F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 3 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
DION JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4103 (D.C. No. 97-CV-722) TCI CABLEVISION OF UTAH, INC., (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , McKAY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, who was employed by TCI Cablevision of Utah, Inc. as a cable
installer, brought this action under Title VII claiming that he was discriminated
against because of his race and that he was discharged in retaliation for engaging
in protected activities. TCI contended that it neither discriminated nor retaliated
against plaintiff, and that it discharged him solely because of his continued failure
to come to work on time. The jury entered a verdict for TCI on both of plaintiff’s
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. claims. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, arguing the district court
committed several reversible errors during the trial. The district court denied the
motion and plaintiff now appeals. 1 On appeal, plaintiff contends a new trial is
warranted based on two district court errors: the district court allowed TCI to use
certain documents during the course of the trial that were not disclosed to
plaintiff before the trial began, and the district court limited the testimony of
plaintiff’s rebuttal character witness.
We review the district court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion for new
trial under an abuse of discretion standard. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc. , 164
F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 50 (1999). The decision to
admit, limit, or exclude evidence also lies within the sound discretion of the
district court. See Hinds v. General Motors Corp. , 988 F.2d 1039, 1049 (10th
Cir. 1993) (reviewing decisions to admit and exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion); Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc. , 903 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir.
1990) (reviewing decision to limit scope of evidence for abuse of discretion).
Even if we find error in the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence,
“we will set aside a jury verdict only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2- right of a party. The effect on the jury of evidence can only be prejudicial if it
can be reasonably concluded that with or without such evidence, there would have
been a contrary result.” Hinds , 988 F.2d at 1049 (citations omitted).
The first evidentiary ruling of which plaintiff complains concerns TCI’s use
of the daily work orders that plaintiff filled out during the course of his
employment. TCI did not make any pre-trial disclosure to plaintiff about its
possession of the work orders or its intent to use them as evidence. The first time
the work orders came to light was when TCI attempted to use them to impeach
plaintiff’s testimony about his job performance. Plaintiff objected to TCI’s use of
the documents, arguing that they were never disclosed to plaintiff despite fairly
broad discovery requests. The court overruled the objection because the
documents were plaintiff’s own work records. See Appellant’s App., Vol. B at
493. The next day, the court heard extensive argument from counsel about the
admissibility of the work orders and a summary of those orders prepared by
plaintiff’s last supervisor, Michele Jackson, that TCI wished to introduce as
evidence. The court ruled that neither the work orders nor the summary could be
admitted as exhibits, but that TCI could examine Michele Jackson on the
summary. See Appellant’s App., Vol. A at 212-213. Thereafter, TCI questioned
Ms. Jackson about information contained in the summary as it related to
plaintiff’s completion of assigned work during the last days of his employment.
-3- On appeal, plaintiff argues that by not disclosing the work orders and
summary before trial, TCI violated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(B)
(initial disclosures), 26(a)(3)(C) (pretrial disclosures), and 26(e)(1)
(supplementation of disclosures). Accordingly, plaintiff contends, the district
court should have precluded TCI from using the documents for any purpose
pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), which provides that “[a] party that without substantial
justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall
not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial . . .
any witness or information not so disclosed.”
TCI argues that it did not violate any of the disclosure requirements of Rule
26(a) or Rule 26(e), and that the documents were not subject to exclusion under
Rule 37(c)(1) because TCI used the documents solely for purposes of impeaching
plaintiff’s testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) 1993 advisory committee’s note
(“As disclosure of evidence offered solely for impeachment purposes is not
required under [Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1)], this preclusion sanction likewise
does not apply to that evidence.”). Further, TCI contends that plaintiff secured all
the benefits of Rule 37(c) by having the documents excluded as exhibits. Plaintiff
admits that the documents were used for impeachment purposes, but argues
impeachment was not the sole purpose for which TCI used the documents.
Plaintiff argues that TCI also used the testimony about the documents to support
-4- its theory that plaintiff wanted to get fired. Further, plaintiff argues that
excluding the documents as exhibits was not a sufficient sanction because the jury
still heard the testimony of plaintiff and Ms. Jackson about the contents of the
documents.
We need not decide whether the district court erred in allowing TCI to
examine plaintiff and Ms. Jackson about the work orders and summary, because
we conclude that even if the district court erred, that error did not prejudicially
affect plaintiff’s substantial rights so as to warrant a new trial. First, the only
substantive purposes for which TCI arguably used the documents was to support
its theory that plaintiff wanted to get fired. Thus, the evidence related only to
TCI’s defense to plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge, not to its defense to
his claim for discriminatory treatment. Second, to defend against plaintiff’s claim
of retaliatory discharge, TCI had only to show that it’s own motives were not
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 3 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
DION JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4103 (D.C. No. 97-CV-722) TCI CABLEVISION OF UTAH, INC., (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , McKAY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, who was employed by TCI Cablevision of Utah, Inc. as a cable
installer, brought this action under Title VII claiming that he was discriminated
against because of his race and that he was discharged in retaliation for engaging
in protected activities. TCI contended that it neither discriminated nor retaliated
against plaintiff, and that it discharged him solely because of his continued failure
to come to work on time. The jury entered a verdict for TCI on both of plaintiff’s
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. claims. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, arguing the district court
committed several reversible errors during the trial. The district court denied the
motion and plaintiff now appeals. 1 On appeal, plaintiff contends a new trial is
warranted based on two district court errors: the district court allowed TCI to use
certain documents during the course of the trial that were not disclosed to
plaintiff before the trial began, and the district court limited the testimony of
plaintiff’s rebuttal character witness.
We review the district court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion for new
trial under an abuse of discretion standard. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc. , 164
F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 50 (1999). The decision to
admit, limit, or exclude evidence also lies within the sound discretion of the
district court. See Hinds v. General Motors Corp. , 988 F.2d 1039, 1049 (10th
Cir. 1993) (reviewing decisions to admit and exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion); Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc. , 903 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir.
1990) (reviewing decision to limit scope of evidence for abuse of discretion).
Even if we find error in the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence,
“we will set aside a jury verdict only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2- right of a party. The effect on the jury of evidence can only be prejudicial if it
can be reasonably concluded that with or without such evidence, there would have
been a contrary result.” Hinds , 988 F.2d at 1049 (citations omitted).
The first evidentiary ruling of which plaintiff complains concerns TCI’s use
of the daily work orders that plaintiff filled out during the course of his
employment. TCI did not make any pre-trial disclosure to plaintiff about its
possession of the work orders or its intent to use them as evidence. The first time
the work orders came to light was when TCI attempted to use them to impeach
plaintiff’s testimony about his job performance. Plaintiff objected to TCI’s use of
the documents, arguing that they were never disclosed to plaintiff despite fairly
broad discovery requests. The court overruled the objection because the
documents were plaintiff’s own work records. See Appellant’s App., Vol. B at
493. The next day, the court heard extensive argument from counsel about the
admissibility of the work orders and a summary of those orders prepared by
plaintiff’s last supervisor, Michele Jackson, that TCI wished to introduce as
evidence. The court ruled that neither the work orders nor the summary could be
admitted as exhibits, but that TCI could examine Michele Jackson on the
summary. See Appellant’s App., Vol. A at 212-213. Thereafter, TCI questioned
Ms. Jackson about information contained in the summary as it related to
plaintiff’s completion of assigned work during the last days of his employment.
-3- On appeal, plaintiff argues that by not disclosing the work orders and
summary before trial, TCI violated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(B)
(initial disclosures), 26(a)(3)(C) (pretrial disclosures), and 26(e)(1)
(supplementation of disclosures). Accordingly, plaintiff contends, the district
court should have precluded TCI from using the documents for any purpose
pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), which provides that “[a] party that without substantial
justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall
not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial . . .
any witness or information not so disclosed.”
TCI argues that it did not violate any of the disclosure requirements of Rule
26(a) or Rule 26(e), and that the documents were not subject to exclusion under
Rule 37(c)(1) because TCI used the documents solely for purposes of impeaching
plaintiff’s testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) 1993 advisory committee’s note
(“As disclosure of evidence offered solely for impeachment purposes is not
required under [Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1)], this preclusion sanction likewise
does not apply to that evidence.”). Further, TCI contends that plaintiff secured all
the benefits of Rule 37(c) by having the documents excluded as exhibits. Plaintiff
admits that the documents were used for impeachment purposes, but argues
impeachment was not the sole purpose for which TCI used the documents.
Plaintiff argues that TCI also used the testimony about the documents to support
-4- its theory that plaintiff wanted to get fired. Further, plaintiff argues that
excluding the documents as exhibits was not a sufficient sanction because the jury
still heard the testimony of plaintiff and Ms. Jackson about the contents of the
documents.
We need not decide whether the district court erred in allowing TCI to
examine plaintiff and Ms. Jackson about the work orders and summary, because
we conclude that even if the district court erred, that error did not prejudicially
affect plaintiff’s substantial rights so as to warrant a new trial. First, the only
substantive purposes for which TCI arguably used the documents was to support
its theory that plaintiff wanted to get fired. Thus, the evidence related only to
TCI’s defense to plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge, not to its defense to
his claim for discriminatory treatment. Second, to defend against plaintiff’s claim
of retaliatory discharge, TCI had only to show that it’s own motives were not
retaliatory in nature. Plaintiff’s motivation for his own conduct was of little, if
any, relevance to TCI’s defense. Finally, TCI presented a wealth of evidence that
plaintiff continually failed to come to work on time, despite receiving numerous
written and verbal warnings about the need to correct his behavior, and that his
tardiness problem worsened significantly during the weeks immediately preceding
his termination. TCI also presented uncontradicted evidence that having its cable
installers report to work on time was very important for effective customer
-5- service. Most importantly, TCI presented uncontradicted evidence that Ms.
Jackson, who was responsible for firing plaintiff, did not rely on plaintiff’s failure
to complete work assignments when she decided to fire plaintiff. In fact, Ms.
Jackson said that she was unaware of how plaintiff’s actual performance had
deteriorated until she reviewed the work orders in the week prior to trial.
“In order to reverse a district court judgment on account of an evidentiary
ruling, [plaintiff] must make a clear showing []he suffered prejudice, and the
ruling was inconsistent with substantial justice or affected [his] substantial
rights.” Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotations omitted). Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that
plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to warrant reversal.
The second evidentiary ruling of which plaintiff complains concerns the
testimony of Carl Dan Miner, plaintiff’s bishop in the Mormon Church. Plaintiff
called Mr. Miner as a rebuttal witness to give his opinion about plaintiff’s
character for truthfulness pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). The district court
permitted Mr. Miner to testify, over TCI’s objection, but he did not permit Mr.
Miner to testify about the religious basis for his relationship with plaintiff. The
district court concluded that “[a]llowing Mr. Miner to testify that he knew
plaintiff through his church would have constituted an improper appeal to
religious prejudice. This type of testimony may have sent the message to the jury
-6- that because the plaintiff attended church he must be an honest person. This type
of testimony is improper . . . .” Appellant’s App., Vol. A at 173-74 (footnote
omitted). In limiting Mr. Miner’s testimony , the district court relied on Fed. R.
Evid. 610, which prohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions
of a witness on matters of religion . . . for the purpose of showing that by reason
of their nature the witness’ credibility is impaired or enhanced.”
Plaintiff contends that the district court should have permitted Mr. Miner to
testify that he knew plaintiff through their church and to describe “the situations
that have caused him to reach an opinion as to [plaintiff’s] character for
truthfulness.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54. Based upon our review of the
record, we conclude that under the circumstances presented here, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Mr. Miner to testify about the
religious basis of his relationship with plaintiff. Moreover, even if the district
court did err in limiting Mr. Miner’s testimony, plaintiff has not shown that the
error prejudicially affected his substantial rights, so as to warrant a new trial.
-7- The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge
-8-