Jones v. Polland

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedNovember 18, 2019
Docket3:19-cv-02127
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Polland (Jones v. Polland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Polland, (S.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GARLAND JONES, Case No.: 19cv2127 MMA (BLM)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 14 M. POLLARD, Warden, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of 18 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 19 FAILURE TO SATISFY FILING FEE REQUIREMENT 20 Petitioner has failed to pay the $5.00 filing fee and has failed to move to proceed in 21 forma pauperis. Because this Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the 22 $5.00 filing fee or qualified to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court DISMISSES the 23 case without prejudice. See Rule 3(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. If Petitioner wishes to 24 proceed with this case, he must submit, no later than January 13, 2020, a copy of this 25 Order with the $5.00 fee or with adequate proof of his inability to pay the fee. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM ON FEDERAL HABEAS 2 Additionally, in accordance with Rule 4 of the rules governing § 2254 cases, 3 Petitioner has failed to allege that his state court conviction or sentence violates the 4 Constitution of the United States. 5 Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review 6 for federal habeas corpus claims: 7 The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 8 corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 9 judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 10 United States. 11 12 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). See Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th 13 Cir. 1991); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988); Kealohapauole v. 14 Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, to present a cognizable federal 15 habeas corpus claim under § 2254, a state prisoner must allege both that he is in custody 16 pursuant to a “judgment of a State court,” and that he is in custody in “violation of the 17 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 18 Here, Petitioner claims that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 19 “purposely withheld documents,” seemingly related to a civil rights complaint. (Pet. at 6, 20 ECF No. 1.) Petitioner further alleges prison officials have failed to adequately protect 21 him while in custody. (Id. at 8.) In no way, however, does Petitioner claim he is “in 22 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 23 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on habeas because they do not 24 challenge the constitutional validity or duration of confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 25 2254(a); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 26 477, 480–85 (1994). 27 Challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are brought by petition for a writ 28 of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; challenges to conditions of confinement 1 are brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 2 488-500. When a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical 3 imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate 4 release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of 5 habeas corpus. Id. at 500. On the other hand, a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a 6 state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, 7 but not to the fact or length of his custody. Id. at 499; McIntosh v. United States Parole 8 Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997). 9 Further, the Court notes that Petitioner cannot simply amend his Petition to state a 10 federal habeas claim and then refile the amended petition in this case. He must exhaust 11 state judicial remedies before bringing his claims via federal habeas. State prisoners who 12 wish to challenge their state court conviction must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 13 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust 14 state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme 15 Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her 16 federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. 17 Moreover, to properly exhaust state court judicial remedies a petitioner must allege, in 18 state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme 19 Court in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: “If state courts are to be given 20 the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 21 be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 22 Constitution.” Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner 23 wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process 24 of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 25 court, but in state court.” Id. (emphasis added). 26 Additionally, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and 27 Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a 28 petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 1 State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: 2 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 3 seeking such review; 4 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 5 application created by State action in violation of the 6 Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 7

8 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 9 been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 10 retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Granberry v. Greer
481 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 1987)
United States v. Carlton
512 U.S. 26 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Artuz v. Bennett
531 U.S. 4 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Duncan v. Walker
533 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Guenter Mannhalt v. Amos E. Reed
847 F.2d 576 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Mike Hernandez v. Eddie S. Ylst, Warden
930 F.2d 714 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
Jones v. Polland, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-polland-casd-2019.