Jones v. Montgomery Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr. Bd. of Edn.

2025 Ohio 4774

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 30415
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Jones v. Montgomery Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr. Bd. of Edn., 2025-Ohio-4774.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

KRIS JONES : : C.A. No. 30415 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 00623 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas BOARD OF EDUCATION OF : Court) MONTGOMERY COUNTY : EDUCATIONAL SERVICE CENTER : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION Appellee ...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on October 17, 2025, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

EPLEY, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30415

DAVID M. DUWEL, Attorney for Appellant BEVERLY A. MEYER & BENJAMIN J. REEB, Attorneys for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Kris Jones appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of her administrative appeal

against the Board of Education of the Montgomery County Educational Service Center (“the

Board”) due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Board had not issued a final order from

which Jones could have appealed, and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over her action. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In October 2023, Jones was employed in a full-time first shift non-teaching

position as an administrative assistant at the Board’s Early Childhood Program at Learning

Center East. Based on several allegations made against her by her employer, Jones

underwent a pre-disciplinary hearing, where she presented a response to the Board’s

allegations.

{¶ 3} On January 18, 2024, the Board’s director of human resources mailed Jones a

letter with a notice of disciplinary transfer, advising her that, although her actions provided

sufficient grounds for termination of her employment, she was not being terminated but

rather was being transferred to a full-time second shift custodial position at Learning Center

North. On January 26, 2024, the Board’s treasurer sent an email to Jones, which stated:

Good Afternoon,

Last night (1/25/24) the Montgomery County Governing Board of Education

met in open session and took action to approve your transfer. Therefore, you

2 are expected to report to work per the letter dated January 18, 2024, from Mrs.

Stout. If you have any questions, please reach out to Marion Stout, HR Director

for MCESC directly.

Thanks,

Christopher Fox

Treasurer

Montgomery County E.S.C.

{¶ 4} Jones appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court, contending that she was

demoted and thus allowed to appeal the Board’s action demoting her. The parties disputed

whether Jones had actually been demoted. The trial court issued an entry finding that

pursuant to R.C. 2506.03, a hearing to gather additional evidence was necessary, and

evidentiary hearings were held on two dates.

{¶ 5} Following the hearings, the trial court dismissed Jones’s appeal after concluding

sua sponte that absent a final order and service of notice of a final order, the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to consider Jones’s appeal. In its decision, the trial court stated

that for Jones to perfect an administrative appeal, (1) the Board must have issued a final

order terminating, suspending, or demoting Jones; (2) the Board must have served Jones

with notice of its decision; and (3) Jones must have perfected the appeal within ten days of

receipt of the notice. The court found that there was no indication in the record that the Board

had issued a final order from which Jones could have perfected her appeal or that the Board

had served Jones with notice of a final order. Accordingly, the court concluded that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 6} Jones appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her administrative appeal.

3 II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 7} On appeal, Jones asserts two assignments of error:

The Trial Court erred when it determined that it did not have jurisdiction

of Plaintiff-Appellant’s administrative appeal due to the lack of a final

appealable order and service upon Ms. Jones.

The Trial Court erred in not remanding the case to the officer or body

appealed from with instructions to enter an order, adjudication or decision

pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2506.08.

{¶ 8} Jones brought her administrative appeal in the trial court under R.C. 3319.081,

which governs employment contracts for non-teaching public school employees. The statute

allows an employee to appeal a board of education’s action terminating the contract of the

employee or suspending or demoting the employee. R.C. 3319.081(C). The statute requires

the action of the board to be served upon the employee by certified mail, regular mail with a

certificate of mailing, or other form of delivery with proof of delivery, including electronic

delivery with electronic proof of delivery. Id. Within ten days of the employee’s receipt of the

board’s notice, the employee may file an appeal, in writing, with the court of common pleas

in the county in which the board is situated. Id. After hearing the appeal, the common pleas

court may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the action of the board. Id.

{¶ 9} R.C. 3319.081, however, lacks a statutory procedure for appeals, and as a

result, an appeal of a school board decision under R.C. 3319.081 is brought under

R.C. Chapter 2506. Matthews v. Springfield-Clark CTC Bd., 2023-Ohio-1304, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.),

citing Kiel v. Green Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 149 (1994), Robinson v.

Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 144 Ohio App.3d 38, 42 (9th Dist. 2001),

paragraph one of the syllabus, and McGlinch v. Greenville City School Dist., 2010-Ohio-

4 2924, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). The right to appeal from an administrative decision is not an inherent

right but instead is one conferred by statute. See Harrison v. Ohio State Medical Bd.,

103 Ohio App.3d 317, 321 (10th Dist. 1995). When a statute confers a right to appeal, strict

adherence to the statutory conditions is essential. Holmes v. Union Gospel Press, 64 Ohio

St.2d 187, 188 (1980).

{¶ 10} In general, every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal,

authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political

subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in

which the principal office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505

of the Revised Code. R.C. 2506.01(A). As used in R.C. Chapter 2506, “‘final order,

adjudication, or decision’ means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights,

duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person. . .” R.C. 2506.01(C). To be

appealable under R.C. 2506.01, the administrative decision must be rendered in a quasi-

judicial proceeding, which includes requirements of notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to

introduce evidence. Lakota Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Brickner, 108 Ohio App. 3d 637

(6th Dist. 1996).

{¶ 11} The hearing of an appeal taken in relation to a final order, adjudication, or

decision covered by division (A) of section 2506.01 of the Revised Code shall proceed as in

the trial of a civil action, but the court shall generally be confined to the transcript filed under

section 2506.02 of the Revised Code. R.C. 2506.03(A). The Revised Code further provides:

If an appeal is taken in relation to a final order, adjudication, or decision

covered by division (A) of section 2506.01 of the Revised Code, the court may

find that the order, adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, illegal,

arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of

5 substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record. Consistent

with its findings, the court may affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the order,

adjudication, or decision, or remand the cause to the officer or body appealed

from with instructions to enter an order, adjudication, or decision consistent

with the findings or opinion of the court. The judgment of the court may be

appealed by any party on questions of law as provided in the Rules of

Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter

2505. of the Revised Code.

R.C. 2506.08.

{¶ 12} In addition to the foregoing requirements for an administrative appeal, a trial

court must have subject matter jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. Subject matter

jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and decide a case upon its merits and to provide

the remedy demanded. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St. 2d 86 (1972). We have held that,

“‘[a] court of common pleas has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal [under Chapter 2506]

unless there is a final order from which to appeal.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Leist v. Mad

River Twp. Bd. of Trs., 2016-Ohio-2960, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), quoting Bench Billboard Co. v. City

of Dayton, 1992 WL 80772, *7 (2d Dist. Apr. 10, 1992).

{¶ 13} A final order by an administrative board should contain the following:

1. the case number, the applicant, and a brief description of the matter before

the administrative board;

2. a designation as a final decision;

3. a clear pronouncement of the board’s decision;

6 4. the signatures of the entire board, the voting majority of the board, or the

signature of the clerk for the board expressly certifying that the decision

constitutes the action taken by the board;

5. a date indicating when the decision was mailed to the applicant.

Am. Aggregates Corp. v. Clay Twp., 1997 WL 282334, *5-6 (2d Dist. May 30, 1997). “By

complying with these formalities, an administrative board ensures that the document

received by the applicant clearly constitutes a final decision of the board and is, therefore, a

final appealable order.” Id. at *6.

{¶ 14} “‘[T]he lack of a final appealable order goes to the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction which cannot be waived and may be raised sua sponte by an appellate court.’”

Leist at ¶ 6, quoting Galloway v. Firelands Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2013-Ohio-4264,

¶ 6 (9th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82, 84

(1996). In other words, “[b]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court

to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any

time.” Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11, citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,

630 (2002) and State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75 (1998).

{¶ 15} If the trial court acts without subject matter jurisdiction, any proclamation by

that court is void ab initio. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), paragraph three of the

syllabus. Thus, “[w]hen there is a lack of jurisdiction, a dismissal of the action is the only

proper order.” Dilatush v. Bd. of Rev., Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 107 Ohio App. 551,

552-53 (2d Dist. 1959). “A trial court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction raises questions of law; thus, an appellate court reviews the decision de novo.”

DeSantis v. Estate of De Santis, 2023-Ohio-519, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.), quoting In re Britt, 2015-

Ohio-1605, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.), citing Morway v. Durkin, 2009-Ohio-932, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.).

7 {¶ 16} In the case before us, Jones concedes that the January 18th letter regarding

her disciplinary transfer did not constitute a final order from the Board because it preceded

the Board’s January 25th hearing approving the transfer. However, Jones contends that the

email sent to her by the Board’s treasurer did constitute a final order because it stated the

Board’s decision to transfer her to another position. Jones argues that the Board’s treasurer

was authorized by the Board to communicate its decision to transfer her in his email and the

disciplinary nature of the transfer, as set forth in the January 18th letter, was a demotion

subject to administrative appeal.

{¶ 17} In its decision, the trial court provided the requirements of an administrative

board’s final order as set forth in Am. Aggregates Corp. and concluded that neither the

January 18th letter from the Board’s human resources director nor the email from the

Board’s treasurer constituted a final order. According to the court and conceded by Jones,

the January 18th letter (dated before the Board’s January 25th hearing) did not constitute a

final order of the Board from which Jones could appeal. The January 26th email from the

Board’s treasurer, which Jones submits is the final order, did not include all the requirements

of a final order but rather included only a date and the treasurer’s name. Under these

circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the absence of the necessary components

of a final order of the Board defeats Jones’s contention that the email from the Board’s

treasurer constitutes a final appealable order. Without a final order, the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over Jones’s administrative appeal.

{¶ 18} Jones also argues that the minutes from the Board’s January 25th meeting

were required to be read, modified, and approved. The trial court acknowledged that

according to the record, such action did not occur. The trial court recognized that under

R.C. 2506.08, it had the authority to remand the cause to the Board with instructions to enter

8 an order, adjudication, or decision. R.C. 2506.08; Leist, 2016-Ohio-2960, at ¶ 7-9 (2d Dist.)

(remanding administrative appeal of terminated fire chief to the township board of trustees

to issue a final order from which the former employee could appeal). But the trial court

declined to remand the matter to the Board. The trial court explained that because it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction, it could not resolve the contested issue of whether Jones was, in

fact, demoted—an essential prerequisite of her right to appeal. Lacking the authority to

determine the issue of Jones’s alleged demotion, the trial court concluded it could not direct

the Board to enter a final order or to serve notice of that order upon Jones. We agree that

the trial court, lacking subject matter jurisdiction, had no authority to resolve whether Jones

was demoted for the purpose of ascertaining her right to appeal. The trial court correctly

declined remand of Jones’s appeal to the Board for entry of a final order or service of notice

of that order on Jones.

{¶ 19} Jones’s assignments of error are overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 20} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

.............

EPLEY, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.