Jones v. Schwendiman

Utah Supreme Court

Jones v. Schwendiman

721 P.2d 893, 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 1986 Utah LEXIS 820

CourtUtah Supreme Court

DecidedJune 27, 1986

Docket20635

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 721 P.2d 893 (Jones v. Schwendiman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jones v. Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893, 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 1986 Utah LEXIS 820 (Utah 1986).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Jones appeals the revocation of his driver’s license and requests that this Court order reinstatement of his driving privileges.

Defendant revoked plaintiff’s license under Utah’s implied consent statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10. After a trial de novo in district court, plaintiff’s license was revoked as of May 6, 1985, for a period of one year.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that he was not properly requested to submit to a chemical test since the arresting officer did not see plaintiff driving the automobile. The test is whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff was in control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). Although it does appear that there were reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the plaintiff in the instant case was in control of the vehicle, we do not reach the question because the case is now moot.

This Court has held that a case is moot where the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants. Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409 (Utah 1982), and cases cited therein. In the present appeal, plaintiff requests only that his driver’s license be reinstated. The revocation was for one year, which period expired on May 6, 1986, and there is nothing in the record to indicate any stay of that order during the appeal period. 1 Because the order of revocation has now expired by its own terms, we refrain from adjudicating the merits of the issues raised.

The appeal is dismissed. No costs awarded.

1

. The record in the instant case was filed with this Court on June 4, 1986. It does not contain a district court order of stay of judgment pending appeal, and no such order has been sought in this Court. See Utah R.App.P. 8. The only reference by the parties to the date of expiration of the revocation order is contained in defendant’s brief, where it is stated that the order "would expire on May 6, 1986."

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PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Jones appeals the revocation of his driver’s license and requests that this Court order reinstatement of his driving privileges.

Defendant revoked plaintiff’s license under Utah’s implied consent statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10. After a trial de novo in district court, plaintiff’s license was revoked as of May 6, 1985, for a period of one year.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that he was not properly requested to submit to a chemical test since the arresting officer did not see plaintiff driving the automobile. The test is whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff was in control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). Although it does appear that there were reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the plaintiff in the instant case was in control of the vehicle, we do not reach the question because the case is now moot.

This Court has held that a case is moot where the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants. Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409 (Utah 1982), and cases cited therein. In the present appeal, plaintiff requests only that his driver’s license be reinstated. The revocation was for one year, which period expired on May 6, 1986, and there is nothing in the record to indicate any stay of that order during the appeal period. 1 Because the order of revocation has now expired by its own terms, we refrain from adjudicating the merits of the issues raised.

The appeal is dismissed. No costs awarded.

1

. The record in the instant case was filed with this Court on June 4, 1986. It does not contain a district court order of stay of judgment pending appeal, and no such order has been sought in this Court. See Utah R.App.P. 8. The only reference by the parties to the date of expiration of the revocation order is contained in defendant’s brief, where it is stated that the order "would expire on May 6, 1986."

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Bluebook (online)

721 P.2d 893, 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 1986 Utah LEXIS 820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-schwendiman-utah-1986.

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