Jones v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Jones v. State

491 N.E.2d 542, 1986 Ind. LEXIS 1102

CourtIndiana Supreme Court

DecidedApril 25, 1986

Docket885S325

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 491 N.E.2d 542 (Jones v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jones v. State, 491 N.E.2d 542, 1986 Ind. LEXIS 1102 (Ind. 1986).

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Opinion

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief. In February, 1984, appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty to a charge of five counts of violation of the Indiana Controlled Substance Act and entered a plea of guilty to a charge of Dealing in Cocaine, a Class B felony, a lesser included offense under Count II of his original charge. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to fifteen (15) years executed sentence on his plea of guilty.

Appellant now claims his plea of guilty was not intelligently and voluntarily made as required by the United States Constitution. He makes two specific claims of omission by the trial court: 1) the mandatory special parole time where a petitioner could conceivably serve the entire fifteen (15) years as fully executed time; and 2) the minimum and maximum applicable sentences of the crimes charged including fines. We find no merit to either of these claims.

There is no requirement in the law that a person entering a plea of guilty be advised as to the possible future effects the parole statutes will have upon his incarceration. In Greer v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 787, 790-91, we held: "The parole requirements in the statute have general application to persons imprisoned for felonies, and do not constitute a special penal consequence for those found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Knowledge of these requirements was not essential to the voluntary and knowing character of appellant's plea." See also, Romine v. State (1982), Ind., 431 N.E.2d 780; Greer v. Duckworth (N.D.Ind.1983), 555 F.Supp. 725.

There is nothing in either the statutes or the case law of this state that requires the defendant be advised as to the possible sentences for all crimes charged. The only requirement is that he be advised as to the consequences of his plea as it relates to the specific crime under which he is to be sentenced on his plea. Brown v. State (1983), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 316.

*544 An examination of the record in this case reveals that appellant was fully advised as to his plea of guilty to Dealing in Cocaine, a Class B felony.

The trial court is affirmed.

All Justices concur.

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GIVAN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief. In February, 1984, appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty to a charge of five counts of violation of the Indiana Controlled Substance Act and entered a plea of guilty to a charge of Dealing in Cocaine, a Class B felony, a lesser included offense under Count II of his original charge. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to fifteen (15) years executed sentence on his plea of guilty.

Appellant now claims his plea of guilty was not intelligently and voluntarily made as required by the United States Constitution. He makes two specific claims of omission by the trial court: 1) the mandatory special parole time where a petitioner could conceivably serve the entire fifteen (15) years as fully executed time; and 2) the minimum and maximum applicable sentences of the crimes charged including fines. We find no merit to either of these claims.

There is no requirement in the law that a person entering a plea of guilty be advised as to the possible future effects the parole statutes will have upon his incarceration. In Greer v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 787, 790-91, we held: "The parole requirements in the statute have general application to persons imprisoned for felonies, and do not constitute a special penal consequence for those found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Knowledge of these requirements was not essential to the voluntary and knowing character of appellant's plea." See also, Romine v. State (1982), Ind., 431 N.E.2d 780; Greer v. Duckworth (N.D.Ind.1983), 555 F.Supp. 725.

There is nothing in either the statutes or the case law of this state that requires the defendant be advised as to the possible sentences for all crimes charged. The only requirement is that he be advised as to the consequences of his plea as it relates to the specific crime under which he is to be sentenced on his plea. Brown v. State (1983), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 316.

*544 An examination of the record in this case reveals that appellant was fully advised as to his plea of guilty to Dealing in Cocaine, a Class B felony.

The trial court is affirmed.

All Justices concur.

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491 N.E.2d 542, 1986 Ind. LEXIS 1102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-state-ind-1986.

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