Jones v. Preiss

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 14, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00615
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Preiss (Jones v. Preiss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Preiss, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

CORVON L. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-C-615

BRIAN HAYES, et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Corvon L. Jones, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Fox Lake Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $19.43. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,”

that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, Plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Plaintiff is an inmate at the Fox Lake Correctional Institution. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants are

Administrator Brian Hayes, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mayumi M. Ishii, Parole Officer (PO) Amy Pucilowski, PO Supervisor Karla Preiss, PO Lacob Leannais, and State Public Defender Eric Hailstock. Id. at 1. According to the complaint, on October 25, 2022, PO Preiss allegedly gave PO Leannais “permission to disguise himself as a neighbor acting as a ‘stalking horse” for the police.” Id. at 2. The police allegedly “breached” a third-party’s home and “illegally seized” Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was then subject to parole revocation charges based on allegations of absconding and attempting to flee the state. Id. Plaintiff gave a statement to his PO denying the allegations, explaining that his address and phone number never changed. Id. at 3. PO Pucilowski later got Plaintiff’s revocation hearing date pushed back several times due to the inability to locate witnesses. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that this violated his right to a “speedy trial” under Wis. Stat. §971.10. Id. at 2-3. The first public defender assigned to Plaintiff’s case withdrew from the case. Id. at 3. Attorney Hailstock later represented Plaintiff during his parole revocation hearing. Id. at 3. Attorney Hailstock was allegedly ineffective as counsel because he did not subpoena squad-car video footage of the incident. Id. ALJ Ishii revoked his parole and Administrator Hayes affirmed ALJ Ishii’s decision. Id. Plaintiff is currently in custody due to his parole revocation. Id. For relief, Plaintiff seeks release from custody and monetary damages. Id. at 4. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S.

v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court will dismiss the complaint. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff cannot seek release from custody through a §1983 lawsuit. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”). Nor can Plaintiff assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a §1983 action. See Cannon v. Newport, 850 F.3d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that a claim that Plaintiff was denied counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment was barred by Heck v. Humphrey because his

conviction had not been set aside). Toward that end, a public defender is not considered a state actor for purposes of a §1983 lawsuit. Agrawal v. Pallmeyer, 313 F. App’x 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Public Defender Hailstock.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Minnesota v. Carter
525 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Wilson v. Kelkhoff
86 F.3d 1438 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Rooni v. Biser
742 F.3d 737 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Cannon v. Newport
850 F.3d 303 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Agrawal v. Pallmeyer
313 F. App'x 866 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Jones v. Preiss, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-preiss-wied-2023.