JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 20, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-00318
StatusUnknown

This text of JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY (JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (E.D. Pa. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN MICHAEL JONES, : CIVIL ACTION Plaintiff, : : v. : : NO. 20-318 ANDREW SAUL, : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION Timothy R. Rice August 20, 2020 U.S. Magistrate Judge Plaintiff John Jones alleges the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by discounting the opinions of his treating providers without substantial supporting evidence. Pl. Br. (doc. 15) at 1. For the reasons explained below, I deny Jones’s claims. Jones first applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) in April 2017, following a series of short-term disability leaves. R. at 157, 683, 731, 746, 754. Jones had first left work in early 2014, when he was hospitalized with a C. diff. infection.1 Id. at 712. He then suffered from recurrent ankle pain, id. at 706, which ultimately led to a diagnosis of complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS),2 id. at 552, 1085. During this time period, Jones also began treatment for migraines and had his gallbladder removed. Id. at 552, 1070-90. After returning to work for less than a year, the pain in his legs and back worsened and he had a spinal stimulator implanted

1 C. Diff, or Clostridium Difficile, is a bacteria that can cause acute, serious gastrointestinal symptoms. Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (32nd ed. 2012) (“Dorland’s”) at 374, 625.

2 CRPS is a pain disorder triggered by a neurological injury. R. at 70; see also https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-Education/Fact-Sheets/Complex- Regional-Pain-Syndrome-Fact-Sheet (last visited August 20, 2020). in the summer of 2015. Id. at 687-89. In January 2016, he was hospitalized when a long-term allergy to onions resulted in anaphylaxis for the first time. Id. at 467-68. Following this hospitalization, pre-existing insomnia and anxiety increased. Id. at 665-66. He returned to work again in early 2016, id. at 661-62, but suffered an additional episode of allergic anaphylaxis in

April of that year, id. at 462, 498, 552, 649. In May 2016, his left shoulder was injured, id. at 556, and in June 2016, his left leg became painful again, despite the internal stimulator, id. at 632. In the fall of 2016, he stopped working again for left shoulder surgery. Id. at 557, 617. He listed this time as the alleged onset of full disability in his DIB application. Id. at 157. In November 2016, another episode of allergic anaphylaxis led to a prolonged period of pulmonary symptoms and chest pain that were ultimately diagnosed as hyperventilation syndrome, a psychological condition. Id. at 444, 446, 481, 484, 488, 764, 744, 738. Jones’s other pulmonary symptoms were attributed to severe sleep apnea, which he repeatedly declined to treat with a CPAP machine.3 Id. at 751, 754, 434, 750, 430-31, 477. Jones was ultimately issued a CPAP machine, but never used it as directed. Id. at 881, 993.

In March 2017, one of Jones’s treating physicians cleared him to return to work as long as his hyperventilation syndrome could be accommodated with unscheduled breaks, but he disagreed with the recommendation and did not return. Id. at 422-23, 737, 603. That same month, Jones began outpatient psychiatric treatment, after his primary care physician’s recommendation of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization was overruled at the emergency room. Id. at 772.

3 A CPAP machine provides “continuous positive airway pressure,” to alleviate the periodic cessation of breathing that characterizes sleep apnea. Dorland’s, at 116-17, 427. In an April 2017 functional evaluation ordered by a treating provider, Jones was found unable to return to his previous job but capable of “light workload capacity.” Id. at 591. He was referred to physical therapy, filed for DIB, and declined the voluntary psychiatric hospitalization recommended by his primary care provider. Id. at 157, 590, 964. In June 2017, Jones’s physical

therapy was canceled for failure to participate. Id. at 953. Over the fall of 2017, Jones continued to complain of intense pain and his medications were adjusted, although he was unable to obtain pain injections due to his hyperventilation syndrome and continued to be noncompliant with his CPAP regimen. Id. at 912-13, 918, 934, 1018. By late 2017, Jones’s pain management doctor planned to perform pain injections under full anesthesia, but Jones was still noncompliant with his CPAP regimen and refused to attend the more intensive outpatient mental health program recommended by his psychiatrist. Id. at 880, 886, 896, 1009. On December 28, 2017, Jones was sent to the emergency room after telling his therapist he had taken extra medication. Id. at 871. He explained to hospital providers that he had merely been trying to adjust his dosages, and was discharged. Id. at 875. A month later, he admitted to

his psychiatrist that he had tried to overdose, but still refused to participate in the day program his psychiatrist recommended. Id. at 1004, 1006. After repeatedly exhibiting disruptive behavior at his long-time primary care provider’s office, id. at 866, Jones started with a new primary care practice in March 2018. Id. at 1048. He continued to see his psychiatrist through the spring of 2018, and his medications were regularly adjusted. Id. at 1148-1199. In May 2018, Jones sprained his ankle on his neighbor’s lawn; one medical record says that he was walking on the lawn and fell in a hole, another states he was mowing the lawn. Id. at 1119, 1126. At his August 2018 hearing, Jones testified he had been visiting his neighbor, not mowing the lawn. Id. at 39. In late May 2018, Jones’s new primary care provider filled out FMLA forms, stating Jones should not work due to his severe psychiatric issues and ongoing muscle weakness. Id. at 1139. By July 2018, his psychiatrist had extended the schedule of his medication management visits to every six to eight weeks instead of every month. Id. at 1163. At his August 2018 hearing, Jones testified he was unable to work because his CRPS

limited his ability to sit, stand, or walk for a prolonged period of time, and his depression and anxiety had affected his memory, focus, and concentration. Id. at 42-43. He testified he could dress himself but not always shower without help, that he “seldom” cooked, almost never shopped, washed dishes and did laundry only if others carried it, id. at 38, vacuumed or swept “once in a while,” never took out the trash or tended to the yard, but was able to drive himself to doctor appointments, id. at 39. He testified that he did not engage in social activities and his wife brought their children to most sporting events. Id. at 41-42. He testified that he napped during the day and took his medications as prescribed. Id. at 43. A consulting physician reviewed Jones’s medical records on the stand and opined that Jones could perform a limited range of medium work. Id. at 63. A vocational expert (VE) testified that such work was

available in the national economy. Id. at 74. The ALJ adopted physical functional limitations for Jones that were beyond those recommended by the consulting physician, id. at 21, 63, and mental functional limitations consistent with those recommended by the reviewing psychologist, id. at 22, 88. He opined Jones did not qualify for benefits because his residual functional capacity (RFC), i.e., “the most [he] can still do [in a work setting] despite [his] limitations,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a), allowed for a limited scope of medium work.4 He relied on the VE testimony to find that Jones could perform work as a laundry worker, potato chip sorter, or bakery conveyer worker. R. at 27. Jones argues the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of his treating physician and psychologist. Pl. Br. at 1. I disagree.

Dr. Scott In June 2017, Jones’s primary care physician, Dr.

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JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-commissioner-of-social-security-paed-2020.