1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEONTE JONES, Case No.: 25-cv-00946-WQH-SBC
Plaintiff, 12 ORDER v. 13 14 EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, 15 Defendant. 16 HAYES, Judge: 17 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 18 On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff Deonte Jones (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, initiated 19 this action by filing a Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) The same day, Plaintiff filed an Application 20 to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2) and a Motion 21 for Leave to Electronically File Documents (ECF No. 3). 22 On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplement to Complaint in which he 23 attached “additional exhibits in support of [his] claims asserted against Defendant Equifax 24 Information Services, LLC.” (ECF No. 4.) 25 On May 14, 2025, the Court issued an Order denying Plaintiff’s Application to 26 Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2) because “Plaintiff 27 28 1 ha[d] failed to complete all required free-response fields regarding his income, assets, 2 expenses, dependents, and debts.” (ECF No. 5 at 2.) 3 On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the now pending Application to Proceed in District 4 Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis”). (ECF 5 No. 6.) 6 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS 7 Pursuant to the Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures 8 Manual of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California (“ECF 9 Manual”), pro se litigants are required to submit and file all documents in paper form unless 10 the Court grants the litigant leave to electronically file. See ECF Manual § 2(b). 11 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents (ECF No. 3) contends 12 that Plaintiff has regular access to the technical requirements necessary to e-file 13 successfully and asks the Court for permission to file documents electronically. 14 Based on Plaintiff’s representations, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to electronically 15 file. Plaintiff is required to follow all rules and policies in the ECF Manual, available via 16 the Court’s website. As stated in the ECF Manual, Plaintiff “must register as a user with 17 the Clerk’s Office and as a subscriber to PACER within five (5) days.” ECF Manual § 2(b). 18 III. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 19 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, other than 20 a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 21 CivLR 4.5. An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is 22 granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 23 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in forma pauperis is 24 a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965). 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 In his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Plaintiff states that he is not presently 2 employed, earns $390.00 in total monthly income, and has no assets beyond a motor 3 vehicle worth $900.00. (See generally ECF No. 6.) Based on Plaintiff’s representations, 4 the Court determines that Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the filing fee in this case. Plaintiff’s 5 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 6) is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). 7 IV. INITIAL SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT 8 A. Legal Standard 9 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer screening 10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 11 an IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, 12 or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 13 502 (9th Cir. 2017). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous 14 or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 15 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 16 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 17 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 20 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a 21 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 22 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 23 quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 24 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 25 suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a 26 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 27 and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 28 1 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 2 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 3 B. Allegations in the Complaint 4 On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff sent Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC 5 (“Equifax”) a written dispute letter related to an account with USAA Saving Bank (the 6 “Account”). (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17–18, 20.) “The Accounts were clearly described and 7 identified” and the errors, which consisted of inaccurate and incomplete information, “were 8 clearly spelled out for Equifax to understand the nature of the errors.” Id. ¶¶ 21–23. On 9 March 10, 2025, Equifax received the letter. Id. ¶ 24. It is unclear whether Equifax properly 10 notified the furnishers of the Accounts of the dispute. Id. ¶ 25. 11 “Equifax knew it was not allowed to report incomplete or inaccurate information[,] 12 or information that could not be verified[,] but it did so anyway.” Id. ¶ 28. “A reasonable 13 investigation would have certainly resulted in the correction or deletion of the Account as 14 the information related to the Accounts consisted of data directly from credit reports 15 produced by Equifax,” however, “Equifax has refused to invest the time, money, and effort 16 to carry out its federally mandate[d] dut[y] of investigation.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEONTE JONES, Case No.: 25-cv-00946-WQH-SBC
Plaintiff, 12 ORDER v. 13 14 EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, 15 Defendant. 16 HAYES, Judge: 17 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 18 On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff Deonte Jones (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, initiated 19 this action by filing a Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) The same day, Plaintiff filed an Application 20 to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2) and a Motion 21 for Leave to Electronically File Documents (ECF No. 3). 22 On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplement to Complaint in which he 23 attached “additional exhibits in support of [his] claims asserted against Defendant Equifax 24 Information Services, LLC.” (ECF No. 4.) 25 On May 14, 2025, the Court issued an Order denying Plaintiff’s Application to 26 Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2) because “Plaintiff 27 28 1 ha[d] failed to complete all required free-response fields regarding his income, assets, 2 expenses, dependents, and debts.” (ECF No. 5 at 2.) 3 On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the now pending Application to Proceed in District 4 Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis”). (ECF 5 No. 6.) 6 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS 7 Pursuant to the Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures 8 Manual of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California (“ECF 9 Manual”), pro se litigants are required to submit and file all documents in paper form unless 10 the Court grants the litigant leave to electronically file. See ECF Manual § 2(b). 11 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents (ECF No. 3) contends 12 that Plaintiff has regular access to the technical requirements necessary to e-file 13 successfully and asks the Court for permission to file documents electronically. 14 Based on Plaintiff’s representations, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to electronically 15 file. Plaintiff is required to follow all rules and policies in the ECF Manual, available via 16 the Court’s website. As stated in the ECF Manual, Plaintiff “must register as a user with 17 the Clerk’s Office and as a subscriber to PACER within five (5) days.” ECF Manual § 2(b). 18 III. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 19 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, other than 20 a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 21 CivLR 4.5. An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is 22 granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 23 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in forma pauperis is 24 a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965). 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 In his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Plaintiff states that he is not presently 2 employed, earns $390.00 in total monthly income, and has no assets beyond a motor 3 vehicle worth $900.00. (See generally ECF No. 6.) Based on Plaintiff’s representations, 4 the Court determines that Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the filing fee in this case. Plaintiff’s 5 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 6) is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). 7 IV. INITIAL SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT 8 A. Legal Standard 9 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer screening 10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 11 an IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, 12 or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 13 502 (9th Cir. 2017). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous 14 or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 15 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 16 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 17 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 20 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a 21 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 22 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 23 quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 24 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 25 suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a 26 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 27 and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 28 1 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 2 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 3 B. Allegations in the Complaint 4 On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff sent Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC 5 (“Equifax”) a written dispute letter related to an account with USAA Saving Bank (the 6 “Account”). (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17–18, 20.) “The Accounts were clearly described and 7 identified” and the errors, which consisted of inaccurate and incomplete information, “were 8 clearly spelled out for Equifax to understand the nature of the errors.” Id. ¶¶ 21–23. On 9 March 10, 2025, Equifax received the letter. Id. ¶ 24. It is unclear whether Equifax properly 10 notified the furnishers of the Accounts of the dispute. Id. ¶ 25. 11 “Equifax knew it was not allowed to report incomplete or inaccurate information[,] 12 or information that could not be verified[,] but it did so anyway.” Id. ¶ 28. “A reasonable 13 investigation would have certainly resulted in the correction or deletion of the Account as 14 the information related to the Accounts consisted of data directly from credit reports 15 produced by Equifax,” however, “Equifax has refused to invest the time, money, and effort 16 to carry out its federally mandate[d] dut[y] of investigation.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 36. “Equifax 17 negligently, recklessly, wantonly and/or willfully violated the requirement of a reasonable 18 investigation as required under the [Fair Credit Reporting Act (the ‘FCRA’)].” Id. ¶ 37. 19 Additionally, “Plaintiff requested [his] full file disclosure” pursuant to Section 20 1681(g) of the FCRA, but Equifax “refused” to give it to him. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. Specifically, 21 “Equifax knew Plaintiff had requested this information and had identified who the Plaintiff 22 was and requested the file be sent to Plaintiff’s home address.” Id. ¶ 51. “Without having 23 access to all the information in Plaintiff’s file, Plaintiff is unable to determine if there is 24 additional inaccurate/incomplete information that Plaintiff needs to dispute had Plaintiff 25 been given the full file as required by law.” Id. ¶ 55. 26 As a result of Equifax’s misconduct, Plaintiff has suffered 27 actual damages because of these illegal actions by Equifax in the form of anger, anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration, upset, humiliation, 28 1 embarrassment, amongst other negative emotions (and Plaintiff had physical manifestations of such emotions), damage to credit, damage to Plaintiff[’s] 2 creditworthiness, economic loss, money spent for mailing, as well as suffering 3 from unjustified and abusive invasions of personal privacy. All such damages have suffered in the past, are continuing to be suffered, and such damages will 4 continue in the future. 5 Id. ¶ 45. 6 Plaintiff now brings seven claims for relief against Defendant Equifax, for violations 7 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 8 C. Discussion 9 The FCRA aims to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in 10 the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 11 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). The statute generally prohibits the inclusion of certain information in 12 consumer credit reports and mandates the implementation of procedural safeguards. 15 13 U.S.C. §§ 1681c-1(a)(1), 1681i(a). The FCRA provides for private causes of action for 14 negligent and willful noncompliance with its requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. 15 Courts have concluded that “general allegations are sufficient to maintain a claim for 16 willful violations of the FCRA.” Barrios v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. CV 19-5009 17 PSG (JEMx), 2019 WL 7905897, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2019) (collecting cases). 18 Plaintiff’s claims against Equifax arise under three sections of the FCRA: 15 U.S.C. 19 §§ 1681e; 1681g; 1681i. The essential elements of each claim are outlined below. 20 1. § 1681e 21 To successfully allege a claim under Section 1681e, a plaintiff must allege that (1) 22 an inaccuracy existed on his credit report (2) as the result of unreasonable procedures on 23 the defendant’s part (3) that caused him cognizable harm. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit 24 Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 2. § 1681g 26 The FCRA requires the nationwide credit reporting companies—TransUnion, 27 Equifax, and Experian—to provide consumers with a free copy of their credit report, at the 28 1 consumer’s request, once every twelve months. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681j(a)(1)(A); see 2 also 12 C.F.R. § 1022.136. This requirement, however, “shall apply ... only if the request 3 from the consumer is made using the centralized source established for such purpose ….” 4 Id. § 1681j(a)(1)(B). 5 3. § 1681i 6 “[A] plaintiff states a claim under § 1681i when she alleges: (1) that her credit report 7 contained an inaccuracy; (2) that she notified the [credit reporting agency] of her dispute 8 and requested a reinvestigation; and (3) that the [credit reporting agency] did not remove 9 the inaccuracy.” Hamm v. Equifax Info. Serv., LLC, No. CV-17-03821-PHX-JJT, 2018 WL 10 3548759, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2018). 11 Liberally construing the Complaint, as required at the screening stage and in light of 12 Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a 13 plausible claim for relief as to each of his claims. Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte 14 screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent 15 Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. 16 Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 17 Plaintiff is automatically entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 18 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform 19 all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (providing that “service be made by a 20 United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the 21 court … if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915.”). 23 V. CONCLUSION 24 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to Electronically File 25 Documents (ECF No. 3) is granted. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF 27 No. 6) is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall issue a summons and provide Plaintiff with 28 the summons, certified copies of both this Order and the Complaint, and a blank U.S. | ||Marshal Form 285. Plaintiff shall complete the U.S. Marshal Form 285 and forward the 2 Form 285 and the designated copies of this Order and the Complaint to the U.S. Marshal. 3 || The U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendant as 4 || directed by Plaintiff on the U.S. Marshal Form 285. 5 6 Dated: July 7, 2025 itt Z. A a 7 Hon. William Q. Hayes 8 United States District Court 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28