Jones v. Knight Transportation Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedNovember 8, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00024
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Knight Transportation Incorporated (Jones v. Knight Transportation Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Knight Transportation Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Brittany A Jones, No. CV-23-00024-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Knight Transportation Incorporated,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss 16 Action. (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 21), and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 17 22). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the relevant law, the Court will grant 18 Defendant’s Motion. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff was employed as a recruiter for Defendant from July 2021 to February 21 2022. (Doc. 10-1.) In February 2022, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. (Id.) 22 Plaintiff brought this action alleging employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of 23 the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (Doc. 10 at 3.) She alleges that she was 24 terminated for making a complaint about discrimination in the workplace and that 25 Defendant retaliated against her. (Id. at 4.) She also alleges that she was discriminated 26 against on the basis of her race and religion. (Id.) Defendant responded by filing this 27 Motion. (Doc. 17.) 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 On a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a 3 district court decides (1) whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate, and, if 4 so, (2) whether the agreement to arbitrate encompasses the underlying dispute. Collins v. 5 Macy’s Inc., No. CV-19-02572-PHX-GMS, 2019 WL 5188749, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 15, 6 2019). If both issues are answered in the affirmative, then the court must enforce the 7 arbitration agreement. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Cheesecake Factory, 8 Inc., No. CV08-1207-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1259359, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2009). 9 Arbitration agreements are construed under general state law contract principles. Id. 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 The Court must first analyze whether the parties formed a valid agreement. 12 Defendant argues that Plaintiff voluntarily signed the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement 13 (“the Agreement”) as part of her onboarding process. (Doc. 17 at 1–2.) Defendant 14 contends that Plaintiff’s electronic signature on the agreement could only have been made 15 by her or someone under her direction because it was in an online portal only Plaintiff 16 could access using her personal username and password. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff counters that 17 she was “pressured to hurry and complete hiring paperwork due to business needs” and 18 was not allowed to read documents before signing them. (Doc 21 at 1.) Specifically, she 19 alleges she was forced to sign the Consent to Receive Electronic Communications Form 20 (“the consent form”) without reading it. (Id.) 21 Here, Defendant received and signed the Agreement through the online portal. 22 (Doc. 17-1.) On the same day, she signed several other employment related documents 23 using that same portal and login. (Doc. 17-2.) This is evidenced by Defendant’s 24 screenshots of the online portal and two declarations from a member of Defendant’s 25 Employee Relations team. (See id.; Doc. 22 at 2; Doc. 22-1.) These screenshots also show 26 that the Agreement was kept in her file and was readily accessible to both Plaintiff and 27 Defendant. 28 The consent form Plaintiff alleges she was forced to sign is not within this group of 1 documents. Rather, it is a consent to receive electronic communications, including an 2 agreement that her electronic signature would serve as the “legally binding equivalent” to 3 her handwritten signature. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff signed the consent form on July 11, 2021— 4 a day before she electronically signed the Agreement. (Id. at 10.) On this date, Plaintiff 5 was not yet employed by Defendant. Therefore, her claim that she was “on a call with a 6 driver” and when she received the consent form and was rushed to complete it is not 7 credible. (See Doc. 21.) 8 Moreover, Plaintiff submits no evidence to support her claim that she was pressured 9 to hurry and complete the remaining employment paperwork. (See Doc. 21.) And lastly, 10 Plaintiff had sufficient time to review the Agreement prior to signing it. Although she 11 signed it on July 12, 2021, she was not required to submit it until July 24, 2021—two days 12 prior to her start date. (Doc. 22 at 2.) Taken together, these facts undercut Plaintiff’s claim 13 of duress or undue influence. (See Doc. 21.) Instead, they show that Plaintiff agreed to 14 review and sign the onboarding documents electronically, then properly accessed the 15 online system to do so. 16 Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate. 17 Defendant made this offer as a condition of employment, which Plaintiff accepted. Both 18 parties gave valid consideration by waiving their right to pursue a judicial forum and 19 instead submit to arbitration. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th 20 Cir. 2002). The facts and circumstances show that this was a valid agreement. 21 Next, the Court must analyze whether the Agreement encompassed this dispute. A 22 Title VII plaintiff, like Plaintiff here, may only be forced to forego their statutory claims 23 and arbitrate their claims if they knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration. 24 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42. F3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the scope of 25 the Agreement includes any “past, current, and future disputes, controversies, or claims 26 that would otherwise be brought in a federal, state, or local court or agency” arising out of 27 Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant. (See Doc. 17-1 at 2.) The Agreement even 28 specifically includes claims brought under Title VII. (Id.) As such, the Agreement 1 || encompasses the underlying dispute. 2 In summary, because the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate and the 3 || Agreement encompasses the underlying dispute, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion. 4|| This case will also be dismissed because all of Plaintiffs claims are subject to the 5|| Agreement. Forrest v. Spizzirri, 62 F.4" 1201, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming district 6 || court decision compelling arbitration and dismissing case because all claims were subject to arbitration); see also Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We 8 || recognize that efficient docket management is often the basis for dismissing a wholly 9|| arbitrable matter.”). However, this Order does not prevent the parties from filing a 10 || potential future action in federal court to enforce an arbitration award, if necessary. IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons discussed above, 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss Action (Doc. 17). 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to terminate this case. 16 Dated this 8th day of November, 2023. 17 —_—_— i ose 19 onorable Susan M, Brnovich United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Jones v. Knight Transportation Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-knight-transportation-incorporated-azd-2023.