Jones v. Hopper

Supreme Court of Georgia

Jones v. Hopper

212 S.E.2d 367, 233 Ga. 531, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1367

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 29, 1975

Docket29352

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 212 S.E.2d 367 (Jones v. Hopper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jones v. Hopper, 212 S.E.2d 367, 233 Ga. 531, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1367 (Ga. 1975).

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Opinion

Hall, Justice.

Albert E. Jones petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his incarceration pursuant to convictions on *532 two guilty pleas to rape was unlawful because he had pled guilty to these capital felonies following accusations rather than indictments by a grand jury. At the hearing on his petition, he supplemented that allegation with an oral assertion that his guilty pleas had not been voluntarily and intelligently entered because his attorney "didn’t explain my rights to me.”

Submitted November 1, 1974 — Decided January 29, 1975. Albert E. Jones, pro se.

The state’s showing at the hearing consisted of evidence that Jones was currently serving a total of eleven concurrent sentences, of which the two life sentences for rape here attacked were the longest. Following the hearing, the court ruled that in view of the other unchallenged concurrent sentences, it had no authority to make any disposition of the case except to remand Jones to the custody of the warden.

On Jones’ appeal, we remand to the Tattnall County Superior Court for consideration of whether Jones’ confinement pursuant to the two life sentences is enhancing his imprisonment under the other concurrent sentences by, for example, delaying his eligibility for parole (see Nelson v. George, 399 U. S. 224, 229 (90 SC 1963, 26 LE2d 578)), or whether he is for any other reason "restrained of his liberty” by these sentences within the meaning of Code Ann. § 50-101 (c) beyond the restraint flowing from the other sentences. If the answer to that question is "yes,” the court is further directed to consider the merits of Jones’ attacks on his two guilty pleas to rape.

Though we have not heretofore squarely held that a prisoner may in some circumstances on habeas corpus attack one of multiple concurrent sentences, such a ruling on these facts plainly follows from the rationale of Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687 (208 SE2d 493) and authorities cited therein.

Remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur. *533 Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, John B. Ballard, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

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Hall, Justice.

Albert E. Jones petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his incarceration pursuant to convictions on *532 two guilty pleas to rape was unlawful because he had pled guilty to these capital felonies following accusations rather than indictments by a grand jury. At the hearing on his petition, he supplemented that allegation with an oral assertion that his guilty pleas had not been voluntarily and intelligently entered because his attorney "didn’t explain my rights to me.”

Submitted November 1, 1974 — Decided January 29, 1975. Albert E. Jones, pro se.

The state’s showing at the hearing consisted of evidence that Jones was currently serving a total of eleven concurrent sentences, of which the two life sentences for rape here attacked were the longest. Following the hearing, the court ruled that in view of the other unchallenged concurrent sentences, it had no authority to make any disposition of the case except to remand Jones to the custody of the warden.

On Jones’ appeal, we remand to the Tattnall County Superior Court for consideration of whether Jones’ confinement pursuant to the two life sentences is enhancing his imprisonment under the other concurrent sentences by, for example, delaying his eligibility for parole (see Nelson v. George, 399 U. S. 224, 229 (90 SC 1963, 26 LE2d 578)), or whether he is for any other reason "restrained of his liberty” by these sentences within the meaning of Code Ann. § 50-101 (c) beyond the restraint flowing from the other sentences. If the answer to that question is "yes,” the court is further directed to consider the merits of Jones’ attacks on his two guilty pleas to rape.

Though we have not heretofore squarely held that a prisoner may in some circumstances on habeas corpus attack one of multiple concurrent sentences, such a ruling on these facts plainly follows from the rationale of Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687 (208 SE2d 493) and authorities cited therein.

Remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur. *533 Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, John B. Ballard, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

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212 S.E.2d 367, 233 Ga. 531, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-hopper-ga-1975.

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