[Cite as Jones v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2026-Ohio-1583.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
BRANDON MICHAEL JONES : : C.A. No. 30662 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 05524 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas DIRECTOR OF OHIO DEPARTMENT : Court) OF JOB AND FAMILY SERV ET AL. : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellees : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 1, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30662
BRANDON MICHAEL JONES, Appellant, Pro Se DOUGLAS R. UNVER, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} In this administrative appeal, Brandon Michael Jones appeals pro se from the
decision of the trial court affirming the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission (“UCRC”) finding that Jones was terminated for just cause because he had
been incarcerated. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Procedural History
{¶ 2} The administrative transcript reflects the following facts. Jones was employed
by Manpower U.S., Inc. (“Manpower”), from October 13, 2022, through December 12, 2022.
He was on an assignment with Proctor and Gamble, which ended because he was
incarcerated on December 12, 2022, and he remained so until February 2023. On February
27, 2023, Jones filed an application for determination of benefit rights with the Ohio
Department of Job and Family Services, which was disallowed.
{¶ 3} On July 17, 2024, the Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services
(“Director”), issued a redetermination disallowing the application based upon a finding that
Jones was discharged for just cause, pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), for being absent or
tardy. On August 6, 2024, Jones appealed the redetermination. The following day, the Ohio
Department of Jobs and Family Services transferred jurisdiction to the UCRC.
{¶ 4} On August 27, 2024, a telephone hearing was conducted by a UCRC hearing
officer. Manpower did not appear. Jones stated that his assignment ended because he was
incarcerated for more than 30 days and that he reported his situation to a supervisor at
2 Manpower, in accordance with Manpower policy. The supervisor advised Jones to “ask for
work release.” Jones stated he could not “get work relief.” After Jones was released from
jail, according to him, he was advised by Manpower that he could no longer work at Proctor
and Gamble under the policy of that company, but he remained “in good standing” with
Manpower, was offered another position—which he did not accept—and was never
discharged. The hearing officer affirmed the Director’s redetermination, finding that Jones
was separated from his employment with Manpower for just cause, his incarceration, as
provided under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d).
{¶ 5} Jones sought review by the UCRC. On October 2, 2024, a decision was mailed
that stated, “The Commission concludes that the Hearing Officer’s decision should be
affirmed."
{¶ 6} On October 24, 2024, Jones filed a notice of administrative appeal with multiple
attachments in the trial court. On September 17, 2025, Jones filed a brief, and the UCRC
did so on September 24, 2025. The trial court’s decision that is the subject of this appeal
was issued on October 3, 2025. It stated, in part, “The UCRC hearing officer found that Mr.
Jones was terminated for just cause because he was incarcerated, by his own admission.
That finding has been affirmed throughout the administrative process, and was not
unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Rather, it is
consistent with the language and purpose of the statutes.” Jones filed a timely notice of
appeal.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶ 7} In his pro se brief, Jones’s sole assignment of error asserts that the trial court
violated multiple Civil Rules, namely Civ.R. 6, 7, 8, 12, 16, 26, 32, and 34. Jones quotes
each rule in turn, without mention of their applicability to an administrative appeal or to the
3 just cause determination. He asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court or remand the
matter for further proceedings. The Director responds that Jones was not entitled to
unemployment compensation, and the determination that he was terminated for just cause
is supported by the record and is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
{¶ 8} “Litigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law and
correct procedure, and are held to the same standard as other litigants.” Yocum v. Means,
2002-Ohio-3803, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357,
363 (8th Dist. 1996). “[A] pro se litigant ‘cannot expect or demand special treatment from the
judge, who is to sit as an impartial arbiter.’” Id., quoting Kilroy at 363.
{¶ 9} R.C. 4141.282(H) states that the common pleas court “shall hear the appeal on
the certified record provided by the commission. If the court finds that the decision of the
commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it
shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission.
Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission.”
{¶ 10} “The Ohio Supreme Court recognizes that there is no distinction between the
scope of review of common pleas and appellate courts under the unemployment
compensation statute.” Broaddus v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs and Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-1205,
¶ 13 (9th Dist.), citing Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d
694, 696-697 (1995), and Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18
(1985). Accordingly, “this Court ‘may only reverse an unemployment compensation eligibility
decision by the Review Commission if the decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the
manifest weight of the evidence.’” Id., quoting Moore v. Comparison Market, Inc., 2006-Ohio-
6382, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing Tzangas at 696. Moore noted that “‘it is important to keep in mind
4 the limitation on an appellate court’s assessment of a Review Commission decision, which
precludes the court from making factual findings or weighing the credibility of witnesses.’”
Id., quoting Moore at ¶ 7, citing Tzangas at 696.
{¶ 11} “Pursuant to R.C. 2505.03(B), the appellate rules govern administrative
appeals taken to the common pleas court, not the civil rules.” VFW Post 1238 v. Liquor
Control Comm., 1997 WL 614938, *1, fn.1 (6th Dist. Sept. 22, 1997). R.C. 2505.03 states,
in part:
Unless, in the case of an administrative-related appeal, Chapter 119. or other
sections of the Revised Code apply, such an appeal is governed by this
chapter and, to the extent this chapter does not contain a relevant provision,
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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[Cite as Jones v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2026-Ohio-1583.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
BRANDON MICHAEL JONES : : C.A. No. 30662 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 05524 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas DIRECTOR OF OHIO DEPARTMENT : Court) OF JOB AND FAMILY SERV ET AL. : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellees : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 1, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30662
BRANDON MICHAEL JONES, Appellant, Pro Se DOUGLAS R. UNVER, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} In this administrative appeal, Brandon Michael Jones appeals pro se from the
decision of the trial court affirming the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission (“UCRC”) finding that Jones was terminated for just cause because he had
been incarcerated. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Procedural History
{¶ 2} The administrative transcript reflects the following facts. Jones was employed
by Manpower U.S., Inc. (“Manpower”), from October 13, 2022, through December 12, 2022.
He was on an assignment with Proctor and Gamble, which ended because he was
incarcerated on December 12, 2022, and he remained so until February 2023. On February
27, 2023, Jones filed an application for determination of benefit rights with the Ohio
Department of Job and Family Services, which was disallowed.
{¶ 3} On July 17, 2024, the Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services
(“Director”), issued a redetermination disallowing the application based upon a finding that
Jones was discharged for just cause, pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), for being absent or
tardy. On August 6, 2024, Jones appealed the redetermination. The following day, the Ohio
Department of Jobs and Family Services transferred jurisdiction to the UCRC.
{¶ 4} On August 27, 2024, a telephone hearing was conducted by a UCRC hearing
officer. Manpower did not appear. Jones stated that his assignment ended because he was
incarcerated for more than 30 days and that he reported his situation to a supervisor at
2 Manpower, in accordance with Manpower policy. The supervisor advised Jones to “ask for
work release.” Jones stated he could not “get work relief.” After Jones was released from
jail, according to him, he was advised by Manpower that he could no longer work at Proctor
and Gamble under the policy of that company, but he remained “in good standing” with
Manpower, was offered another position—which he did not accept—and was never
discharged. The hearing officer affirmed the Director’s redetermination, finding that Jones
was separated from his employment with Manpower for just cause, his incarceration, as
provided under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d).
{¶ 5} Jones sought review by the UCRC. On October 2, 2024, a decision was mailed
that stated, “The Commission concludes that the Hearing Officer’s decision should be
affirmed."
{¶ 6} On October 24, 2024, Jones filed a notice of administrative appeal with multiple
attachments in the trial court. On September 17, 2025, Jones filed a brief, and the UCRC
did so on September 24, 2025. The trial court’s decision that is the subject of this appeal
was issued on October 3, 2025. It stated, in part, “The UCRC hearing officer found that Mr.
Jones was terminated for just cause because he was incarcerated, by his own admission.
That finding has been affirmed throughout the administrative process, and was not
unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Rather, it is
consistent with the language and purpose of the statutes.” Jones filed a timely notice of
appeal.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶ 7} In his pro se brief, Jones’s sole assignment of error asserts that the trial court
violated multiple Civil Rules, namely Civ.R. 6, 7, 8, 12, 16, 26, 32, and 34. Jones quotes
each rule in turn, without mention of their applicability to an administrative appeal or to the
3 just cause determination. He asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court or remand the
matter for further proceedings. The Director responds that Jones was not entitled to
unemployment compensation, and the determination that he was terminated for just cause
is supported by the record and is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
{¶ 8} “Litigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law and
correct procedure, and are held to the same standard as other litigants.” Yocum v. Means,
2002-Ohio-3803, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357,
363 (8th Dist. 1996). “[A] pro se litigant ‘cannot expect or demand special treatment from the
judge, who is to sit as an impartial arbiter.’” Id., quoting Kilroy at 363.
{¶ 9} R.C. 4141.282(H) states that the common pleas court “shall hear the appeal on
the certified record provided by the commission. If the court finds that the decision of the
commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it
shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission.
Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission.”
{¶ 10} “The Ohio Supreme Court recognizes that there is no distinction between the
scope of review of common pleas and appellate courts under the unemployment
compensation statute.” Broaddus v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs and Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-1205,
¶ 13 (9th Dist.), citing Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d
694, 696-697 (1995), and Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18
(1985). Accordingly, “this Court ‘may only reverse an unemployment compensation eligibility
decision by the Review Commission if the decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the
manifest weight of the evidence.’” Id., quoting Moore v. Comparison Market, Inc., 2006-Ohio-
6382, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing Tzangas at 696. Moore noted that “‘it is important to keep in mind
4 the limitation on an appellate court’s assessment of a Review Commission decision, which
precludes the court from making factual findings or weighing the credibility of witnesses.’”
Id., quoting Moore at ¶ 7, citing Tzangas at 696.
{¶ 11} “Pursuant to R.C. 2505.03(B), the appellate rules govern administrative
appeals taken to the common pleas court, not the civil rules.” VFW Post 1238 v. Liquor
Control Comm., 1997 WL 614938, *1, fn.1 (6th Dist. Sept. 22, 1997). R.C. 2505.03 states,
in part:
Unless, in the case of an administrative-related appeal, Chapter 119. or other
sections of the Revised Code apply, such an appeal is governed by this
chapter and, to the extent this chapter does not contain a relevant provision,
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. When an administrative-related appeal is
so governed, if it is necessary in applying the Rules of Appellate Procedure to
such an appeal, the administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal,
commission, or other instrumentality shall be treated as if it were a trial court
whose final order, judgment, or decree is the subject of an appeal to a court of
appeals or as if it were a clerk of such a trial court.
{¶ 12} Accordingly, violations of the civil rules are not properly raised in appeals under
R.C. 4141.282(H), because the appellate rules govern such proceedings, review is limited
to the certified record, and the statutory standard focuses on whether UCRC’s decision was
unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence rather than the
procedural requirements of the Civil Rules. Jones’ arguments that the trial court violated the
inapplicable Civil Rules lack merit.
{¶ 13} Further, “[u]nemployment benefits may not be paid to a person who has been
discharged for just cause.” Gregg v. SBC Ameritech, 2004-Ohio-1061, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.),
5 citing R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). “‘Just cause’ is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is
a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act. Whether just cause exists depends
on the unique factual circumstances of each case.” Id., citing Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 17.
R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) disqualifies an individual from benefits if the individual “has been
discharged for just cause in connection with the individual’s work,” and
R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d) provides a categorical disqualification when the individual has
become “unemployed by reason of commitment to any correctional institution.” “The fact that
two sections of the Revised Code apply to this particular set of circumstances does not
change the fact that appellant, through his own fault, was unable to attend work.” Scharver
v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. Office of Unemp. Comp., 2007-Ohio-3633, ¶ 14
(5th Dist.).
{¶ 14} As the trial court noted, Jones admitted, and it was found throughout the entire
administrative proceedings, that his employment was terminated after he was incarcerated.
As the Director asserts, under our restrictive standard of review, the decision of the trial court
is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Jones’s
assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 15} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.