
dant may have exercised its business judgment erroneously; however, “an em-
ployer’s exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment does not
constitute pretext.” Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th
Cir. 1995). In the absence of evidence of an improper motive, plaintiff has not
met his burden of showing that defendant’s reasons were pretexts for discrimina-
tion.
Plaintiff’s evidence in support of his discriminatory promotion claim
suffers from the same deficiency. Although plaintiff established a prima facie
case by showing that he is African-American, was qualified for the promotion but
was not promoted, and that white coworkers were promoted, see id. at 1534, he
did not present any evidence that defendant’s stated reason for promoting the
others, namely that they were more qualified, was unworthy of belief. Therefore
summary judgment was proper on plaintiff’s failure to promote claim.
Summary judgment should not have been granted, however, on plaintiff’s
discriminatory work assignment claims. Plaintiff alleges that he was treated less
favorably than his white coworkers because he was not given the more desirable
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 7/30/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JAMES JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 95-5263 (D.C. No. 94-C-867-K) WAL-MART STORES, INC., doing (N.D. Okla.) business as Sam’s Club, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff James Jones appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. on his employment discrimina-
tion claims, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f). Because plaintiff raised a triable issue as to whether discrimination
motivated defendant’s decisions regarding his work assignments, but not his lack
of promotion or layoff, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff, an African-American, was employed as a stockperson at Sam’s
Club in Tulsa, Oklahoma, from May 1992 to December 1992. Plaintiff alleges he
was treated less favorably than his white coworkers in his job assignments, in his
failure to receive a promotion to team leader, and in his eventual layoff at the end
of the Christmas shopping season. The district court granted summary judgment
in defendant’s favor, finding that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence of
race discrimination or show that defendant’s stated reasons for its decisions were
pretextual. Plaintiff appealed.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard
applied by the district court. Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). We examine the record and reasonable inferences therefrom in
-2- the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v.
First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990).
In race discrimination cases, we apply the three-part burden shifting
analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and
its progeny. See Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1995).
Under this analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a facially
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Id. at 530. Upon such a
showing, the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie
showing “simply drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993). The plaintiff then carries the full burden of showing
that defendant discriminated on the basis of race, “either directly by proving the
employer acted with a discriminatory motive,” or indirectly by showing the
employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual. Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530 (citation
omitted).
We first address plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim. Plaintiff met
his burden of showing a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge through
evidence that he is a member of a protected class, was adversely affected by
defendant’s decision, was qualified for his position, and was laid off when less
qualified white coworkers were retained. See Bell v. American Tel. & Tel. Co,
-3- 946 F.2d 1507, 1510 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991). Defendant, in turn, met its burden of
producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination by
showing that he was included in a group of twelve employees laid off because of
the post-Christmas slowdown, and because he was one of the least productive
workers. This shifted the burden back to plaintiff to demonstrate that his termina-
tion was motivated by racial discrimination.
Plaintiff did not submit any direct evidence of discrimination. His indirect
evidence consisted of (1) evidence that when another employee made a racial
statement in supervisor Palmer’s presence, Palmer did not express disapproval,
and (2) observations that plaintiff was a good worker and that his performance
was equal to or better than that of white workers who were retained. We agree
with the district court that this evidence did not raise a factual issue regarding
pretext. Supervisor Palmer’s failure to express public disapproval of the racial
statement does not mean that he shared its sentiment. Palmer, in fact, contended
that he never heard the statement, and that if he had, he would have disciplined
the employee. Because the statement was not made by Palmer, the decision maker
in this case, and did not relate to plaintiff, his position, or the employment
decision, it does not raise the inference of discrimination. See Cone v. Longmont
United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 531-32 (10th Cir. 1994).
-4- Plaintiff’s evidence regarding his performance shows, at most, that defen-
dant may have exercised its business judgment erroneously; however, “an em-
ployer’s exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment does not
constitute pretext.” Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th
Cir. 1995). In the absence of evidence of an improper motive, plaintiff has not
met his burden of showing that defendant’s reasons were pretexts for discrimina-
tion.
Plaintiff’s evidence in support of his discriminatory promotion claim
suffers from the same deficiency. Although plaintiff established a prima facie
case by showing that he is African-American, was qualified for the promotion but
was not promoted, and that white coworkers were promoted, see id. at 1534, he
did not present any evidence that defendant’s stated reason for promoting the
others, namely that they were more qualified, was unworthy of belief. Therefore
summary judgment was proper on plaintiff’s failure to promote claim.
Summary judgment should not have been granted, however, on plaintiff’s
discriminatory work assignment claims. Plaintiff alleges that he was treated less
favorably than his white coworkers because he was not given the more desirable
position of forklift driver and was assigned to work on the most strenuous aisles.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating with respect to “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,” on account of an individual’s race,
-5- color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Assigning an
employee to a less desirable job or denying him the opportunity for a more
desirable position, based on the employee’s race, are adverse employment
decisions affecting the terms and conditions of his employment, and can support
Title VII liability. See, e.g.,Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 673 F.2d 742,
752-53 (5th Cir. 1982) (white longshoremen twice as likely as blacks to be given
more desirable deck positions, which were less demanding positions that allowed
employee to work in fresh air), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1038 (1983); Eubanks v.
Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 635 F.2d 1341, 1345 (8th Cir. 1980) (African-Ameri-
can cement finishers assigned most menial, unpleasant and onerous duties on job);
Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 546 n.37 (5th Cir. 1980)
(African-Americans assigned to least desirable positions in plant, while white
assigned to more desirable position despite less seniority), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1115 (1981).
Adapting the McDonnell-Douglas framework to suit this particular contro-
versy, see Tomsic v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th
Cir. 1996), we conclude that plaintiff raised a prima facie case by showing that he
is African-American, was subjected to adverse employment decisions, was
qualified for his job, and was treated less favorably than his white coworkers.
That evidence which is also relevant to rebutting defendant’s proffered reasons
-6- for its actions or lack thereof is discussed below. Defendant’s rebuttal evidence
was that those assigned to the forklift position had previous forklift experience,
that plaintiff was trained on the forklift but did not show the necessary dexterity
or interest, and that plaintiff was assigned to many different aisles during his
employment.
The burden then shifted to plaintiff to show that defendant’s proffered
reasons were pretextual, “by showing either that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or . . . that the employer’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.” Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 632 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quotations omitted). Plaintiff presented the following evidence: (1) the duties of
a forklift driver were much more desirable than those of a stockperson, Appel-
lant’s App. at 5-33, 5-49 to -50, 5-54; (2) several white coworkers who became
forklift drivers did not have prior experience, id. at 5-51; (3) contrary to what he
was told when hired, plaintiff was never trained to drive a forklift or given a
forklift driving test, id. at 5-32, 5-68 to -69; (4) Jeff Jones was the person who
made the decision who would become a forklift driver, id. at 5-69; (5) Jeff Jones
was a team leader, in management, at the Sam’s Club, id. at 5-39, 5-63, 5-65; (6)
Jeff Jones treated plaintiff differently than his white coworkers, by driving a
forklift wildly around him, refusing to socialize with him, and consistently
unloading a disproportionate amount of work at his aisles, id. at 5-50 to -51;
-7- (7) this conduct was observed by a white coworker, who concluded that Jeff Jones
had “a prejudicial attitude towards [plaintiff] because he was black,” id. at 5-50;
(8) plaintiff showed great interest in training for and becoming a forklift driver,
id. at 5-68 to -69; (9) the dog food and chemical aisles were the most physically
demanding aisles to stock, id. at 5-50; (10) Jeff Jones assigned plaintiff to the dog
food aisle, which remained his assignment throughout most of his employment,
id. at 5-25 to -26; (11) plaintiff was also required to work the chemical aisle, id.
at 4-36, 4-41; and (12) plaintiff was required to help his white coworkers finish
their aisles, but they were not required to help him with his, id. at 4-47, 5-46 to
-47.
Plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to raise an inference of pretext. Plaintiff
produced evidence that both the decision to deny plaintiff a forklift driving
position and the decision to assign him to the more strenuous aisles were made by
team leader Jeff Jones, and that Jones treated plaintiff less favorably than his
white coworkers in many respects, including safety, social relations, and work
load. The evidence that plaintiff was required to help his white coworkers, but
that they were not required to help him, also supports an inference that he was
treated discriminatorily in his assignments. Finally, plaintiff offered evidence
that defendant’s stated reason for not permitting plaintiff to operate a forklift was
unworthy of belief, in that white coworkers were given such an opportunity
-8- despite their lack of prior experience. Therefore, summary judgment on plain-
tiff’s work assignment claims was not proper.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings.
Entered for the Court
James K. Logan Circuit Judge
-9-