20-2951 Jones et al. v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc. et al.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
August Term, 2021
No. 20-2951
BRENDA JONES, AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN DAVID HORTMAN, JILL HORTMAN MORRIS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN DAVID HORTMAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
ADALIA LEE REDD, INDIVIDUALLY AND CO-ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF STEVEN BURTON REDD, DEZARAY REDD, INDIVIDUALLY, JAZLYN REDD, INDIVIDUALLY AND CO-ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF STEVEN BURTON REDD, TRYSTYN REDD, INDIVIDUALLY,
Consolidated-Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GOODRICH PUMP & ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC., ROLLS-ROYCE CORP.,
Consolidated-Defendants-Appellees,
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, INC.,
Consolidated-Defendants, GOODRICH CORPORATION, ROLLS-ROYCE NORTH AMERICA, INC., MD HELICOPTERS, INC., L3 COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, LP, ALLISON ENGINE COMPANY, INC., BOEING CO.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut No. 12-cv-1297
(Argued February 23, 2022; Decided November 21, 2023)
Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, KEARSE and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.) granting summary judgment against them on the grounds that their state law tort claims are barred by implied field preemption flowing from the Federal Aviation Act. Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the Federal Aviation Act’s preempted field does not include military aircrafts like the one to which their suit pertains. Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, we agree. We therefore VACATE AND REMAND.
TEJINDER SINGH, Goldstein & Russel, P.C., Bethesda, Maryland (Ronald L.M. Goldman, Timothy A. Loranger, Crawford Appleby, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, PC, Los Angeles, California, Arthur Alan Wolk, The Wolk Law Firm, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, John J. Gagliano, Gagliano Law Offices, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
JOHN W. CERRETA (James H. Rotondo, Andraya P. Brunau, Day Pitney LLP, 2 Hartford, Connecticut, Thomas R. Pantino, Fitzpatrick & Hunt, Pagano Aubert, LLP, New York, New York, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc.
J. DENNY SHUPE (Robert J. Williams, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Steven E. Arnold, SA Law, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Rolls-Royce Corporation.
Jeffrey R. White, American Association for Justice, Washington, D.C.; Justin T. Green, Anthony Tarricone, Joseph P. Musacchio, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, New York, NY, for American Association for Justice, amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Allison M. Zieve, Adina H. Rosenbaum, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington D.C., for Public Citizen, amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Jonathan M. Hoffman, MB Law Group LLP, Portland, OR, for Product Liability Advisory Council, amicus curiae in support of Defendants- Appellees.
3 Lauren L. Haertlein, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Inc., Washington, D.C., for General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Inc., and National Association of Manufacturers, amici curiae in support of Defendants- Appellees.
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Mark B. Stern, Lindsey Powell, Ben Lewis, Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the United States, amicus curiae in support of neither party.
EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judge:
After two United States Army pilots tragically perished in a helicopter
crash, their surviving family members sued various companies responsible for the
making of the helicopter. The family members alleged that manufacturing and/or
defective operating instructions and warnings caused the pilots’ deaths. The
companies countered that the family members’ asserted state law claims were
barred by a number of preemption doctrines.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies,
finding that there was implied field preemption under the Federal Aviation Act
(the “FAAct” or “Act”). The district court held that the family members’ claims
4 were preempted under this Court’s case law stating that Congress intended for the
FAAct “to occupy the entire field of aviation safety,” Jones v. Goodrich Corp., 422 F.
Supp. 3d 518, 521, 525–26 (D. Conn. 2019) (Eginton, J.) (citing Goodspeed Airport
LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir.
2011)). Although the family members argued that the FAAct could not preempt
their claims because the Act applies only to civil aircrafts—and the helicopter that
crashed here was a military aircraft—the district court rejected that argument,
reasoning that, even though the FAAct “exempt[s] government military aircrafts
from [FAAct] standards,” this “does not constrain the clear congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of aviation safety.” Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525.
We disagree. Field preemption is always a matter of congressional intent,
and we think Congress’s removal of military aircrafts from the FAAct’s reach
indicates that it did not wish to include them in the FAAct’s preempted field.
Rather, Congress intended for the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to have
autonomy over their own aircrafts. While it is possible that the family members’
claims may be barred by the military contractor defense, another preemption
doctrine, see generally Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)—this
determination requires a fact-intensive analysis to be handled by the district court
5 in the first instance. Finally, aside from any issues of preemption by the military
contractor defense, the family members offered sufficient evidence under Georgia
law for their strict liability manufacturing defect claim to survive summary
judgment.
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND
for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2011, United States Army Captain John David Hortman and
Chief Warrant Officer Steven Redd were piloting a military helicopter in
connection with a training exercise at Fort Benning, Georgia. The helicopter
crashed, killing them both.
Approximately 36 seconds before the crash, the helicopter’s Full Authority
Digital Electronic Control (“FADEC”), 1 the engine module that controls the flow
of fuel to the engine, detected an anomaly that caused it to disable its normal mode
of automatic operation. Instead, the FADEC entered fixed mode, in which it
1 While FADEC is the term consistently used for the system in question, the parties reference the full name as both Full Authority Digital Electronic Control and Full Authority Digital Engine Control.
6 provides the engine with fuel at the same rate it had at the moment it left automatic
mode.
For a pilot, a FADEC entering fixed mode signals an emergency. In
response, the pilot must switch the FADEC out of fixed mode into its manual
mode, which requires properly timing when to make the switch, waiting for the
FADEC to switch over, and then piloting the helicopter while using a lever
mechanism to regulate the flow of fuel. Unfortunately, Captain Hortman and
Chief Redd were unable to regain control of the helicopter in time.
Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Appellants”), surviving family members of Captain
Hortman and Chief Redd, sued the engine manufacturers—Rolls-Royce
Corporation (“Rolls-Royce”) and Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc.
(“Goodrich”)—collectively, Consolidated Defendants-Appellees (“Appellees”),
among other defendants not party to this appeal, because the FADEC at issue was
developed by Goodrich in collaboration with Rolls-Royce.
Appellants allege that the fatal helicopter crash resulted from defects in the
FADEC’s design and manufacture. First, they contend that one of the FADEC’s
components, its potentiometer, failed in a manner indicating that it was
defectively manufactured, and that, once the potentiometer failed, no pilots could
7 have recovered the helicopter to avert the crash at issue in this case. Second,
Appellants argue that the engine’s maintenance manual was defectively designed
because it failed to identify the potentiometer as a part to be investigated when the
FADEC enters fixed mode. Indeed, two weeks prior to the crash that killed
Captain Hortman and Chief Redd, the same helicopter had a FADEC issue, but
Army engineers did not check the potentiometer because they followed the
manual’s troubleshooting steps. As a result, the helicopter was put back into
service.
Contesting Appellants’ theories of liability, Rolls-Royce and Goodrich
argued, in relevant part, that the helicopter engine in question—including its
FADEC—was manufactured and designed to meet specifications the Army
required in a contract. Among other things, the Army contract required Rolls-
Royce to obtain a type certification from the Federal Aviation Administration (the
“FAA”) for the helicopter’s engine. “[T]ype certification” is “[t]he first stage of the
FAA compliance review” that a manufacturer must complete “before marketing”
certain types of aircrafts and aircraft parts. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 805 (1984). The FAA is to “issue
a type certificate” once it finds that the aircraft or aircraft part “is properly
8 designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and
minimum standards prescribed under” other parts of the FAAct and its
implementing regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1); see also 14 C.F.R. § 21.21
(discussing type certification requirements). And, under the Army contract, the
helicopter’s engine maintenance manual also had to be provided to the FAA for
certification.
After the parties completed summary judgment briefing, the district court
sua sponte requested briefing on whether this Court’s cases on FAAct implied field
preemption applied to Appellants’ claims. The district court subsequently held
that Appellants’ claims were preempted because “[t]he Second Circuit has found
clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety.” Jones, 422
F. Supp. at 521 (citing Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2011)). The court reasoned that,
because Goodrich and Rolls-Royce had obtained the “type certificate,” this meant
that the engine “met federal certification standards,” and thus that using state tort
“law rules for aircraft components would interfere with the uniform requirements
established by the federal government.” Id. at 523–24. In reaching its holding, the
district court rejected Appellants’ arguments that the FAAct does not apply to “the
9 military helicopter at issue in this case,” because “[t]he decision to exempt
government military aircraft from FAA standards in certain contexts does not
constrain the clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation
safety.” Id. at 524–25.
The district court further held that Appellants’ manufacturing defect claims
failed on the merits. The court reasoned that Appellants failed to provide evidence
that the potentiometer was defective at the time it was manufactured, and further
that applicable state law relieved Goodrich and Rolls-Royce from liability because
the potentiometer “was supplied by [a] third-party vendor.” Id. at 525.
Appellants timely appealed.
After hearing oral argument, we subsequently called for the views of the
FAA and the DoD on whether the FAAct’s preemption of the field of aviation
safety included the military helicopter at issue here. 2d Cir. 20-2951, ECF Nos. 199,
200. The United States filed a responsive amicus curiae brief on February 8, 2023.
Id. at ECF No. 221. Appellants and Appellees filed responsive briefs on March 7,
2023. Id. at ECF Nos. 226, 227.
10 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment and drawing all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.” M.A. ex rel. H.R.
v. Rockland Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 53 F.4th 29, 35 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 35–36 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And
“[w]e review de novo a district court’s application of preemption principles.” Glover
v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 6 F.4th 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Goodspeed Airport, 634
F.3d at 209 n.3).
III. DISCUSSION
A. FAAct Field Preemption
Previously, “we have held that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire
‘field of air safety.’” Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 74 (2d
Cir. 2019) (quoting Goodspeed Airport, 634 F.3d at 210–212). “Accordingly, ‘state
laws that conflict with the FAAct or sufficiently interfere with federal regulation
of air safety are preempted.’” Id. (alteration marks omitted) (quoting Fawemimo v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 751 F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)). 11 Determining whether implied FAAct field preemption applies in any
particular case thus requires a “twofold” inquiry: First, a reviewing court must
determine whether a challenged state law falls within the “field of air safety” as
established by the FAAct, and second, it must determine whether “the state
regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation [such] that it should be
deemed pre-empted.” Goodspeed Airport, 634 F.3d at 211 (alteration marks omitted)
(quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992)). At bottom,
this calls for an assessment of congressional intent. See Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 211–
12 (“In occupying the field of air safety, Congress did not intend to preempt the
operation of state statutes and regulations like the ones at issue here” that required
a local airport to “obtain a permit before removing the trees in question” from its
property.); see also Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 930 F.3d at 74 (state statute
regulating runway was preempted because “[i]f every state were free to control
the lengths of runways within its boundaries, th[e] Congressional objective” of “a
uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation in the field of air safety” “could
never be achieved” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A review of the FAAct shows that Congress did not intend for military
aircrafts to fall within the FAAct’s preempted “field of air safety.” The FAAct vests
12 the FAA with authority to “promote safe flight of civil aircraft.” 49 U.S.C.
§ 44701(a) (emphasis added). The term “civil aircraft” is key, as Congress drew a
distinction between “civil aircraft,” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(16), and what it deemed
“public aircraft,” § 40102(a)(41). Under the FAAct, a “civil aircraft” is defined as
any “aircraft except a public aircraft.” § 40102(a)(16). A “public aircraft,”
meanwhile, includes “[a]n aircraft owned or operated by the armed forces.”
§ 40102(a)(41)(E). Thus, the FAAct explicitly removes aircrafts owned or operated
by the armed forces from its purview. Further, in giving the FAA authority to
“issue a type certificate,” Congress provided that these certifications would be
available for aircrafts or aircraft engines that “meet[] the regulations and minimum
standards prescribed under section 44701(a) of this title,” which again only speaks
to handling the safety “of civil aircraft.” See §§ 44704(a)(1); 44701(a). Accordingly,
by repeatedly distinguishing between civil and public aircrafts as it did, and by
only creating a system for regulating the former, it appears that Congress did not
intend for the military helicopter at issue here to fall within the preempted field
created by the FAAct.
Instead, the logical conclusion is that Congress meant for the DoD and the
Army to have authority over their own aircrafts. For one thing, Congress provided
13 that “[s]ubject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense .
. . the Secretary of the Army is responsible for . . . all affairs of the Department of
the Army, including . . . [t]he construction, outfitting, and repair of military
equipment.” 10 U.S.C. § 7013(b)(11). For another, as the United States points out
in its amicus brief, the DoD and the Army have robust regulations and policies for
managing the safety of their aircrafts. DoD policy provides that “[a]ll aircraft and
air systems owned, leased, operated, used, designed, or modified by DoD must
have completed an airworthiness assessment,” performed by a department
airworthiness authority, so as to provide personnel “the appropriate level of safety
of flight and risk management adapted to DoD-unique mission requirements.”
DoD Directive 5030.61, DoD Airworthiness Policy § 3(a), Enclosure 3 § 1(a) (May
24, 2013). Army regulations make explicit the DoD’s authority, as they state that
an Army airworthiness release, an Army-specific certification, is “[r]equired prior
to the operation of a new aircraft system, subsystem, [or] component.” Army Reg.
70-62 § 3-1(a)(2).
Faced with the FAAct’s carveout for military aircrafts, Goodrich and Rolls-
Royce argue that implied field preemption bars Appellants’ claims anyway
because “the Army required FAA certification of the [engine] and FADEC” as part
14 of an Army contract. Rolls-Royce Br. at 41; see Goodrich Br. at 43 (“[T]he . . .
[e]ngine did receive a type certificate from the FAA as required by the Army in the
parties’ contract.”). We disagree, as this argument disregards the key component
of the inquiry, which is congressional intent. “Implied [field] preemption arises
when . . . Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy a field
exclusively.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). As the United States rightly
observes, “[t]he scope of the [FAAct]’s field-preemption is not extended by a
contract provision that provides for FAA type certification as part of [a] military
assessment,” because “[t]he requirement results from the Army’s decision,” rather
than from some Act of Congress. United States Amicus Br. at 15. In other words,
the Army’s ad-hoc contract negotiations cannot extend the scope of the field
Congress intended to occupy with the FAAct. To be sure, there are times when
“contract terms have preemptive force,” but those situations result because
“federal statutes” explicitly state that specific “contractual terms” are to have
preemptive force. Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S. 87, 98 (2017)
(expounding on a statute providing that certain “contract terms have preemptive
force only as they ‘relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits
15 (including payments with respect to benefits),’” and citing similar statutes
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1))). Here, nothing in the FAAct suggests Congress
meant for government contract negotiations to extend the field that the FAAct
preempts.
Accordingly, FAAct implied field preemption does not apply in instances
where a military aircraft is the subject of dispute.
B. Conflict Preemption and the Military Contractor Defense
Goodrich and Rolls-Royce also argue that we may affirm the district court
via two other preemption doctrines: (1) conflict preemption and/or (2) the military
contractor defense.
“Conflict preemption exists when a state law actually conflicts with federal
law, in other words, where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of Congress’s intent.” Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). But as with field preemption, conflict preemption only results if we
“find that Congress intended to preempt state law.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2013). We determine if this
is the case by “applying standard tools of statutory construction” to assess whether
“the challenged state law falls within the scope of Congress’s intent to preempt.”
Id. at 96–97. 16 We cannot find conflict preemption here for the reasons already explained
with regard to field preemption—there is no indication that Congress meant for
the FAAct to regulate military aircrafts. The FAA itself has come to this same
conclusion, as it has announced that “[a]ircraft operated by the military are by
statute public-use aircraft and are not subject to the civil regulatory requirements
for certification.” FAA, Advisory Circular No. 20-169, Guidance for Certification of
Military and Special Mission Modifications and Equipment for Commercial Derivative
Aircraft (CDA) 6 (Sept. 30, 2010).
By contrast, while the military contractor defense may be applicable to this
case, whether and how it applies is a fact-specific question that we will leave for
development in the district court on remand. See Jusino v. Fed'n of Cath. Tchrs., Inc.,
54 F.4th 95, 105 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[W]hile we may be free to affirm on any ground
that finds support in the record, even if it was not the ground upon which the
district court relied, we have made clear that we prefer not to speculate in the first
instance as to issues not passed upon below.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Under the military contractor defense, “[l]iability for design defects in
military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law . . . when (1) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
17 conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment.” Badilla v. Midwest Air Traffic
Control Serv., Inc., 8 F.4th 105, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
Appellants contend that the Army did not approve “reasonably precise
specifications for the FADEC,” Reply Br. at 27, which, if correct, would bar
application of the military contractor defense, see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the military contractor defense
is available where inter alia “[t]he government . . . independently and meaningfully
reviews the specifications such that the government remains the agent of decision”
(internal quotation and alteration marks omitted)). To the contrary, Goodrich
argues that the Army was “heavily involved in all phases of the FADEC’s design
and development,” Goodrich Br. at 6, and that “[t]he Army was aware of the risks
of its chosen configuration for the . . . FADEC,” id. at 11. Notably, the government
views the military contractor defense as providing the proper framework for
assessing plaintiffs’ claims but takes no position as to questions of fact that will
permit the ultimate disposition of the claims. See United States Amicus Br. at 18,
20. As such, we leave questions as to these competing factual accounts for
resolution in the district court in the first instance.
18 C. Appellants’ Manufacturing Defect Claims
Finally, we agree with Appellants that the district court erred in finding
that Appellants’ manufacturing defect claims failed for lack of evidence, even if
not barred by FAAct implied field preemption. 2 Applying Georgia law, the
district court determined that, because Appellants relied only on “post-accident
testing” of the potentiometer, they failed to adduce necessary evidence as to
whether the potentiometer was defective “at the time of assembly, as required for
a manufacturing defect claim.” Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525. The court also
believed that, because the potentiometer was supplied by a “third-party vendor,”
the Appellees could not be responsible for its manufacturing defects. Id. The court
erred on both of these points.
The district court misapprehended Georgia law in discounting the post-
accident testing. “Because a product may be destroyed as a result of an incident,
circumstantial evidence is particularly appropriate in product liability cases to
show the manufacturing defect.” Rose v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 229 Ga. App. 848, 851
(1997) (discussing cases where circumstantial evidence was ruled admissible to
2We leave it to the district court to decide on remand whether the military contractor defense is applicable to the manufacturing defect claim. 19 show defects); see Folsom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 174 Ga. App. 46, 46 (1985) (finding
a triable issue with regard to strict liability based on post-accident testing). Here,
Appellants’ post-accident testing suggests that, had the potentiometer been
properly manufactured, it would not have failed the way it did, especially not so
soon into its service life. Appellants’ expert testified that the potentiometer was
the most likely cause of the FADEC error that led to the crash. Further, both
Goodrich and Rolls-Royce presented materials to the Army in which they
identified potentiometers as a common cause of multiple prior helicopter engine
failures. Under a proper reading of Georgia law, this would be sufficient for
Appellants to proceed to a jury on a claim of strict products liability.
Additionally, although the district court is correct that Georgia law does not
provide for “strict liability” for “entities that had no real role in the creation of
products,” Buchan v. Lawrence Metal Prod., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 517, 520–21 (2004), it
erred in determining that this was the case here. The district court found that
Appellees could not be liable because they themselves did not manufacture the
FADEC’s allegedly defective potentiometer, but merely assembled it into the
FADEC. See Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525. However, Georgia law holds that “an
entity which assembles component parts and sells them as a single product under
20 its trade name is a ‘manufacturer’” for products liability purposes. Tyler v. PepsiCo,
Inc., 198 Ga. App. 223, 226 (1990) (quoting Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., 141 Ga.
App. 175, 178 (1977), superseded on other grounds by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-
11.1. (1987)); accord Williams v. Pac. Cycle, Inc., 661 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2016)
(summary order) (“Georgia courts have made clear that” strict liability
manufacturing defect claims are available against “‘actual manufacturers—those
entities that have an active role in the production, design, or assembly of products
and placing them in the stream of commerce.’” (quoting Alltrade, Inc. v. McDonald,
213 Ga. App. 758, 760 (1994))); Pfeil v. Mike’s Golf Carts, LLC, No. 5:13–CV–434
(CAR), 2015 WL 5342398, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (denying summary
judgment where there was “evidence [the company] took component parts
manufactured by other entities . . . and assembled them to create” the allegedly
defective product). Appellants adduced evidence that Goodrich manufactured
the FADEC and that Rolls-Royce assembled the engine.
Moreover, in invoking the military contractor defense, Goodrich and Rolls-
Royce attest that they themselves “had an active role in the production” and
“design” of the FADEC so as to qualify them as manufacturers. See Buchan, 270
21 Ga. App. at 521. Accordingly, Appellees do not have a third-party vendor defense
available against a strict liability manufacturing defect claim.
We refrain from resolving whether Appellants’ negligence theory of
manufacturing defect may proceed. While “evidence” of “an inherent defect”
does not necessarily “demonstrate that the defect was the result of any
negligence,” Owens v. Gen. Motors Corp., 272 Ga. App. 842, 848 (2005), here, no
party has called to our attention any evidence in the record that would substantiate
or defeat Appellants’ negligence charge. Given that the parties did not
meaningfully brief Georgia negligence law on appeal, we will leave it to the district
court to resolve whether this or any other theory of liability—save for strict
liability for the manufacturing defect in the potentiometer—may proceed to trial.
See Jusino, 54 F.4th at 105.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FAAct’s preemption of the field of civilian aircraft safety does not
extend to the military aircraft at issue here. And Appellants have adduced
sufficient evidence to proceed to trial at least on their strict liability theory of
manufacturing defect, assuming Appellees are not entitled to summary judgment
on their military contractor defense. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND
22 for the district court to determine the applicability of the military contractor
defense and for further analysis consistent with this opinion.