Jones v. Habersham

13 F. Cas. 957, 3 Woods 443
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia
DecidedApril 15, 1879
DocketCase No. 7,465
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 13 F. Cas. 957 (Jones v. Habersham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Habersham, 13 F. Cas. 957, 3 Woods 443 (circtsdga 1879).

Opinion

BRADLEY, Circuit Justice.

This is a bill filed by the heirs at law of Mary Telfair, seeking to have the devises and bequests of her last will adjudged inoperative and void, and a resulting trust in all of her estate declared in favor of said heirs, and that they may have a decree for their distributive shares thereof. The defendants demurred, and the question now arises on the demurrer. The will was made on the second day of June, 1875, when the testatrix was far advanced in years, and the probate thereof was strenuously contested, on various grounds, but was finally established on appeal by the supreme court of Georgia. The testatrix was never married, and had no relations except col-laterals in the third and fourth degree. A great portion of her estate, which is alleged to have been of the value of $G30,000, was given to charities.

A fundamental objection raised by the complainants to all the devises and bequests, arises on the twenty-second item of the will, which is as follows: “Twenty-Second. It is my wish, and I hereby so direct, that none of the legacies, bequests and devises in any of the clauses of this, my will, shall be executed or take effect until the building and other improvements on the lot on the corner of Gaston and Whitaker streets, and known as the ‘Hodgson Memorial Hall,’ which I have conveyed in trust to the Georgia Historical Society, shall be completed and entirely paid for out of my estate.” It is contended that this postponement of the execution and effect of the devises and bequests violates the rule against perpetuities, and renders them inoperative and void. The bill alleges that the building and other improvements referred to were in course of construction at the time of the death of testatrix, but were not completed till many months thereafter, and whether yet entirely paid for, the complainants were not certainly informed. If not paid for. it was the only debt known to the complainants existing against said estate. The complainants concede the English rule to be. that where there is an immediate gift to trustees for a general charity, but the particular application of the fund will not of necessity take effect within anj- assignable limit of time, and can never take effect at all, except on the occurrence of events in their nature contingent and uncertain, the gift is valid, and the court will hold up the fund a reasonable time, and await the happening of the contingency. Reference for this is made to the cases of Attorney-General v. Bishop of Chester, 1 Brown, Ch. 444; and to Attorney-General v. Oglander. 3 Brown, Ch. 166. But the complainants question whether this rule can be applied in [966]*966Georgia; and they contend that, whether it can or cannot, there is no immediate gift of the property in the mean time, before the contingency happens. The last clause of the will, it is true, after appointing executors of the will, makes them also “trustees under the provisions of the same;” but it is contended that this does not operate as a devise to them of the real estate.

In considering this objection to the validity of the dispositions of the will, it is to be ob•served, in the first place, that all the gifts therein contained are immediate in form. Thus, the first item declares: “I hereby give, devise and bequeath to George Noble Jones, son of the late Noble Wymberly Jones, all that full lot of land in the city of Savannah,” etc. (going on to describe it), “to him and his heirs forever.” The tenth item declares thus: “I hereby give, devise and bequeath to the trustees of the Independent Presbyterian Church, of the city of Savannah, all that full lot of land,” etc., going on to describe the same, and to declare the purposes for which the gift was made. It seems to us, therefore, that the gift itself is not suspended upon the completion of the Hodgson Memorial Hall, and the payment thereof; but only the execution and carrying into effect thereof. Some of the gifts are pecuniary legacies. If this view is correct, the gift of these legacies is not suspended, but only the payment thereof. This seems to us to be the intent of the testatrix. No one can read the whole will and believe that the testatrix, for one moment, had in her mind the revocation or non-operation of the gifts themselves. The memorial hall was begun at the time the will was executed, and was so far constructed as to be completed within a few months afterwards. Its plan and extent must have been designed, and its cost must, within probable limits, have been anticipated. It was her desire that the executors and trustees should finish that building, and pay for it, before the other legacies should be paid or the other donations carried into effect. If any unreasonable delay should occur in this behalf, of course it would be competent for any of the beneficiaries under the will to compel the trustees to proceed. But it being an obligation of her estate, incurred under her own directions, she wished it discharged before the other donations of her will should be carried out and she is, therefore, emphatic on the subject There is reason in what the counsel for the defendants say, that this provision is in effect what the law of Georgia requires or allows in all eases. Section 2451 of the Code declares that “all property, real and personal, in this state, being assets to pay debts, no devise or legacy passes the title until the assent of the executor is given to such devise or legacy.” In other words, the payment of debts and the fulfillment of obligations are the first things to be executed before the devises and bequests can be carried out without the assent of the executors. The completion of this memorial hall was an obligation already incurred, and the will merely requires what the law virtually requires, or allows the executors to require, in all cases.

Before proceeding further, it may be proper to cite the provisions of the Code of Georgia on the subject of charities. The most important for the purposes of this case are the following:

Section 2468: A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be sustained and carried out in this state; and in all cases where there is a general intention manifested by the testator to effect a certain purpose, and the particular mode in which he directs it to be done fails from any cause, a court of chaneery may, by approximation, effectuate the purpose in a manner most similar to that indicated by the testator.

Section 3155: Equity has jurisdiction to carry into effect the charitable bequest of a testator, or founder, or donor, when the same are definite and specific in their objects, and capable of being executed.

Section 3156: If the specific mode of execution be for any cause impossible, and the charitable intent be still manifest and definite, the court may, by approximation, give effect in a manner next most consonant with the specific mode prescribed.

Section 3157: This section specifies the subjects which are proper matters of charity for the jurisdiction of equity, corresponding nearly to the 43 Eliz.

By these provisions, it will be seen that the law of charities is fully adopted in Georgia, as far as is compatible with a free government where no royal prerogative is exercised.

We will now proceed to consider the objections which have been urged against the several charitable dispositions of the will. The first of these is contained in the tenth item, and is a gift to the trustees of the Independent Presbyterian Church of the city of Savannah, of a certain lot of land in Savannah, with the buildings and improvements thereon, upon the following terms and conditions, to wit:

“First.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
13 F. Cas. 957, 3 Woods 443, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-habersham-circtsdga-1879.