Jones v. Shinn

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-243
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD LEE JONES Sr., No. 24-243 D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00277-MTL-JZB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID SHINN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry, Director at ADOCRR, Central Office; LORI STICKLEY, Deputy Warden at ASPC-Eyman; RONALD N EVANS; Unknown ASHLIN, Sgt at ASPC- Eyman, SMU 1; EDWARD W. APLAS; ULISES A. KISS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 17, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, OWENS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Arizona state prisoner Edward Lee Jones, Sr. appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth

Amendment violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’s claims

relating to black mold, rodents, and other pests because Jones failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies or raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.

632, 638, 643-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must exhaust “such

administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit and describing

limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are effectively

unavailable).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’s remaining

Eighth Amendment claims because Jones failed to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether defendants acted with deliberate indifference to an

excessive risk of harm to Jones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)

(holding that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if the official was

deliberately indifferent, that is, knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to an

inmate’s health and safety).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for

2 24-243 appointment of counsel because Jones failed to demonstrate “exceptional

circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel. See Cano v. Taylor, 739

F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional

circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s motions to

reopen discovery and extend discovery deadlines. See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison

Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and

requirements to modify a pretrial scheduling order); see also Midbrook

Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 612,

619-20 (9th Cir. 2017) (setting forth standard of review and requirements to

request additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)).

The motion (Docket Entry No. 20) to have the appeal heard on the full

record is denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

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