Jones v. McDade

75 So. 988, 200 Ala. 230, 1917 Ala. LEXIS 395
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedMay 17, 1917
Docket3 Div. 296.
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 75 So. 988 (Jones v. McDade) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. McDade, 75 So. 988, 200 Ala. 230, 1917 Ala. LEXIS 395 (Ala. 1917).

Opinion

McCLELLAN, J.

Article 18, consisting-of sections 2S4r-287, inclusive, provides a complete system for either amending the organic law through the submission by the Legislature of an amendment or amendments to the electorate of the state, or the submission by the Legislature to the electorate of a proposition to constitute and convene a body to alter the Constitution. The report of this appeal will contain the sections mentioned, except 285, which is quoted in the opinion. The process provided by these sections is not legislation, is not lawmaking in the sense that laws are proposed and are considered and enacted, under the Constitution of this state. One of the distinguishing features of the two systems and processes is that to the executive is committed functions and powers with respect to the enactment of statutes (Const. §§ 45, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 125); while with respect to the submission to the electorate of propositions for the amendment- of the organic law or for the •convention of a body to alter or amend the Constitution through “act or resolution” section 2S7 provides that neither the “act or resolution” so evincing the judgment of the Senate .and House in the premises “shall be submitted for the approval of the Governor, but shall be valid without his approval.” Another distinguishing feature is present in the fact that a statute becomes a law when its enactment has been accomplished according .to the forms prescribed by the Constitution; whereas the service performed by the legislative houses in respect of changes in the Constitution is that of a proposer of a proposition for the consideration and judgment of the electors at the ballot box; and such a proposition is wholly ineffectual unless the requisite majority of the electorate affirmatively approve the proposition so submitted. The proposal and submission of an amendment or of amendments to the Constitution may be made by resolution, instead of > by an act; the choice of one of these means by the houses for submitting an amendment to the judgment of the electorate being given the houses by section 287 of the •Constitution. A comparison of the methods prescribed by the Constitution for enacting laws with those prescribed for the valid submission by the houses of amendments to the Constitution discloses many differences essential for the valid enactment of laws, and not at all prescribed by the Constitution when the object of the houses is to submit an amendment to the Constitution to the judgment of the electorate. It is not necessary to enter upon an enumeration of all these differences, since they are readily discoverable upon a comparative reading of the two distinct systems. One contemplates the enactment of laws of a permanent nature; while the other contemplates the mere submission of propositions for electoral consideration and action, upon the affirmative response to which by the requisite majority of the electorate the proposal submitted by the houses becomes a part of the Constitution of the state, not an element of the statutory law of the state.

[1] It is not debatable in this jurisdiction that the inquiry whether the organic law has been validly, effectually amended is, under the Constitution, a judicial question. The suggestion to the contrary was finally concluded by this court in Collier, Governor, v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, 109, decided in 1854, where it was aptly said:

“We entertain no doubt that, to change the Constitution in any other mode than by a convention, every requisition which is demanded by the instrument itself must be observed, and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment. We scarcely deem any argument necessary to enforce this proposition. The Constitution is the supremo- and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it is clearly defined. It has been said *234 that certain acts are to he done, certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what purpose are these acts required, or these requisitions enjoined, if the Legislature or any other department of the govoi'nment can dispense with them? To do so would be to violate the instrument which they are sworn to support; and every principle of public law and sound constitutional policy requires the courts to pronounce against every amendment which is shown not to have been made in accordance with the rules prescribed by the fundamental law.”

[2] Under the method prescribed by the mentioned sections of the Constitution, for the formulation arid submission of amendments, two things are necessary to be done in each of the houses, viz.: (a) “The proposed amendments shall be read * * * on three several days” ; and (b) “three-fifths of all the members elected” to each house shall vote in favor of the submission of proposed amendments, whereupon an election shall be ordered by the Legislature upon the amendment or amendments so favored. While there is, as stated, a requirement that a proposed amendment shall be read in each house on three several days, there is no provision of the Constitution requiring that such readings shall be affirmatively shown on or by the journals of either or both of the houses. It is required by section 287 that “all votes of the Legislature upon proposed amendments to this Constitution, • * * * shall be taken by yeas and nays and entered on the journals." (Italics supplied.) This court long since- accepted and has often applied the rule that, unless the Constitution expressly requires the journals to show certain action by the houses, the presumption will be indulged, if not refuted by the recitals of the journals themselves, that the Legislature observed the prescriptions of -the organic law prescribing methods,for the exercise of the functions of that department. State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 599, 613; Harrison v. Gordy, 57 Ala. 49; Walker v. Griffith, 60 Ala. 361, 366, 367; Cooley’s Con. Lim. pp. 193-195. The reason and conservative result of this rule impels its application to t)ie system provided by our Constitution for proposing amendments thereto or for proposing to- the electorate the convention of a body to alter the Constitution. The requirement for several readings of subjects of consideration by legislative bodies as directed to the purposes, among others, of preventing hasty and ill-advised action, to the assurance of cautious and deliberate judgment by the bodies. Cooley, p. 117; 36 Cyc. pp. 949, 950.

[3] The requirement of three readings in each house of proposed amendments to the Constitution (section 284) was not intended to exact these six readings of a proposed amendment in hmc verba in both houses. To so affirm would exclude the right of the houses to amend, and thereby to perfect proposals for the submission to the electorate of amendments to the Constitution. The very purpose of the requirement of several readings in the houses of subjects of legislative action—whether with the view to the enactment of laws or to the submission of ameridments to the Constitution to the electorate—is to assure the cautious, conservative deliberation of the bodies thereupon, a process that always implies, within constitutional limitations, the possession of the parliamentary means whereby the subject of consideration may be made to harmonize with the judgment of the requisite majority in the respective bodies, and thus perfect the product of their deliberation.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 So. 988, 200 Ala. 230, 1917 Ala. LEXIS 395, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-mcdade-ala-1917.