Jones v. Evans

46 F.2d 197, 18 C.C.P.A. 866
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 21, 1931
Docket2560
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 46 F.2d 197 (Jones v. Evans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Evans, 46 F.2d 197, 18 C.C.P.A. 866 (ccpa 1931).

Opinion

GRAHAM, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Benjamin W. Jones, filed his application for a patent on improvements in motor control, on January 9) 1922. The appellee, Clarence T. Evans, filed his application for what is coneededly the same device, on April 22, 1921. Thereafter an interference was declared by the Patent Office, whieh involved the following counts:

“1. A control system for electric motors comprising resistance in the motor circuit, electromagnetic switch mechanism for controlling the resistance, means operated responsively to the value of the motor current for holding the said switch mechanism in the open position and means responsive to the rate of change of a motor operating condition for controlling the closing of said switch mechanism.

“2. A control system for electric motors, comprising resistance in the motor circuit, electromagnetic switch mechanism for controlling the resistance, means responsive to the value of the motor current for initiating the operation of the said switch mechanism, and means responsive to the rate of change of a motor operating condition for controlling the subsequent operation of the said switch mechanism.

“3. A control system for electric motors, comprising a resistor, electro-responsive switeh mechanism for controlling the resistor, and means for regulating the supply of current to operate the said switch mechanism in accordance with the rate of change of the potential difference between points of the motor circuit and a time function.”

Testimony was taken by both parties, and the Examiner of Interferences, in a lengthy and well-considered decision, awarded priority of invention of the subject-matter covered by counts 1 and 2 to the appellant and junior party, Jones, and of count 3 to the appellee and senior party, Evans. The Board of Appeals took a somewhat different view of the matter and found that the appellant, Jones, though first to conceive the invention covered by counts 1 and 2, had failed to establish diligence from April, 1921, when Evans entered the field, up to the date of Jones’ reduction to practice on September 27, 1921. Therefore priority was awarded on all counts to the appellee, Evans. Jones has appealed, and the only matter now involved in this court is the correctness of the decision of the Board of Appeals in awarding priority to the appellee as to counts 1 and 2. There is no contention that Evans conceived the invention prior to April 13, 1921.

The appellant contends that he conceived the invention covered by said counts in the period between February 1, and February 19, 1921; that he disclosed the invention and made a written description of the same on February 19th; that he made the first drawing of his invention on February 23 d, and reduced the invention to practice during the latter half of the month of March and the first half of the month of April, in the year 1921. He further contends that, from the time immediately prior to the entrance of the party Evans into the field, up to the date of the filing of his application on January 9, 1922, he was diligent.

Evans claims that he conceived the invention in the early part of 1921, and not later than April 13th; that he disclosed his invention to others, made a drawing of the same and a written description of the invention during the same period, and that he constructively reduced the invention to practice on April 22, 1921, by filing his application for patent.

*199 In his brief and argument, appellee contends that the appellant should not prevail as to said counts 1 and 2, because, first, there was no proof of reduction to practice of the invention described in said counts, and, second, that the appellant was not diligent from the time immediately prior to April 22, 1921, up until the time he filed his application for patent on January 9, 1922.

The device which is the subject of the controversy here is a system of control by which electric motors may be started and operated without shook and possible injury thereto by the application of the power direct to them. The system of control heretofore known to the art is to apply, in the electric circuit by which the motor is caused to function, various resistances. These have a tendency to retard the current and prevent it from damaging the motor by too heavy a rush of current. These resistances are cut out by the action of the current so that gradually, as the motor accelerates, the resistance lessens and finally the full force of the current becomes available to the motor. The improvement consists of the interposition of a transformer and relays in the motor circuit, and its operation is fairly well explained by the following portion of appellant’s specification:

* * Assume that line voltage is supplied to the two lines labeled LI, L2 and that the control switch is open as indicated. Under this condition the bottom coil of the left-hand relay will be connected directly across the tips of contactor 1. This potential across the tips of line contactor 1 will be sufficient to cause the armature of this relay to be attracted towards the coils and open its control contact. When the control switch is closed for the purpose of starting the equipment, a circuit will be made for energizing the coil of contactor 1. This will close the contacts of contactor 1, which will cause a current to flow through the coils of the two transformers through the tip of the contactor 1, through the resistor Rl, R2, R3 and through the motor armature and series field to the other side of the line. This will cause the motor to start. When contactor No. 1 ¿loses, it will short-circuit the lower coil of the left-hand relay which will cause the flux in this coil circuit to diminish towards zero. If there was no other force acting on the armature of this relay, the armature would release and close the contacts of the relay, after an interval of time. However, due to the changing current in the line circuit caused by the motor accelerating, there will be induced in the secondary of this transformer a current which is proportional to the rate of change of the motor current. This induced current will flow through the upper coil of this left-hand relay and prevent it from releasing until the rate of change of this current has diminished to a prescribed rate. At this time the armature will release and permit the coil of contactor 2 to become energized and thereby close. When contactor 1 initially closed, the upper coil of the right-hand relay received a potential equal to the drop across resistor Rl, R2. This energization of the upper coil of the right-hand relay caused the armature of this relay to be attracted towards the coil and open its control contacts. Therefore, at the time when contactor 2 closed as above described, the upper coil of the right-hand relay became short-circuited in a manner similar to the lower coil of the left-hand relay. The action of the right-hand relay is similar to that of the left-hand relay, in that after the upper coil has been short-circuited and after an elapse of time, and after the rate of change of the current in the motor circuit has diminished to a prescribed value, the armature will release and allow the coil of contactor .3 to become energized and thereby close. It therefore follows that the combination of transformers, relays, contactors and motor shows an arrangement which causes the motor to be accelerated in accordance with a rate of change of an electrical condition of the motor and of a time function.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
46 F.2d 197, 18 C.C.P.A. 866, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-evans-ccpa-1931.