Jones v. State

544 S.E.2d 541, 247 Ga. App. 716, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 602, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 98
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedJanuary 29, 2001
DocketA00A2559
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 544 S.E.2d 541 (Jones v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. State, 544 S.E.2d 541, 247 Ga. App. 716, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 602, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

Pope, Presiding Judge.

On November 30, 1998, Johnny Jones pled guilty to a stop sign violation, obstruction of an officer, a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and operating a vehicle after having been declared an habitual violator. Jones was sentenced for these crimes to ten years to serve consecutively to a prior sentence.

Jones did not make application for a sentence review within 30 days. More than six months later, in June 2000, he filed a motion for an out-of-time sentence review. The trial court denied the motion, and Jones appeals.

In his sole enumeration of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an out-of-time sentence review. Jones further contends that the court’s denial was arbitrary and capricious. Citing OCGA § 17-10-6 and Brantley v. State, 190 Ga. App. 642 (379 SE2d 627) (1989), he argues that he was entitled to a sentence review and that a sentence review is a “first appeal” as a matter of right.

We reject Jones’ arguments. First, assuming arguendo that OCGA § 17-10-6 even applies to the sentences here,1 there was no error in the court’s denial of the out-of-time motion. Further, Brantley v. State, 190 Ga. App. 642 (1), is distinguishable from this case and is not controlling. Contrary to Jones’ arguments, nothing in Brantley indicates that its pronouncement regarding an appellant’s first appeal as of right applies to untimely motions for review of sentences imposed as part of a plea agreement.2 In this regard, unlike the defendant who appealed his conviction in Brantley, Jones does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea. Moreover, although Jones claims that he asked his attorney to file a motion for sentence review on December 23, 1998, there is no ineffective assistance claim so as to mandate remand. See Holt v. State, 205 Ga. App. 40, 44 (4) (421 SE2d 131) (1992).

Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s denial of Jones’ motion.

Judgment affirmed.

Miller and Mikell, JJ., concur. [717]*717Decided January 29, 2001. Johnny Jones, pro se. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Staci L. Guest, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

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Bluebook (online)
544 S.E.2d 541, 247 Ga. App. 716, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 602, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-state-gactapp-2001.