Jones v. Wainwright

Ninth Circuit

Jones v. Wainwright

333 F. App'x 317

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 7, 2009

DocketNo. 08-16679

StatusPublished

This text of 333 F. App'x 317 (Jones v. Wainwright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jones v. Wainwright, 333 F. App'x 317 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

Melvin Jones, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his independent action to set aside a prior judgment for fraud on the court pursuant to Rule 60(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Appling v. State Farm Mut. [318]*318Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jones’s independent action because his allegations fail to state a claim for fraud on the court. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998) (concluding that “an independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice”); see also Appling, 340 F.3d at 780 (explaining that the term “fraud on the court” is read narrowly to mean “only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Jones’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Jones’s request to use the original record in the underlying case, which we construe as a request for judicial notice of relevant portions of that record, is granted.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

**

Melvin Jones, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his independent action to set aside a prior judgment for fraud on the court pursuant to Rule 60(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Appling v. State Farm Mut. [318]*318Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jones’s independent action because his allegations fail to state a claim for fraud on the court. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998) (concluding that “an independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice”); see also Appling, 340 F.3d at 780 (explaining that the term “fraud on the court” is read narrowly to mean “only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Jones’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Jones’s request to use the original record in the underlying case, which we construe as a request for judicial notice of relevant portions of that record, is granted.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Bluebook (online)

333 F. App'x 317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-wainwright-ca9-2009.

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