Jones v. Ethicon, Inc.

District Court, S.D. Georgia·Decided May 16, 2022·No. 4:21-cv-00023·Unknown

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION TAQUITA JONES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV421-023 ) ETHICON, INC. and ) JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER This case originated in multi-district litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Systems Products Liability Litigation, No. 2:12-md- 2327 (S.D. W. Va.) (the “Ethicon MDL”). See doc. 1 (Amended Short Form Complaint). Plaintiff is one of thousands who allege injury after being implanted with pelvic mesh products designed, manufactured, and sold by defendants. See generally id. Her case was transferred to this Court on October 27, 2020. Doc. 42 at 2. She has filed a Motion to Strike

Defendants' Non-Retained Experts in Violation of MDL Pretrial Order #320. Doc. 93. Defendants have responded. Doc. 95. Her motion is ripe for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND The District Judge presiding over the MDL, Hon. Joseph R.

Goodwin, entered Pretrial Order (“PTO”) #320, which limited the parties to “no more than five experts per case (exclusive of treating physicians).” Doc. 12 at 4. In addition to identifying their “Retained Expert

Witnesses,” Defendants also identified nine “Non-Retained Experts” as potential witness at trial. See generally docs. 93-4 & 93-5. Plaintiff contends that this designation of nine additional experts violates the

PTO’s express limitation on the number of experts allowed. Doc. 93 at 5- 6. She argues that the MDL Court and other courts to consider the issue have determined that any expert beyond the express five-expert

limitation must be excluded and asks this Court to follow suit. Id. at 6- 7. Defendants disagree. Doc. 95. They first argue that Plaintiff’s

motion is untimely. Id. at 3. Then, they argue that the other courts to consider the PTO’s language have excluded their non-retained experts after only a superficial analysis of their arguments, and that this Court should ignore those cases and, in their words, “analyze the issue more fully.” Id. at 4. In doing so, they urge the Court to consider their inability

to properly defend the case without these witnesses, and that the application of this expert witness cap serves to unfairly “punish” Ethicon

for having a highly educated workforce with specialized scientific and technical knowledge. Id. at 5-6. They compare their non-retained experts to Plaintiff’s treating physicians who are, by the express

language of the PTO, excluded from the calculation of experts allowed at trial. Id. at 7. They suggest their non-retained experts are similarly situated to those physicians and “should not be treated differently.” Id.

Defendants further argue that excluding these witnesses would violate their due process rights, id. at 8, but that permitting them would in no way prejudice Plaintiff, id. at 9.

II. ANALYSIS Before turning to the merits of the parties’ arguments, the Court first addresses the timing of the Plaintiff’s motion. As Defendants

correctly note, a “motion to strike is not the proper vehicle” for the Plaintiff’s argument. Doc. 95 at 1, n.1. Plaintiff’s motion is more properly characterized as a motion in limine, and construed as such, there is no evidence that it is untimely. Defendants have not cited to any deadline that would preclude the Court from considering Plaintiff’s motion. See

doc. 95 at 3 (referencing a deadline for Daubert motions, but no others); see also doc. 12 at 3 (providing deadlines for dispositive motions and

Daubert motions, but not motions in limine). Plaintiff is not challenging the substance of the proposed experts’ opinions; she is challenging Defendants’ attempts to avoid the PTO’s expert-witness cap. That

challenge is not untimely, and the Court will consider it on its merits. The express language of the PTO mandates that “the plaintiffs and each defendant are limited to no more than five experts per

case (exclusive of treating physicians).” Doc. 12 at 4 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 3, n.3. In arguing that they should be permitted additional experts, Defendants attempt to draw a distinction between the

non-retained status of the disputed experts and their other retained experts. See, e.g., doc. 95 at 6 (“The opinions of Ethicon’s non-retained experts are from hands-on, percipient observations during their

employment; they were not formed for the purposes of litigation.”). Their argument seeks to read an implied qualifier into the PTO—that it only applies to “retained” experts. Nothing in the plain text of the order supports that interpretation. While the distinction between “retained” and “non-retained” experts might bear upon whether a witness is

required to provide a report, see, e.g., Southard v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2013 WL 209224, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2013), it does not bear

upon whether the witness is properly considered an “expert.” The presiding MDL judge himself has rejected reading such a distinction into the language of the PTO. See, e.g., Lankston v. Ethicon, Inc., 2:12-cv-

00755, doc. 148 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 12, 2017). In support of her motion, Plaintiff cites not only to decisions from the MDL Court, see doc. 93 at 6 (citing In re Ethicon, 2:12-md-02326, doc.

8902 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 18, 2019)), but also to multiple decisions from district courts around the country which have consistently precluded any party from having more than five expert witnesses, whether retained or

non-retained. See doc. 93 at 3-4 (citing Sluis v. Ethicon, Inc., 529. F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1022-23 (D.S.D. 2021); Kelly v. Ethicon, Inc., 2020 WL 5949225 (N.D. Ia. Oct. 7, 2020); Wegmann v. Ethicon, Inc., 2020 WL

5960923 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 8, 2020)). Defendants urge this Court to blaze a different trail; since they believe that none of the prior orders involved a careful analysis of the specific arguments advanced here, they conclude that a different outcome is warranted. Doc. 95 at 4. Notably, although Defendants urge this Court to ignore the decisions relied upon

by Plaintiff, they cite to no cases where a court has accepted their interpretation of the language of the PTO. See generally doc. 95. While

none of the rulings cited by Plaintiff represent binding authority on this Court, they are highly persuasive, and the Court is not persuaded by the Defendants arguments otherwise.

Defendants argue that their “primary witnesses necessarily will be employees with scientific and medical expertise who formed opinions and acted based on their scientific knowledge during the development and

continuing evaluation of the products at issue.” Doc. 95 at 5. Therefore, these “experts in their field” must testify based on this scientific or technical knowledge in offering their percipient testimony. Id. Without

this testimony, defendants contend that they “could not properly defend this case.” Id. at 6. Contrary to their assertion, defendants are not being “punished” by this limitation on experts. The same as all other parties

to this massive litigation, they had to make a strategic choice as to who to name as experts. They made that choice by naming their retained experts who may be called to testify at trial. See doc. 93-4. Despite this strategic choice, as the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa recognized, “Defendants' employees are not wholly prohibited from

testifying.” Kelly, 2020 WL 5949225, at *6. They may testify as lay witnesses, subject to the constraints of Rule 701 and any evidentiary

rulings at trial. They may not, however, testify as experts in excess of the five-expert limit. Defendants’ argument that Ethicon’s highly educated employees

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