Jones v. Lil Uzi Vert

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 4, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01286
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CORTEZ DUANDRE JONES, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-1286 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 9 v. 10 LIL UZI VERT, 11 Defendant. 12 13

14 Plaintiff Cortez Daundre Jones requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis against “Lil 15 Uzi Vert.” Dkt. No. 1. Jones alleges “[r]obbery in connection to Lil Uzi Vert [r]ecord [l]abel.” 16 Id. at 3. U.S. Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson issued a Report and Recommendation 17 (“R&R”), recommending that the Court deny Jones’s IFP application because he failed to 18 provide sufficient financial information. Dkt. No. 4 at 1–2. On the same day, Jones filed an 19 objection to Judge Peterson’s R&R, purporting to explain his financial situation, listing this 20 matter number along with 56 of his other cases and noting “objection to all cases.” Dkt. No. 3. 21 The Court has reviewed Jones’s proposed complaint, his IFP application, and the other 22 files on record, and it finds Jones’s filings devoid of any factual or legal details demonstrating 23 the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction or the plausibility of Jones’s claims for relief. 24 1 The Court first considers whether Jones has Article III standing to sue. The Court has an 2 ongoing duty to ensure that it has jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims. Leem v. Bank of Am. 3 Home Loans, No. C13-1517RSL, 2014 WL 897378, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2014) (citing

4 Watkins v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 720 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)); see 5 also Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating “the threshold question 6 of whether plaintiff has standing (and the court has jurisdiction) is distinct from the merits of his 7 claim.”); Equity Lifestyle Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184, 1189 n. 10 (9th 8 Cir. 2008) (stating “[t]he jurisdictional question of standing precedes, and does not require, 9 analysis of the merits.”). The Court may raise the issue on its own accord, and “[i]f, at any time 10 the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action.” 11 Leem, 2014 WL 897378, at *1. “Article III standing is an essential ingredient of subject matter 12 jurisdiction.” Perry v. Newsom, 18 F.4th 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom.

13 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 143 S. Ct. 301, 214 L. Ed. 2d 131 (2022). For Article III standing, Jones 14 must allege that (1) he has suffered a concrete injury in fact; (2) Defendant Lil Uzi Vert caused 15 his alleged injury; and (3) “redressability,” that is, Jones’s requested relief will redress his 16 alleged injury. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (citing Lujan v. 17 Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 18 Here, Jones does not meet any factor demonstrating his standing to sue. Jones alleges Lil 19 Uzi Vert “generated more than a trillion dollars in sales also paying for promotion w[ith] stolen 20 money to get started.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5. But Jones does not allege Lil Uzi Vert’s alleged conduct 21 caused him an injury. See id. Nor does Jones allege facts to demonstrate how a trillion dollars 22 would redress any harm that could be construed from his vague allegations. See id. In sum,

23 Jones’s complaint has failed to state a “case or controversy” to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. 24 See Perry v. Newsom, 18 F.4th at 630. 1 Next, when it comes to IFP complaints, the Court must dismiss the action “at any time 2 [if] the court determines that . . . [the complaint] fails to state a claim on which relief may be 3 granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.

4 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] 5 complaint that fails to state a claim.”). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has 6 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as 7 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 8 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 10 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). “This standard does not require ‘detailed 11 factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 12 me accusation.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

13 Jones’s complaint does not meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. Jones used the 14 court’s pro se complaint template, which instructs would-be plaintiffs to “[w]rite a short and 15 plain statement of the[ir] claim,” but Jones only alleges (1) that Lil Uzi Vert is an artist from 16 Pennsylvania, (2) a “robbery” occurred in connection with Lil Uzi Vert’s (unnamed) record 17 label, (2) that Lil Uzi Vert purportedly generated “more than a trillion dollars in sales,” and (4) 18 Lil Uzi Vert paid for “promotion” with “stolen money to get started.” Dkt. No. 1. 19 The heart of Jones’s allegation appears to be that Lil Uzi Vert used stolen money to pay 20 for promotions, but Jones offers no further details regarding Lil Uzi Vert’s conduct (e.g., whether 21 he stole the money), fails to allege any facts showing that Lil Uzi Vert injured Jones, nor any 22 facts demonstrating a plausible claim that he suffered a trillion dollars in damages. See Tripati v.

23 First Nat’l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An in forma pauperis complaint is 24 1 frivolous if ‘it had no arguable substance in law or fact.’”) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, 2 Jones’s complaint does not contain any factual basis demonstrating a plausible claim to relief. 3 Ordinarily, when a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a

4 claim, it must grant leave to amend even when no request to amend is made. Yagman v. Garcetti, 5 852 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). But leave to amend may be denied when bad faith or futility 6 are found. Id.; see also Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 7 1472 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, 8 prejudice, and futility.”). At last count, Jones has filed over 60 lawsuits in the District since 9 August 2, 2023, which means he has filed more than one lawsuit a day for weeks. So many cases 10 filed in such a short amount of time supports a finding that Jones is advancing claims without 11 merit and that leave to amend would be futile. 12 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Jones’s request to proceed IFP and DISMISSES his

13 complaint without prejudice or leave to amend. 14 Dated this 4th day of October, 2023. 15 A 16 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24