24CA0735 Jones v ICAO 10-17-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0735 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 463-2024
Douglas Jones,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and T Mobile USA, Inc.,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN J. Jones and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 17, 2024
Douglas Jones, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondents ¶1 Claimant, Douglas Jones, seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) disqualifying him from
receiving benefits based on his job separation from T-Mobile USA,
Inc. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Jones worked as a technical service expert from May 27, 2014,
until November 7, 2023, when T-Mobile terminated his
employment. A deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance
initially determined that Jones was eligible for benefits. T-Mobile
appealed the deputy’s determination and requested a hearing. A
hearing officer reversed the deputy’s determination, concluding that
Jones was disqualified from receiving benefits under section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2024 (failure to meet established job
performance or other defined standards). The hearing officer
credited testimony from Jones’s supervisor, Michelle Arnold, that
Jones had violated company policy on at least two occasions. Jones
appealed to the Panel, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
II. Analysis
¶3 Proceeding pro se on appeal, Jones contends that his due
process rights were violated, the hearing officer failed to fully
1 develop the record, and the reason for his termination wasn’t
“factually established.” Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we
affirm the Panel’s order.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶4 We will uphold the Panel’s decision unless the findings of fact
don’t support the decision or the decision is erroneous as a matter
of law. § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2024; see Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.
Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17.
¶5 An individual is entitled to receive unemployment benefits if he
is unemployed through no fault of his own. See § 8-73-108(1)(a).
For purposes of the unemployment statutes, “fault” includes “a
volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice in the
circumstances leading to the discharge from employment such that
the claimant can be said to be responsible for the termination.”
Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo.
App. 1996).
¶6 Whether a claimant is at fault for the separation from
employment is an “ultimate legal conclusion,” Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.
Dist., ¶ 17, and requires a case-specific consideration of the totality
2 of the circumstances using an objective standard. Morris v. City &
Cnty. of Denver, 843 P.2d 76, 79 (Colo. App. 1992).
B. Discussion
¶7 The hearing officer determined that Jones was disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits due to his failure to meet
established job performance or other defined standards under
section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX). A claimant is properly disqualified
under this subsection if he knew what was expected of him and
failed to “satisfactorily perform the job thereafter.” Pabst v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App. 1992).
¶8 The hearing officer credited Arnold’s testimony that Jones gave
customer account access to an unauthorized party in violation of T-
Mobile’s confidentiality policies. Arnold also testified that Jones
received training on October 11, 2023, to discuss the policy
violation and ensure that he understood the concept of
unauthorized access to customer accounts. The hearing officer also
had in the record a “notice of no longer in good standing.” The
notice, part of Exhibit AA, contained the following statement: “It is
important for you to understand that additional problems or failure
to sufficiently improve and sustain your conduct may lead to
3 further action up to and including termination of employment.”
Jones signed the notice on October 17, 2023. Then, ten days later,
Jones made a call in which he disclosed confidential information to
an unauthorized third party. T-Mobile terminated Jones’s
employment as a consequence of these policy violations.
¶9 The hearing officer concluded that Jones was aware of T-
Mobile’s policies on safeguarding confidential information based on
both his initial employee orientation and the employee handbook.
The hearing officer determined that Jones failed to meet established
job standards and was therefore disqualified from benefits. The
Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s determination, finding it was
supported by the record evidence.
¶ 10 Jones first contends that his due process rights were violated
because he wasn’t allowed to more fully cross-examine Arnold. But
the transcript shows that he was able to thoroughly cross-examine
Arnold twice during the hearing. He was also allowed to testify
extensively as to why he thought his termination wasn’t justified.
In unemployment benefit hearings, due process only requires that a
party be given an opportunity to be heard. Norton v. Colo. State. Bd.
of Med. Exam’rs, 821 P.2d 897, 901-02 (Colo. App. 1991). Like the
4 Panel, we conclude that Jones was provided with a fair opportunity
to be heard, and we discern no due process violation from the
record. See Wafford v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 907 P.2d 741, 743
(Colo. App. 1995) (noting that “fundamental fairness” is the essence
of due process in unemployment compensation proceedings).
¶ 11 Jones also contends that the hearing officer didn’t fully
develop the record. He alleges that T-Mobile failed to provide the
hearing officer with a specific policy regarding releasing “dealer
codes.” But when the hearing officer asked Jones if a continuance
was needed to consider additional evidence, Jones replied in the
negative. The record reflects that one of T-Mobile’s privacy policies,
part of Exhibit AA and entitled “CPNI Policy,” prohibits disclosure of
confidential information. Arnold testified that giving out a dealer
code was considered CPNI information. Thus, the record
sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s conclusions, regardless of
whether a more specific policy was provided.
¶ 12 Finally, Jones asserts that the reason for his termination
wasn’t adequately established, and that he didn’t engage in “willful
misconduct.” We note that in the unemployment context, “fault”
isn’t necessarily related to culpability, but is defined as a volitional
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24CA0735 Jones v ICAO 10-17-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0735 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 463-2024
Douglas Jones,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and T Mobile USA, Inc.,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN J. Jones and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 17, 2024
Douglas Jones, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondents ¶1 Claimant, Douglas Jones, seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) disqualifying him from
receiving benefits based on his job separation from T-Mobile USA,
Inc. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Jones worked as a technical service expert from May 27, 2014,
until November 7, 2023, when T-Mobile terminated his
employment. A deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance
initially determined that Jones was eligible for benefits. T-Mobile
appealed the deputy’s determination and requested a hearing. A
hearing officer reversed the deputy’s determination, concluding that
Jones was disqualified from receiving benefits under section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2024 (failure to meet established job
performance or other defined standards). The hearing officer
credited testimony from Jones’s supervisor, Michelle Arnold, that
Jones had violated company policy on at least two occasions. Jones
appealed to the Panel, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
II. Analysis
¶3 Proceeding pro se on appeal, Jones contends that his due
process rights were violated, the hearing officer failed to fully
1 develop the record, and the reason for his termination wasn’t
“factually established.” Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we
affirm the Panel’s order.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶4 We will uphold the Panel’s decision unless the findings of fact
don’t support the decision or the decision is erroneous as a matter
of law. § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2024; see Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.
Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17.
¶5 An individual is entitled to receive unemployment benefits if he
is unemployed through no fault of his own. See § 8-73-108(1)(a).
For purposes of the unemployment statutes, “fault” includes “a
volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice in the
circumstances leading to the discharge from employment such that
the claimant can be said to be responsible for the termination.”
Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo.
App. 1996).
¶6 Whether a claimant is at fault for the separation from
employment is an “ultimate legal conclusion,” Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.
Dist., ¶ 17, and requires a case-specific consideration of the totality
2 of the circumstances using an objective standard. Morris v. City &
Cnty. of Denver, 843 P.2d 76, 79 (Colo. App. 1992).
B. Discussion
¶7 The hearing officer determined that Jones was disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits due to his failure to meet
established job performance or other defined standards under
section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX). A claimant is properly disqualified
under this subsection if he knew what was expected of him and
failed to “satisfactorily perform the job thereafter.” Pabst v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App. 1992).
¶8 The hearing officer credited Arnold’s testimony that Jones gave
customer account access to an unauthorized party in violation of T-
Mobile’s confidentiality policies. Arnold also testified that Jones
received training on October 11, 2023, to discuss the policy
violation and ensure that he understood the concept of
unauthorized access to customer accounts. The hearing officer also
had in the record a “notice of no longer in good standing.” The
notice, part of Exhibit AA, contained the following statement: “It is
important for you to understand that additional problems or failure
to sufficiently improve and sustain your conduct may lead to
3 further action up to and including termination of employment.”
Jones signed the notice on October 17, 2023. Then, ten days later,
Jones made a call in which he disclosed confidential information to
an unauthorized third party. T-Mobile terminated Jones’s
employment as a consequence of these policy violations.
¶9 The hearing officer concluded that Jones was aware of T-
Mobile’s policies on safeguarding confidential information based on
both his initial employee orientation and the employee handbook.
The hearing officer determined that Jones failed to meet established
job standards and was therefore disqualified from benefits. The
Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s determination, finding it was
supported by the record evidence.
¶ 10 Jones first contends that his due process rights were violated
because he wasn’t allowed to more fully cross-examine Arnold. But
the transcript shows that he was able to thoroughly cross-examine
Arnold twice during the hearing. He was also allowed to testify
extensively as to why he thought his termination wasn’t justified.
In unemployment benefit hearings, due process only requires that a
party be given an opportunity to be heard. Norton v. Colo. State. Bd.
of Med. Exam’rs, 821 P.2d 897, 901-02 (Colo. App. 1991). Like the
4 Panel, we conclude that Jones was provided with a fair opportunity
to be heard, and we discern no due process violation from the
record. See Wafford v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 907 P.2d 741, 743
(Colo. App. 1995) (noting that “fundamental fairness” is the essence
of due process in unemployment compensation proceedings).
¶ 11 Jones also contends that the hearing officer didn’t fully
develop the record. He alleges that T-Mobile failed to provide the
hearing officer with a specific policy regarding releasing “dealer
codes.” But when the hearing officer asked Jones if a continuance
was needed to consider additional evidence, Jones replied in the
negative. The record reflects that one of T-Mobile’s privacy policies,
part of Exhibit AA and entitled “CPNI Policy,” prohibits disclosure of
confidential information. Arnold testified that giving out a dealer
code was considered CPNI information. Thus, the record
sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s conclusions, regardless of
whether a more specific policy was provided.
¶ 12 Finally, Jones asserts that the reason for his termination
wasn’t adequately established, and that he didn’t engage in “willful
misconduct.” We note that in the unemployment context, “fault”
isn’t necessarily related to culpability, but is defined as a volitional
5 act or the exercise of some control in light of the totality of the
circumstances. See Richards, 919 P.2d at 934. The record shows
numerous “coaching sessions” and several incidents where Jones
received further training about T-Mobile’s expectations over his
years with T-Mobile. Arnold testified that Jones was aware of the
relevant policies and violated them on at least two occasions. While
Jones testified that he wasn’t aware that his actions violated T-
Mobile policies, the hearing officer is tasked with assessing the
witnesses’ credibility, resolving any conflicts in the evidence, and
determining the weight to be accorded the evidence. See Tilley v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Colo. App. 1996).
We discern no error in the hearing officer’s weighing of the evidence
surrounding the termination of Jones’s employment.
¶ 13 After careful review, we conclude that the hearing officer
correctly found that Jones knew what was expected of him yet failed
to satisfactorily perform the job thereafter, as required by section 8-
73-108(5)(e)(XX). Because this was a reasonable inference from the
record, we are bound by it. See Pero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
46 P.3d 484, 486 (Colo. App. 2002). The Panel didn’t err as a
matter of law in affirming the hearing officer’s order.
6 III. Disposition
¶ 14 We affirm the Panel’s order.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.