Jones v. Mercy Health Services, Inc.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedSeptember 22, 1997
DocketI.C. No. 479225
StatusPublished

This text of Jones v. Mercy Health Services, Inc. (Jones v. Mercy Health Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Mercy Health Services, Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. 1997).

Opinion

The undersigned have reviewed the Award based upon the record of the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner.

The appealing party has shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence. However, upon much detailed reconsideration of the evidence as a whole, the undersigned reach the same facts and conclusions as those reached by the Deputy Commissioner, with minor technical modifications. The Full Commission, in their discretion, have determined that there are no good grounds in this case to receive further evidence or to rehear the parties or their representatives, as sufficient convincing evidence exists in the record to support their findings of fact, conclusions of law and ultimate order.

* * * * * * * * * *

This matter was initially heard before the Deputy Commissioner on September 29, 1995, in Charlotte, North Carolina. At the initial hearing, the parties stipulated that they are subject to the Workers' Compensation Act, that an Employer-Employee relationship existed between the parties during the time period in question, that plaintiff's average weekly wage is properly represented on a Form 22 submitted to the Industrial Commission, and that Mercy Health Services, Inc., is a duly qualified self-insured with Key Risk Management Services, Inc., as the adjusting agent for this claim. The parties further stipulated that plaintiff has received short-term disability benefits beginning in May, 1995, and that such benefits were provided pursuant to a group disability plan funded solely by Defendant.

Following the initial hearing, the parties took the deposition of Anita Gail Doster on January 17, 1996, and the deposition of Dr. Carmine Dalto on June 25, 1996. On June 27, 1996, the records of Dr. William F. Cappleman, III were forwarded to the Industrial Commission and stipulated into evidence by the parties. By Order of the deputy commissioner the record was closed on September 24, 1996, and the parties were provided a period of time to submit contentions. Thereafter, the period of time to submit contentions was enlarged, up to, and including December 13, 1996.

The issues before the deputy commissioner and now the Full Commission include the following:

1. Whether Plaintiff developed reactive airways disease syndrome (RADS), and, if so, whether the same constitutes a compensable occupational disease?

2. In the event Plaintiff has contracted a compensable occupational disease, whether Plaintiff is entitled to any compensation for disability?

3. In the event Plaintiff's claim is ruled compensable, whether Defendant is entitled to take a credit for payments made to Plaintiff under a group disability plan under N.C. G.S. § 97-42.

Accordingly, based on the competent, credible, and convincing evidence of record, the undersigned make the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff has been employed with Defendant-Employer from December 29, 1980, until at least the date of initial hearing as a respiratory technician. However, she has not returned to work since May 20, 1995, when she began a leave of absence.

2. Plaintiff is a high school graduate and has completed two years of study at Central Piedmont Community College. She has worked in the textile, food service and grocery-retail industries. In addition to her medical duties as a respiratory technician, she has performed clerical work for Mercy Health Services, Inc., consisting of typing and record keeping.

3. Plaintiff's duties as a respiratory technician included administering respiratory care and patient testing, along with utilizing, maintaining and cleaning respiratory therapy equipment.

4. Cleaning respiratory therapy equipment required Plaintiff to wash the utensils in a solution of water and Joy dish washing detergent, followed by a solution of water and a cleaning agent-antiseptic, known by the brand name Wavicide, which contains the active ingredient glutaraldehyde.

5. Until 1994, the Wavicide used at Mercy Health Services was in a solution form that was diluted by 50% with water. Since 1994, Plaintiff has not cleaned respiratory therapy equipment, nor worked with Wavicide. Plaintiff has never been exposed to Cidex.

6. The MSDS Material Safety Date Sheet for Wavicide establishes that the only possible health hazard resulting from inhalation is "(v)apors from full strength solution may cause nasal discomfort." Respiratory control measures are "not generally required, but in a confined or poorly ventilated area, the use of NOSH approved respirator may be required."

7. Although Plaintiff testified that Wavicide "takes your breath like ammonia," the MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet for Wavicide lists no such hazard. Conversely, Ms. Doster has personally cleaned respiratory equipment with Wavicide, and noted that "I could sense a faint odor, but nothing that was irritating to me."

8. The facility in which Plaintiff worked was ventilated with an exhaust system. Additionally, cleaning rooms on other floors were ventilated by a negative pressure system which exhaust air outside to insure that it is not recirculated within the facility. The negative pressure system for the cleaning room located on the fifth floor was activated by a "light switch" located on a wall in the cleaning room.

9. The fifth floor cleaning room was attached to a breezeway and the doors to this cleaning room were always kept open, except during fire drills.

10. Until the position was eliminated in 1994, the duties of cleaning and maintaining equipment were relegated to a single equipment technician. Respiratory technicians, such as Plaintiff, performed equipment cleaning solely on the weekends when the equipment technician was absent. Since 1994, all respiratory therapy department staff members, consisting of eighteen to twenty persons, clean equipment as part of their regular duties.

11. Plaintiff assumed no greater responsibility for cleaning equipment than did any of her co-workers. Moreover, less than 5% of Plaintiff's work day was involved in cleaning equipment.

12. Although Plaintiff testified that on one occasion she was exposed to Wavicide, when the solution was spilled, Ms. Doster testified that Plaintiff was specifically instructed not to approach the area near the spill, and the spill was cleaned up by Plaintiff's co-worker, Patrick Gann.

13. The prior equipment technician who performed all cleaning duties on a full-time basis and used Wavicide throughout her workday developed Asthma. However, she continued to utilize Wavicide with no additional problems noted by Ms. Doster for six to eight years after receiving a diagnosis of Asthma.

14. On February 10, 1994, Plaintiff was treated for an upper respiratory infection and diagnosed by her family physician, Dr. William F. Cappleman, III, with sino-bronchitis and a chronic cough. Throughout February of 1994, Dr. Cappleman treated Plaintiff for persistent respiratory infections. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff underwent sinus surgery. Plaintiff had a history of respiratory arrest related to her use of Valium.

15. Following Plaintiff's return to work on October 14, 1994, she was not required to clean equipment and only performed "floor work," i.e. worked with patients. When she came back to work, Plaintiff was feeling better, but became sick again three days later while walking down a hallway where a floor was being stripped with stripping solution. Plaintiff's symptoms were further aggravated when she smelled perfume worn by a co-worker.

16. In a report dated September 7, 1994, Dr. Cappleman noted that Plaintiff had informed him that "she regularly participates in cleaning respiratory equipment with Sidex (sic) which (sic) an aqueous glutaraldehyde solution.

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Jones v. Mercy Health Services, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-mercy-health-services-inc-ncworkcompcom-1997.