Jones v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General United States Postal Service (Pacific Area) Agency

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 KYUNG SOOK JONES, Case No. 21-cv-02849-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 16 GENERAL UNITED STATES POSTAL

12 Defendant.

13 14 Pro se Plaintiff Kyung Sook Jones alleges claims for racial discrimination, disability 15 discrimination, and unlawful retaliation by Defendant, her employer. See Dkt. No. 1. Pending 16 before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss, briefing for which is complete. Dkt. Nos. 16 17 (“Mot.”), 22 (“Opp.”), 23 (“Reply”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition 18 without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 19 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 20 Civil Procedure. See generally Mot. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead 21 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 22 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content 23 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “[p]leadings must be 25 construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). For that reason, “a pro se complaint, however 26 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 27 lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations marks and citations omitted). 1 pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim—Panahi v. Los 2 Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 Defendant argues that Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims should be dismissed 4 because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the union grievance process. See 5 Mot. at 7-10. However, exhaustion is an affirmative defense most appropriately resolved via a 6 motion for summary judgment (and Defendant has already filed that motion, Dkt. No. 41, 7 following a discussion of the issue at the September 2021 case management conference). See 8 Kraus v. Presidio Trust Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1046 n. 7 (9th 9 } Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (“Whether a plaintiff in a Title VII action has timely exhausted her 10 administrative remedies ‘is an affirmative defense, [so] the defendant bears the burden of pleading 11 and proving it.’”). 12 Under the liberal standard applicable to pro se pleadings, the Court also denies the motion 13 to the extent it is based on a claimed failure to adequately allege the elements, or on res judicata. 14 Those issues are best dealt with on a fuller record on a later motion for summary judgment, if the 3 15 case survives the pending motion based on failure to exhaust. a 16 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: 3/14/2022

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28