Jones v. Pierce County Jail

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided January 24, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-06241·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA CASE NO. 3:19-cv-06241-BHS-JRC Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR v. AMEND COMPLAINT PIERCE COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants. This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the District Court has referred to the undersigned. See Dkt. 2. Plaintiff, who is a pretrial detainee proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se, seeks damages from defendants Pierce County Jail and A. Mastrada for alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement—namely filthy recreation yard conditions that plaintiff states caused him to become ill. Plaintiff’s claims against Pierce County Jail and defendant Mastrada in his official capacity fail because plaintiff does not bring them against the proper defendant (Pierce County) and does not allege a municipal custom, policy, or practice that caused the alleged constitutional violation. However, the Court will offer plaintiff an opportunity to amend these claims before service, if he wishes to proceed against the County. Failure to show cause or amend the complaint will result in the undersigned recommending dismissal of all claims except claims brought against defendant Mastrada in his individual capacity for damages. If plaintiff takes no

action in response to this Order by February 28, 2020, then the undersigned will direct service of the complaint on only defendant Mastrada. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment related to conditions of his pretrial confinement at Pierce County Jail. See Dkt. 5, at 4. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on September 5, 2019, he was taken to the jail yard, where there was “visibly an inexcusable amount of bird droppings and feathers littered around the yard area.” Dkt. 5, at 4–5. Defendant Mastrada—who plaintiff alleges “had the authority to close the rec yard”—was alerted and “took notice of the area[,] said he’d work on it[,] and left.” Dkt. 5, at 5. Plaintiff had to remain in the

yard in the meantime, which he alleges caused him to become ill, to begin vomiting, and to ultimately be left bedridden with physical symptoms for a week. See Dkt. 5, at 5. He requests monetary damages from defendant Mastrada for deliberate indifference (for not closing the recreation yard immediately and allowing individuals to remain in the yard after learning of the unsanitary conditions) and from defendant Pierce County Jail. See Dkt. 5, at 5, 9. /// /// /// ///

I. Screening Standards Because plaintiff brings claims against a government entity and a government employee, the Court must review his complaint and dismiss any portion of the complaint that fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. However, because plaintiff is pro se, the Court will offer him an opportunity to amend his complaint unless it appears that any amendment would be futile. See Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, plaintiff’s complaint suffers from deficiencies that will result in the undersigned recommending dismissal of certain claims unless plaintiff corrects those claims in an amended complaint. II. Claims Against Defendant Mastrada in Individual Capacity The Court interprets plaintiff’s claims as claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, since plaintiff alleges that he was a pretrial detainee at the time. See Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2016) (pretrial detainees’ claims considered under the Fourteenth

Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must show that the conditions under which the detainee was confined put him at “substantial risk of suffering serious harm.” See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. Moreover, such a claim requires a showing of “objective indifference, not subjective indifference” by the prison official. See Gordan v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118,

1120 (9th Cir. 2018). Objective indifference is “more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 888 F.3d at 1071. Solely for the purposes of § 1915A screening, the Court finds that plaintiff has adequately stated a claim that defendant Mastrada in his individual capacity violated the

Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Mastrada disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm posed by not immediately closing the recreation yard, which caused plaintiff to become physically ill. However, the Court cautions plaintiff that even if he has adequately alleged this claim for screening purposes, that does not mean that the claim will necessarily survive any motion to dismiss. Further, plaintiff’s remaining claims are deficient in the respects discussed in the remainder of this Order. III. Claims Against Pierce County Jail and Against Defendant Mastrada in Official Capacity Plaintiff requests damages for the allegedly unconstitutional yard conditions from defendant Pierce County Jail. However, the proper defendant for such a claim is Pierce

County—not the jail—since Pierce County is the municipal entity at issue. See, e.g., Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Moreover, even if plaintiff amends his pleading to list Pierce County as a defendant, his claim is inadequate because local governments are not liable simply on the basis that their employees committed misconduct. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). A claim against a municipality requires a showing that the constitutional violation was committed “pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.’” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “Official municipal policy

includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. A plaintiff must show that the policy, practice, or custom caused the constitutional deprivation. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). And like all allegations,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Jones v. Pierce County Jail, (W.D. Wash. 2020).

Jones v. Pierce County Jail (Jones v. Pierce County Jail) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee
14 U.S. 304 (Supreme Court, 1816)
Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
James Gillette v. Duane Delmore, and City of Eugene
979 F.2d 1342 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
AE Ex Rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare
666 F.3d 631 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Vance v. County of Santa Clara
928 F. Supp. 993 (N.D. California, 1996)
Mary Gordon v. County of Orange
888 F.3d 1118 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Trevino v. Gates
99 F.3d 911 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.
114 F.3d 1467 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Connick v. Thompson
179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Busby v. City of Orlando
931 F.2d 764 (Eleventh Circuit, 1991)