Jones v. Lenoir City Car Works

392 S.W.2d 671, 216 Tenn. 351, 20 McCanless 351, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 582
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1965
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 392 S.W.2d 671 (Jones v. Lenoir City Car Works) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Lenoir City Car Works, 392 S.W.2d 671, 216 Tenn. 351, 20 McCanless 351, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. 1965).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Chattin,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff-in-error, Dailey E. Jonés, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, brought this action for workmen’s compensation benefits due to an alleged occupational disease, silicosis, • contracted in the course of his employment against the defendant, Lenoir City Car Works.

*353 The defendant relied upon the one year statute of limitations which, after a hearing, was sustained by the trial judge and dismissed petitioner’s suit.

Petitioner has perfected an appeal in error to this Court. The errors assigned complain of the action of the trial judge in admitting an extrajudicial statement of petitioner into evidence; and that there is no material evidence to support the judgment.

The facts are petitioner was sixty-one years of age at the time of the trial, June 24, 1964. He had an eighth grade education. He was employed by the defendant as a coremaker. Sand and silicate clays were used to make the cores. In the process of making the cores, dust laden-ed with airborne particles of silicate was created.

It is the theory of the petitioner the breathing of the silicate dust caused the contraction of silicosis.

Petitioner had worked on and off for the defendant over a period of forty years. Approximately eight years prior to the trial, he was examined by defendant’s physician and x-rays were made of his chest. He was told at this time he should quit smoking and drinking. Periodically during this period of time, the defendant’s physician had examined and taken x-rays of petitioner’s chest.

During the month of January 1963 he was examined twice by the defendant’s physician. At no time was-he advised by the physician of the condition of his health.

Petitioner testified at the trial, as follows:

‘ ‘ Q. Have you been under the care of a doctor here?
“A. I’ve been under ‘Doc’ Freedman for the last two years I guess.
*354 “Q. Do you. know what his diagnosis has been as to your condition of your lungs?
“A. Well, he said that it was pretty rugged; told me.
“Q. What do you mean by ‘pretty rugged’? Just tell the court.
“A. Well, this bronchitis and this dust, I reckon is what he had reference to.
######
■ “Q. What-did Dr. Freedman tell you about working —your working condition?
“ A. Well, he told me I wasn’t able to work or do nothing.” 0

He testified on his pre-trial deposition, which is filed in the record, as follows:

“Q. Well, when did you first notice that condition? When did you first—
“A. Well, just like I told you, just so had, it happened about three years ago, you know, when I was having these attacks, see.
“Q. Well, how would you feel? Was there pain or what was the matter?
“A.' Yeah, pain. Go through there, and I’d get sore.
“Q. You say ‘through here.’ That would be your chest?
“A. Yeah, and then just seemed like a hall of fire or something going across there.”

He had been under the care of Dr. Harold D. Freedman since May 1962. Dr. Freedman had treated him for “by *355 pertension and extreme weakness with shortness of breath.”

In May 1963, he went to Dr. Bobert W. Newman, who hospitalized him and made tests at the University of Tennessee Hospital. He was in the hospital for about five days after which, he returned to work. He worked for two weeks, but pain in his chest grew worse and he quit his work on July 19, 1963. Eight weeks after the tests were run at the hospital, Dr. Newman informed petitioner he silicosis.

After petitioner quit work'he made application for retirement benefits.

On August 30, 1963, petitioner was requested to make a statement as to his application for - retirement. His statement was recorded on a dictaphone recorder. In answer to questions of Mr. T. C. Mims, Claim Agent, petitioner stated he had had shortness of breath for about five or six years and that it had progressively become worse. He also stated he had always thought this condition was caused from inhaling the silicate dust.

He further admitted he had talked with Mr. J; E. Griffith, Claim Agent, in January and February of 1960; and that Griffith told him at first he had a “cavity” in his right lung. That on the second occasion he talked with Griffith he told him he had a spot on his lung.

Counsel objected to the introduction of the foregoing extrajudicial statements an the grounds that petitioner was not represented by Counsel at the time and the statements were not under oath. The trial judge overruled the objection.

*356 The record shows, however, on the trial of the case, petitioner, on cross examination, admitted the truth of the statements.

It is settled that in this State that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible for the purposes of impeachment and testing the credibilty of the witness, but are not to be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein. Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917); King v. State, 187 Tenn. 431, 215 S.W.2d 813 (1948); Rhea v. State, 208 Tenn. 559, 347 S.W.2d 486 (1961).

But, where the witness, on cross examination and under oath, affirms the truth of the extrajudicial statements, he is then subject to the safeguards of the hearsay rule, and the statements may then be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. McFarlin v. State, 214 Tenn. 613, 381 S.W.2d 922 (1964).

Moreover, [a]ny statement, whether oral or written, made by or attributable to a party to an action, which constitutes an admission against his interest and tends to establish or disprove any material fact in the case, is competent evidence against him in such action.” 31 A C.J.S. Evidence sec. 272, page 697; Nelson v. Rural Educational Ass’n. 23 Tenn.App. 409, 134 S.W.2d 181 (1939).

We are of the opinion the trial judge was not in error in admitting this evidence. We overrule petitioner’s assignment on this point.

We now consider whether there is any material evidence to support the finding of the trial judge petitioner’s action was barred by the statute of limitations of one year.

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Bluebook (online)
392 S.W.2d 671, 216 Tenn. 351, 20 McCanless 351, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-lenoir-city-car-works-tenn-1965.