Jones v. United States

100 F. Supp. 628, 120 Ct. Cl. 747, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 1951 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 2, 1951
DocketNo. 46969
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 100 F. Supp. 628 (Jones v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 628, 120 Ct. Cl. 747, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 1951 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95 (cc 1951).

Opinion

Howell, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit to recover for the alleged infringement of' United States letters patent No. 2,078,854, issued to plaintiff' on April 27,1937, on an application filed in the Patent Office» June 20, 1936. Plaintiff is the owner of the entire right,, title, and interest to the patent which is entitled “Boundary Layer Air Control.”

The defendant contends that insofar as the claims herein issue are involved, the patent is not infringed, and that, certain of the claims are invalid in view of the prior art.

The essential facts established by the record in this case-are fully set forth in the findings, and except for certain controverted issues hereinafter discussed, it is unnecessary to-refer to them in detail.

The patent in suit, which will be more fully described below, relates both to a method and a mechanism for removing the boundary air layer adjacent to the airfoil surfaces of an airplane wing.

Friction is present in the air when the individual particles-, thereof either move relative to each other or relative to a surface. When an airplane wing moves through the air the-thin layers of air immediately adjacent thereto tend to move with it at substantially the same speed because of this frictional effect. If the air is contemplated as being in a number of thin layers, each outward layer has less forward motion. [796]*796imparted to it from the inner layer until an outer layer is reached which does not partake of any of the forward motion of the wing. ■ This outer layer of air contains no turbulence as a result of the forward motion of the airplane wing. The air thus affected is known to those skilled in the aeronautic art as the boundary layer and is technically defined as “a layer of fluid, close to the surface of a body placed in a mow ing stream, in which the impact pressure is reduced as a result of the viscosity of the fluid.”

Characteristics of the boundary air layer are well known and are capable of both measurement.and computation. The thickness of the boundary air layer is, of course, dependent upon such factors as speed through the air of the airfoil or wing, the shape of the airfoil, the altitude and the angle of the wing relative to the air. In an example given in finding 5, the thickness of the boundary air layer on a B-17 wing section (one of the alleged infringing Government airplanes) , flying at a speed of 250 miles per hour, at an altitude of 20,000 feet, varies from a few thousandths of an inch in the front edge of the wing to a maximum of about 6 inches at the rear thereof. We have referred somewhat in detail to the conventional boundary air layer because in the patent in suit the patentee expresses a different concept of boundary air layer.

The Jones patent in suit relates both to a method and mechanism for removing the boundary air layer adjacent the airfoil surfaces by sucking it in through spanwise slots, compressing it by means of a power-operated compressor driven by the engine, and then ejecting the compressed air into a different pressure zone through other spanwise slots. The engine-operated blower has its speed controlled by means of a gear shift or selective speed mechanism similar to that employed on automobiles except that the gears are shifted or selected by a mechanism responsive to the relative speed of travel of the airplane through the air. The Jones patent also has a speed responsive device actuated by the relative speed of the airplane through the air which simultaneously actuates the valves that open and close entrance and exit spanwise slots located at various points on the surface of the airplane wing..

[797]*797Findings 7 to 11, inclusive, describe the Jones patent disclosure in detail, and it is unnecessary to.further discuss them other-than to call attention to the Jones theory of boundary .air layer which appears to be inconsistent with .this.phenomena as it is recognized and treated by those skilled in aeronautical art. The Jones theory is that as the airfoil or wing moves through the air it displaces a mass of air equal in volume to that of the wing, and that as the wing progresses through the air, a similar volume of air is displaced each time the wing moves forward chord length (a distance equal from the front to the rear of the wing). According to the Jones theory the boundary air layer is much larger for a thick wing than a thin wing, and is a quantity not dependent upon air friction or altitude. Even to one unskilled in aeronautical art, it is apparent that under the Jones theory the compressor in the'wings and the entrance and discharge slots would all have to be of such a large capacity that the airplane would literally suck its way through the air. Whether such concept of boundary air layer is correct or not is immaterial as long as the patentee has defined it in such a manner that it is understandable.

See White et at. v. E. L. Bruce Co., 162 F. (2d) 304, 307:
“We are not holding the patentee to the correctness of his scientific explanation of the result achieved. He is not bound by his theory.”

In the present situation, however, certain of the claims in suit, i. e., claims 1,3, and 7, call for the removal of the boundary air layer, and obviously the monopoly expressed by such claims would require the removal of the boundary air layer, as Jones has defined it, rather than the removal of the conventional and relatively thin boundary air layer. Other claims in suit specify removal of portions only of the boundary air layer volume.

' The defendant’s structures alleged to infringe comprise three different types of airplanes — the Boeing B-17, the Republic P-47, and the Lockheed P-80. The structure and operation of these three airplanes are described in findings ■ 15 to 25, inclusive, and it is therefore only necessary to refer to them briefly in this opinion. In all three instances [798]*798these airplanes have openings either in the forward edge of the wing or near the front end of the fuselage, the purpose of these openings being either to receive air and compress it by means of a power actuated blower to supply oxygen for the fuel charge of the engines, or to supply air under its. natural pressure for cooling-purposes.

Eeferring to the B-17, this airplane is equipped with four engines, two being mounted on each wing. Adjacent each engine are three rectangular openings in the front edge of the wing. The first of these openings supplies air for the fuel charge to a rotary compressor driven by a turbine operated by the exhaust gases from the engine. This compresses the air and delivers it to the engine. The speed of the compressor is controlled not by the speed of the airplane- or the engine but by an automatic device which responds to-the altitude of the plane and causes air to be compressed in accordance with the altitude, supplying more air at the higher altitudes because of the thinner oxygen content of the air.

The second opening provides a natural flow of air through an intercooler, the function of which is to cool the air on its way from the compressor to the engine. After passing through the intercooler this cooling air is dumped into the interior of the wing and escapes through a number of slots, in the rear thereof. The third opening merely supplies air under natural pressure to an oil cooler, this air also being-dumped into the interior of the wing and escaping through the slots in the rear thereof.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Autogiro Company of America v. The United States
384 F.2d 391 (Court of Claims, 1967)
Farrell Marine Devices, Inc. v. The United States
377 F.2d 560 (Court of Claims, 1967)
Lavelle Aircraft Corporation v. The United States
358 F.2d 1005 (Court of Claims, 1966)
Lavelle Aircraft Corp. v. United States
358 F.2d 1005 (Court of Claims, 1966)
Dominion Magnesium Limited v. The United States
320 F.2d 388 (Court of Claims, 1963)
Dominion Magnesium Ltd. v. United States
320 F.2d 388 (Court of Claims, 1963)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
100 F. Supp. 628, 120 Ct. Cl. 747, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 1951 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-united-states-cc-1951.