Jones v. George T. Rogers & Son

36 Ga. 157
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJune 15, 1867
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 36 Ga. 157 (Jones v. George T. Rogers & Son) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. George T. Rogers & Son, 36 Ga. 157 (Ga. 1867).

Opinion

Harris, J.

1. If the complainant (Jones) in receiving the depreciated Confederate Treasury notes, in September, 1863, in payment of the note of the defendant, due before the war began, did so through the influence of public opinion brought to bear on his action by an association organized to persuade and impress men with a sense of public duty, or through the instrumentality of the press, appealing to the patriotic feeling of the citizen, in such case he could not and ought not to have relief in a Court. Such an act would be deemed voluntary. Conscious, as men of intelligence are, that individual example and moral power can, at most, accomplish but little in producing widely beneficial results, they almost instinctively resort to combinations of mind, wealth, character and position — aggregated, the scope and power of the association becomes the sum of the elements thus united — and knowing them, we are thereby furnished with a correct measure of the power it is capable of exerting. Acting within a legitimate sphere, exerted in the cause of education, charity, humanity— in the furtherance of a common public interest or policy — our experience demonstrates many beneficent results which have been accomplished by their agency.

2. But when such associations are formed, though with generous and patriotic ends in view, when the means they employ are unauthorized by law and coercive in their nature, when they combine avowedly, not by personal sacrifice and [175]*175individual example of each, or by persuasive appeals to the hearts and interests of the people to co-operate with them, but to force men by the awe and fear of personal punishment to yield to and comply with their will, then it is that such associations exert a baleful influence over the community in which they exist, depriving men of their freedom, and thus subverting law.

The case of complainant makes it necessary that we should seek through the testimony in the record to ascertain whether the act which he alleges to have been involuntary, is or not ascribable to the influence of an organization of the last kind above described, over his conduct.

Some case or cases having occurred early in the year 1863 of a refusal by a citizen of Macon to receive Confederate Treasury notes in payment of debts due to him, a call for a public meeting was made in the newspapers. A large number of the most respectable citizens of the place assembled, appointed a chairman and a committee, to report the sense of the meeting. The burthen of the report was an impassioned exposition of the momentous importance of sustaining the credit of the Southern Confederacy as vital to the success of its cause, and the report was accompanied by several resolutions, which were unanimously agreed to.

The report denounced as enemies to the Confederacy all persons who refused to receive its Treasury notes in payment of debts, and one of the resolutions pledged the meeting to the use of their best endeavors to bring all such men to condign punishment by legal means, if the laws provide such punishment. To this extent the action of that public meeting might have gone without transcending the limits heretofore stated, for it had an unquestionable right to unite in giving efficiency to existing laws.

There were, however, as must have been known to several distinguished legal gentlemen, who appear to have mingled their counsels with the other persons constituting the meeting, no laws of the Confederate or State governments which made the refusal to receive Confederate Treasury notes a crime, subjecting a person offending to any punishment what[176]*176ever, none which branded him with the epithet of enemy or traitor. So far, then, as they thus engaged, there was nothing illegal, and with all the industry they might use, they could not assist in bringing any one to punishment by law, as there were no such laws to be violated. It could have served at best for only a scare-crow. But the meeting did not stop with that pledge, they went a step beyond — they boldly crossed the line which separates legality and illegality, persuasion'and compulsion, not ignorantly nor unintentionally, but openly, knowingly and defiantly — they resolved unanimously that if the laws did not provide punishment, (for those who refused to receive Confederate Treasury notes,) they would bring them to punishment loithout law. Is there no menace, no threat in this ? Is there not much more ?

To give effect to the combined will of this meeting, it urged the City Council of Macon to appoint a Vigilance Committee of its best and most substantial citizens, who should be clothed with all the powers of the city police, and whose duty it should be to collect all facts they can bearing on the subject, and to bring offenders to punishment. After ordering the publication of its proceedings in the city papers,, it disperses. The City Council take up the subject — it appoints the Vigilance Committee, and places its police at the service of the Committee. The spirit and purposes of the public meeting are transferred to the Vigilance Committee, which was created to carry into effect “the law” prescribed by the public meeting — the last is but the incarnation of the _ first. The public meeting had, so far as Macon was concerned, added by its legislation a new section to the Penal Code — it had created a new crime — its sanction was punishment, but indefinite as to kind or duration; we cannot gather from what they resolved whether it was fine, imprisonment, exile or death — this seems to have been left to the discretion of the Committee.

"When we contemplate with some degree of minuteness the constitution of this body, we realize the establishment of an Inquisition of fearful proportions and powers, where each member is employed industriously in collecting the names of [177]*177all offenders against the new law,” all facts bearing on the subject. Membership implies an engagement to watch, enquire diligently, to be active and on the alert, to arrest and bring offenders to punishment. In fine, the duties imposed and undertaken are those of a police and espionage over the lawful and general business transactions of the city of Macon. This Committee is to exist during the war; it is invested with judicial and executive functions. It arrests the offender, or causes it to be done by the city police; it accuses; it prescribes its own sessions, its modes of procedure, its rules for admission of testimony, the quantity and quality necessary to determine guilt; it judges; it tries; it executes its own sentences. What element is wanting to make a body armed with or arrogating to itself such powers and functions, the most frightful of absolute despotisms ?

It had its origin in the best impulses of patriotic hearts— of men who sought to accomplish what they deemed a great public good. But nothing was capable of greater perversion or could produce more injustice than the enforcement of its own requirement of compelling the receipt of Confederate Treasury notes at par in payment of all debts. It w§is not so intended, but it led to shameless wrong; it became, in fact, an invitation to those who did not feel the restraint of moral principle or conscience to put themselves out of debt at little' cost.

Can it be wondered at that debtors will avail themselves of such opportunities, when supported by the weight of large and respectable bodies of men, who stand pledged to punish all persons who do not comply with their will ?

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Bluebook (online)
36 Ga. 157, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-george-t-rogers-son-ga-1867.