Jones v. Heidel, Samberson

CourtNew Mexico Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 26, 2010
Docket30,333
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jones v. Heidel, Samberson (Jones v. Heidel, Samberson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Mexico Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Heidel, Samberson, (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 5 not include the filing date.

6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

7 EARL JONES,

8 Plaintiff-Appellant,

9 v. No. 30,333

10 HEIDEL, SAMBERSON, NEWELL, 11 COX & MCMAHON,

12 Defendant-Appellee.

13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY 14 Thomas A. Rutledge, District Judge

15 Earl Jones, 16 Hobbs, NM

17 Pro Se Appellant

18 Butt, Thornton & Baehr 19 Alfred L. Green, Jr. 20 Albuquerque, NM

21 for Appellee

22 MEMORANDUM OPINION

23 SUTIN, Judge. 1 In this legal malpractice case, Plaintiff Earl Jones appeals from the order of

2 dismissal with prejudice, granting Defendant Heidel Law Firm summary judgment

3 and dismissing the case with prejudice. [RP 120] Summary judgment was granted

4 on the basis that Plaintiff’s claim for legal malpractice was filed outside the statute of

5 limitations.

6 The calendar notice proposed to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order. [Ct.

7 App. File] Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition that we have duly

8 considered. [MIO] Unpersuaded, however, we dismiss.

9 DISCUSSION

10 “Whether an order is a ‘final order’ within the meaning of the statute is a

11 jurisdictional question that an appellate court is required to raise on its own motion.”

12 Khalsa v. Levinson, 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 680, 964 P.2d 844.

13 “Determining whether [an] appeal was timely involves the interpretation of court

14 rules, which we review de novo.” Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-009, ¶ 7, 145

15 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865.

16 The order of dismissal was filed on January 19, 2010. [RP 120] Plaintiff’s

17 notice of appeal was filed on March 2, 2010. [RP 153] While Plaintiff filed the notice

18 of appeal more than thirty days after the order of dismissal (see Rule 12-201(A)(2)

19 NMRA), on January 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a timely post-judgment motion entitled

2 1 “motion for reversal to court’s orders of dismissal with prejudice on Defendant’s

2 motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s memorandum in support of summary

3 judgment” (Plaintiff’s motion). [RP 115-19] Pursuant to Rule 12-201(D), Plaintiff’s

4 motion extends the time for filing the notice of appeal until thirty days after the post-

5 judgment motion has been ruled upon.

6 Although the order of dismissal was filed on the same day as Plaintiff’s motion

7 and approximately one half hour thereafter, the order of dismissal cannot be

8 considered to be a ruling on Plaintiff’s motion. The order of dismissal refers only to

9 the hearing held on January 7, 2010, on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

10 and it only grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. [RP 120] Moreover,

11 on February 3, 2010, Defendant filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.

12 [RP 125] Thus, there is no indication in the record proper that the district court has

13 ruled on Plaintiff’s motion.

14 The district court was required to rule on the post-judgment motion, and it was

15 not deemed denied by the passage of time. See Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v.

16 Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-051, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 527, 168 P.3d 99 (holding that

17 changes to the Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the automatic denial of post-

18 judgment motions). The fact that the district court has not yet ruled on Plaintiff’s

19 motion renders the order of dismissal non-final and Plaintiff’s appeal premature. See

3 1 Grygorwicz, 2009-NMSC-009, ¶ 8 (recognizing in the context of a foreclosure

2 judgment that when a party makes a motion challenging the judgment, the judgment

3 is not final until the district court rules on the motion); see also Rule 12-201(D)

4 (providing that if a party files a timely post-judgment motion as set forth therein, the

5 time for filing a notice of appeal begins to run from entry of an order disposing of the

6 motion).

7 Thus, this Court’s calendar notice proposed to dismiss the appeal. Plaintiff’s

8 memorandum does not indicate that the district court has ruled on the motion for

9 reconsideration, but urges this Court to consider the merits of his appeal any way.

10 [MIO 2-3] This Court does not have jurisdiction to do so. See, e.g., Collier v.

11 Pennington, 2003-NMCA-064, ¶ 7, 133 N.M. 728, 69 P.3d 238 (discussing that this

12 Court lacks jurisdiction to review a non-final order).

13 CONCLUSION

14 Accordingly, we dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 __________________________________ 17 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

18 WE CONCUR:

19 _______________________________

4 1 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge

2 _______________________________ 3 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

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Related

Grygorwicz v. Trujillo
2009 NMSC 009 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 2009)
Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance
2007 NMSC 051 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 2007)
Collier v. Pennington
2003 NMCA 064 (New Mexico Court of Appeals, 2003)
Khalsa v. Levinson
1998 NMCA 110 (New Mexico Court of Appeals, 1998)

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Jones v. Heidel, Samberson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-heidel-samberson-nmctapp-2010.