UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANISSA JONES, § Plaintiff, § v. g Civi¥ Case No. 17-1437 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, g Defendant. § ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
Anissa J ones sues under the lndividuals Witli Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (IDEA), to challenge her minor son D.M.’s individualized education program (IEP) for the 2015-2016 school year. After a local education hearing officer determined the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) provided D.l\/l. vvith the requisite free appropriate public education (FAPE), J ones appealed to this Court.
The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Meriweather, Who considered the six issues lones raised, affirming the hearing officer on five of tlieln. But the hearing officer never considered the sixth: Whether the 2015-2016 lEP"s failure to account for all hours during the school week or to describe D.M.’s least restrictive possible educational environmentl violated
the IDEA by limiting Jones"s ability to help develop her son’s IEP. iudge Meriweather decided
‘ The IDEA requires schools to educate disabled students “in the least restrictive environment [(LRE)] possibiem that is, the one that provides ‘some educational benefit’ and `most closely approximates the education a disabled child would receive if she had no disability.” Legge!t v. Disrrict och)/ttmbia, 793 F.3d 59, 7'3 (D.C. Cir. 20]5) (quoting Kerkmn v. Szrper.intendem, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)); see also B)'own v. D:'stric! ofColumbia, _179 F. Supp. 3d 15, 27 (D.D.C. 20i6) (“[G]iven the emphasis the IDEA places on the concept of an LRE and the centrai rote the IEP plays in the broader statutory framework, it only makes sense that . . . an IEP team is required to discuss a student’s specific LRE and the IEP is required to include at least a brief description of it.”).
that it did, but since the violation did not actuain affect D.l\/l."s education, it only entitled Jones to declaratory relief.
3 ones objects, arguing the deficient IEP affected D.M.’s education by permitting instruction from non-special-educati011-certified teachers So she wants a compensatory education plan to make up for any instruction bynon--special~educati011-certified teachers. But this relief would not remedy the IDEA violation Judge Meriweather found. And in any event, instruction by non-special-education-ceititied teachers does not render D.M."s 2015-20l6 IEP deficient Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge Meriweather’s Report & Recommendation in full. I. Background
A. Jones’s Prior IDEA Action
This suit concerns D.M."s 2015-2016 IEP. But that IEP actually resulted from an earlier action challenging D.l\/l.’s 2014-2015 IEP. The earlier action ended with a hearing officer ordering DCPS to draft a new IEP for the 2015--2016 school year requiring that “{a]ll of [D.M.]’s academic instruction shall be specialized instruction provided in the outside of general setting,” and that “[a]ll of [D.M.’s] instruction shall be provided in a small classroom (i.e., not to exceed 12 students), with a low ratio of students to adults (i`.e_, not to exceed six students per adult).” R. 20l-02, ECF No. 9.
J ones brought this action because DCPS failed to comply. Though DCPS follows a 32.5» hour school week, D.M.’s 2015-2016 IEP guaranteed only 21 .5 weekly hours of special education See R. 231. But despite this oversight, the 2015~2016 IEP functionally complied with the original order since D.M. spent the entire school week in a small, self-contained classroom designated for behavioral and educational support. See R. 15, 992. Regardless, J ones brought this
IDEA action alleging DCPS denied D.M. a FAPE by failing to formally heed the original order.
I\J
B. Proceedings Below
Tliis time around, tlie hearing officer agreed the 2015-2016 lEP formally “coiiti'avened`"" the original order. R. 15-l6. Yet lie concluded DCPS did not functionally deny D.l\/l. a FAPE since it “actually offered all of his academic instruction . . . outside of fa] general education settiiig."' ]d.
Judge l\/leriweathei' affirmed But she reached further to find two new IDEA violations the officer did not consider: First, she decided the 2015-20l6 lEP’s failure to account for every school hour “negatively impacted [Jones]’s ability to participate in the decision making process regarding the environment iii which [lier son] would be educated."' R. & R. 27, ECF No. 17. Second, she concluded the 2015-2016 iEP’s “failure to address [D.l\/l.’s] LRE also significantly impeded [.Tones]’s participation in the development of the IEP."’ Id. 28. According to ludge l\/leriweather, “botli deficiencies constitute[d] substantive violations of the IDEA” that denied D.M. a FAPE. Id. DCPS does not object to that conclusion
But Judge l\/ieriweatlier admitted this was “an unusual situation because the denial of a FAPE did iiot affect the educational services that D.M. i'eceived.” Id. at 48. Since “[t]he denial of a FAPE arises [only] from the infringement of [.lones]’s ability to participate in the process of determining the setting in which D.M. would be educated,” there was “no lost educational benefit to redress.” fail So she declined loiies’s request for compensatory education, awarding only declaratory relief. Id.
II. Jones’s Objection to Judge Meriweather’s Report & Recornmendatioii
J ones objects to Judge Meriweather’s decision to award only declaratory relief, claiming
the lEP’s failure to account for every school hour and for D.M.’s LRE did affect his educational
services and thus entitle him to equitable relief Slie argues even though DCPS provided D.M.’s
education in a specialized setting, DCPS did not provide D.l\/l. with full-time special education since non~special-educati011-certified teachers occasionally taught D.M. And she seeks compensatory education to make up for these missed hours of special education instruction
Joiies’s objection fails for two reasons First, she requests relief divorced from the particular lDEA violations Judge Meriweatlier found. Judge Meriweather expressly affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that DCPS did not provide D.l\/l. with a deficient education, holding only that DCPS violated the IDEA by negatively impacting Jones’s ability to help develop his IEP. Put another way, DCPS did not harm D.M."s education; it harmed Jones’s role iii developing that education And since equitable relief “inust be drawn with sufficient specificity to remedy the harm sliown,"’ l/Vi'npi'si'nger v. Warson, 628 F.2d 133, 142 (D.C. Cii'. 1980), any relief would necessarily be tailored to Jones"s role iii lEP-developineiit. Yet Jones seeks relief related to D.M.’s educational sei‘vices-~eveii though the hearing officer and Judge l\/leriweather botli found those services uiihanned. So because it does not remedy the harm ludge Meriweatlier found, Jones cannot obtain compensatory education
Second, Jones premises her request for compensatory education on conduct that does not offend the original hearing ofticer’s order.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANISSA JONES, § Plaintiff, § v. g Civi¥ Case No. 17-1437 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, g Defendant. § ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
Anissa J ones sues under the lndividuals Witli Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (IDEA), to challenge her minor son D.M.’s individualized education program (IEP) for the 2015-2016 school year. After a local education hearing officer determined the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) provided D.l\/l. vvith the requisite free appropriate public education (FAPE), J ones appealed to this Court.
The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Meriweather, Who considered the six issues lones raised, affirming the hearing officer on five of tlieln. But the hearing officer never considered the sixth: Whether the 2015-2016 lEP"s failure to account for all hours during the school week or to describe D.M.’s least restrictive possible educational environmentl violated
the IDEA by limiting Jones"s ability to help develop her son’s IEP. iudge Meriweather decided
‘ The IDEA requires schools to educate disabled students “in the least restrictive environment [(LRE)] possibiem that is, the one that provides ‘some educational benefit’ and `most closely approximates the education a disabled child would receive if she had no disability.” Legge!t v. Disrrict och)/ttmbia, 793 F.3d 59, 7'3 (D.C. Cir. 20]5) (quoting Kerkmn v. Szrper.intendem, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)); see also B)'own v. D:'stric! ofColumbia, _179 F. Supp. 3d 15, 27 (D.D.C. 20i6) (“[G]iven the emphasis the IDEA places on the concept of an LRE and the centrai rote the IEP plays in the broader statutory framework, it only makes sense that . . . an IEP team is required to discuss a student’s specific LRE and the IEP is required to include at least a brief description of it.”).
that it did, but since the violation did not actuain affect D.l\/l."s education, it only entitled Jones to declaratory relief.
3 ones objects, arguing the deficient IEP affected D.M.’s education by permitting instruction from non-special-educati011-certified teachers So she wants a compensatory education plan to make up for any instruction bynon--special~educati011-certified teachers. But this relief would not remedy the IDEA violation Judge Meriweather found. And in any event, instruction by non-special-education-ceititied teachers does not render D.M."s 2015-20l6 IEP deficient Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge Meriweather’s Report & Recommendation in full. I. Background
A. Jones’s Prior IDEA Action
This suit concerns D.M."s 2015-2016 IEP. But that IEP actually resulted from an earlier action challenging D.l\/l.’s 2014-2015 IEP. The earlier action ended with a hearing officer ordering DCPS to draft a new IEP for the 2015--2016 school year requiring that “{a]ll of [D.M.]’s academic instruction shall be specialized instruction provided in the outside of general setting,” and that “[a]ll of [D.M.’s] instruction shall be provided in a small classroom (i.e., not to exceed 12 students), with a low ratio of students to adults (i`.e_, not to exceed six students per adult).” R. 20l-02, ECF No. 9.
J ones brought this action because DCPS failed to comply. Though DCPS follows a 32.5» hour school week, D.M.’s 2015-2016 IEP guaranteed only 21 .5 weekly hours of special education See R. 231. But despite this oversight, the 2015~2016 IEP functionally complied with the original order since D.M. spent the entire school week in a small, self-contained classroom designated for behavioral and educational support. See R. 15, 992. Regardless, J ones brought this
IDEA action alleging DCPS denied D.M. a FAPE by failing to formally heed the original order.
I\J
B. Proceedings Below
Tliis time around, tlie hearing officer agreed the 2015-2016 lEP formally “coiiti'avened`"" the original order. R. 15-l6. Yet lie concluded DCPS did not functionally deny D.l\/l. a FAPE since it “actually offered all of his academic instruction . . . outside of fa] general education settiiig."' ]d.
Judge l\/leriweathei' affirmed But she reached further to find two new IDEA violations the officer did not consider: First, she decided the 2015-20l6 lEP’s failure to account for every school hour “negatively impacted [Jones]’s ability to participate in the decision making process regarding the environment iii which [lier son] would be educated."' R. & R. 27, ECF No. 17. Second, she concluded the 2015-2016 iEP’s “failure to address [D.l\/l.’s] LRE also significantly impeded [.Tones]’s participation in the development of the IEP."’ Id. 28. According to ludge l\/leriweather, “botli deficiencies constitute[d] substantive violations of the IDEA” that denied D.M. a FAPE. Id. DCPS does not object to that conclusion
But Judge l\/ieriweatlier admitted this was “an unusual situation because the denial of a FAPE did iiot affect the educational services that D.M. i'eceived.” Id. at 48. Since “[t]he denial of a FAPE arises [only] from the infringement of [.lones]’s ability to participate in the process of determining the setting in which D.M. would be educated,” there was “no lost educational benefit to redress.” fail So she declined loiies’s request for compensatory education, awarding only declaratory relief. Id.
II. Jones’s Objection to Judge Meriweather’s Report & Recornmendatioii
J ones objects to Judge Meriweather’s decision to award only declaratory relief, claiming
the lEP’s failure to account for every school hour and for D.M.’s LRE did affect his educational
services and thus entitle him to equitable relief Slie argues even though DCPS provided D.M.’s
education in a specialized setting, DCPS did not provide D.l\/l. with full-time special education since non~special-educati011-certified teachers occasionally taught D.M. And she seeks compensatory education to make up for these missed hours of special education instruction
Joiies’s objection fails for two reasons First, she requests relief divorced from the particular lDEA violations Judge Meriweatlier found. Judge Meriweather expressly affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that DCPS did not provide D.l\/l. with a deficient education, holding only that DCPS violated the IDEA by negatively impacting Jones’s ability to help develop his IEP. Put another way, DCPS did not harm D.M."s education; it harmed Jones’s role iii developing that education And since equitable relief “inust be drawn with sufficient specificity to remedy the harm sliown,"’ l/Vi'npi'si'nger v. Warson, 628 F.2d 133, 142 (D.C. Cii'. 1980), any relief would necessarily be tailored to Jones"s role iii lEP-developineiit. Yet Jones seeks relief related to D.M.’s educational sei‘vices-~eveii though the hearing officer and Judge l\/leriweather botli found those services uiihanned. So because it does not remedy the harm ludge Meriweatlier found, Jones cannot obtain compensatory education
Second, Jones premises her request for compensatory education on conduct that does not offend the original hearing ofticer’s order. Coiistruing her objection generously, J ones argues her lessened role in D.M.’s lEP development caused his 2015_2016 IEP to violate the original officer’s order by permitting occasional cocurricular instruction by non-special-educationo certified teacliers. But instruction by non»»-special»education-ceitif`ied teachers contradicts neither that order"s letter nor its spirit. Recall the text of the original order1 “All of [D.l\/l.]’s academic instruction shall be specialized instruction provided in the outside of general education setting.” The order did not define "‘specialized instruction,” and l ones does not identify (nor can the Court
find) any authority limiting "‘specializ,ed instruction” to instruction by specialeducation-certified
teachers J ones breezin claims that "it goes without saying that if instruction is provided by a general education teacher, the setting is a general education setting regardless of class size.” Pl.’s Ohjs. 4. But these facts suggest otherwise. l-lere, D.M. received all instruction iii a self-contained classroom Witli four studeiits, two special education aides, and a behavioral specialist R. 261; 991-94. General education teachers occasionally joined that specialized environment to instruct cocurricular subjects like art and physical education R. 991~94. But even then, the instruction occurred outside the general-education setting with (at least) a special education aide and behavioral specialist in the room. Id. The Court declines to deem D.M.’s education insufficiently Specialized_ III. Conclusion
The Court billy adopts Judge Meriweather’s Report & Recomniendation. In particular, although DCPS"s 2015#2016 lEP denied D.M. a FAPE by failing to account for every school hour and to describe his LRE, D.Mi is not entitled to compensatory education The Court will therefore grant J ones declaratory relief that DCPS’s 2015-2016 lEP denied D.M. a FAPE by_ failing to account for every school hour and to describe his LRE but will deny her summary judgment motion [11] and grant D.C.’s cross-motion [12] in all other respects An accompanying
order follows.
Date: February \_|, 2019 § 4 §`. § gauge oyce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge