Jones v. Carraby

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 21, 2021
• Docket: 3:18-cv-01609
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM J. JONES, Case No.: 18-CV-1609-AJB-WVG

12 Plaintiff, REPORT AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 14 ARNETT CARRABY, M.D.; TAYSON DISMISS DELENGOCKY, O.D.; MAJID MANI, 15 M.D.; MICHAEL FOYLE, O.D.; AND 16 ROGELIO ORTEGA, M.D., 17 Defendants. 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to District Judge Anthony J. 21 Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of 22 Civil Procedure. On July 16, 2018, William Joseph Jones (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner 23 proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section 24 1983 (“Section 1983”), against Arnett Carraby, M.D. (“Dr. Carraby”), Tayson 25 Delengocky, D.O. (“Dr. Delengocky”), Michael Foyle, O.D. (“Dr. Foyle”), Majid Mani, 26 M.D. (“Dr. Mani”), and Rogelio Ortega, M.D. (“Dr. Ortega”) (collectively, “all named 27 defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) A year later, on August 26, 2019, Plaintiff amended his 28 Complaint by asserting additional factual allegations against Dr. Foyle. (Doc. No. 27.) On 1 October 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint against all named 2 defendants, which serves as the operative complaint in this action. (Doc. No. 36.) Now, 3 Drs. Carraby, Delengocky, and Mani (“the three defendants”) move the Court to dismiss 4 the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety. (Doc. No. 43.) Having reviewed the Parties’ 5 submissions and the underlying record, the Court RECOMMENDS the three defendants’ 6 Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Second Amended Complaint against the three 7 defendants be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 8 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 9 Plaintiff is an inmate who received medical treatment at California Retina Associates 10 (“CRA”), a private healthcare provider contracted by the California Department of 11 Corrections and Rehabilitations (“CDCR”). The three defendants work for CRA. This case 12 arises from a surgery on Plaintiff’s right eye and the post-operative medical care Plaintiff 13 received at CRA. 14 On March 17, 2017, Dr. Carraby performed cataract surgery on Plaintiff’s right eye. 15 (Doc. No. 36 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that, during surgery, Dr. Carraby used a certain medical 16 instrument that caused his retina to detach and severely impaired Plaintiff’s vision. (Id.) 17 Plaintiff adds that Dr. Carraby administered inadequate anesthesia, which caused Plaintiff 18 to regain consciousness during the surgery and inflicted “unb[e]arable” pain, and over- 19 prescribed a steroid, Prednisolone, to Plaintiff post-surgery, which irreversibly damaged 20 his right eye. (Id.) After the surgery, Plaintiff complained to Drs. Carraby, Ortega, 21 Delengocky, and Foyle, and a certain Dr. Qazi of ongoing pain and loss of vision in his 22 right eye. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the doctors advised him to give his eye time to heal and 23 wait until the stitches were removed. (Id.) 24 Dissatisfied with the outcome of the surgery and the follow-up medical care he 25 received at CRA, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Form 602 Healthcare Appeal on April 16, 2017 26 and requested to have his eyes reexamined. (Doc. No. 36 at 4.) On April 20, 2017, Dr. 27 28 1 Foyle examined Plaintiff for “refraction”1 to determine whether to prescribe eyeglasses. 2 (Id. at 4.) After doing so, Dr. Foyle decided not to prescribe eyeglasses to Plaintiff. (Id.) 3 On May 2, 2017, Dr. Carraby removed Plaintiff’s stitches. (Doc. No. 36 at 6.) At 4 such time, Plaintiff informed Dr. Carraby he could not see. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff 5 was transferred to CRA for additional post-surgical care with retina specialist, Dr. 6 Delengocky. (Id.) On June 19, 2017, Dr. Delengocky discovered swelling in Plaintiff’s 7 retina and gave Plaintiff a steroid shot and a prescription for Diclofenac. (Id.) Dr. 8 Delengocky extended the medication treatment after Plaintiff’s visit on July 18, 2017. (Id.) 9 On August 21, 2017, Dr. Delengocky informed Plaintiff he had lost about 50 percent of his 10 vision in his right eye. (Id.) 11 On September 20, 2017, Dr. Foyle reexamined Plaintiff for eyeglasses. (Doc. No. 6 12 at 6.) Still unable to correct Plaintiff’s vision with eyeglasses, Dr. Foyle referred Plaintiff 13 to CRA for further evaluation of his retina. (Id.) Later that same day, Plaintiff was 14 transported to CRA, where Dr. Delengocky performed additional tests. (Id.) Ultimately, 15 Dr. Delengocky agreed with Dr. Foyle’s assessment that Plaintiff’s vision in his right eye 16 could not be corrected with eyeglasses. (Id.) 17 On October 7, 2017, Dr. Carraby contacted Plaintiff to discuss potentially replacing 18 Plaintiff’s intraocular lens. (Doc. No 36 at 6.) On November 16, 2017, Dr. Mani met with 19 Plaintiff and established a plan to preserve Plaintiff’s vision solely in his left eye. (Id.) 20 After additional visits at CRA, Plaintiff was reexamined for a second time by Dr. Foyle. 21 (Id.) On December 7, 2017, Dr. Foyle checked Plaintiff’s vision and again concluded that 22 glasses would not correct or restore the vision in his right eye. (Id.) After being transferred 23

24 25 1 “Eye refraction is the measurement of the required power for a person’s eyeglasses or contact lenses and is calculated by means of a refraction test. A refraction test gives a doctor 26 the precise measurement for a prescription that a patient will need for their glasses or 27 contact lenses.” Understanding Eye Refraction: What It Is and If You Need It, https://www.nvisioncenters.com/education/eye-refraction/ (last visited November 9, 28 1 to another prison in January 2018, Plaintiff obtained a prescription for eyeglasses from Dr. 2 Wright-Scott, an optometrist who works for California Correctional Institution. (Id.) 3 Plaintiff alleges Dr. Carraby performed a botched surgery on his right eye and the 4 post-operative care he received from all named defendants resulted in irreversible damage 5 that was entirely avoidable. (Id.) Plaintiff now brings Eighth Amendment claims against 6 all named defendants for cruel and unusual punishment as well as deliberate indifference 7 to his serious medical needs. He seeks $300,000 in damages from each Defendant, three 8 million dollars in punitive damages, and to be transferred to an “outside specialist and 9 treatment team [to] have corrective eye surgery if possible to restore vision.” (Doc. No. 1 10 at 19.) 11 III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 12 a. Plaintiff’s State Court Action 13 On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Imperial County Superior Court 14 against all named defendants and others alleging medical negligence (“state court action”). 15 (Doc. No. 43-3 at 1-46.) On May 17, 2019, the three defendants filed a summary judgment 16 motion in the state court action. (Id. at 89-268.) On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed an 17 opposition to the three defendants’ summary judgment motion. (Id. at 270-434.) On August 18 16, 2019, the three defendants replied to Plaintiff’s opposition. (Id. at 436-448.) On January 19 22, 2020, the three defendants’ summary judgment motion was granted, and the state court 20 action was dismissed on February 19, 2020. (Id. at 48-56.) On February 18, 2020, Plaintiff 21 filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One of the 22 State of California. (Id. at 58-75.) On July 28, 2021, the state appellate court affirmed the 23 trial court’s decision. (Id.) 24 b. Plaintiff’s Federal Court Action 25 On July 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed an initial complaint in the Southern District Court of 26 California and alleged all named defendants violated his Eight Amendment rights. (Doc. 27 No. 1.) On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Dr. Foyle 28 only. (Doc. No. 27.) On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint 1 against all named defendants. (Doc. No. 36.) On August 16, 2021, the three defendants 2 filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 43.) On 3 September 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”). (Doc. No. 4 45.) On November 19, 2021, the three named defendants replied to Plaintiff’s Opposition. 5 (Doc. No. 46.) The Motion is now ripe for this Court’s review. 6 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 7 a. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of a 9 complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th 10 Cir. 2003). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons, namely for 11 (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. See 12 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To resolve a motion to dismiss, the 13 court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and construe them in a light most 14 favorable to the non-movant. See Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 At no time is the court bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 16 allegation. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Western Mining Council v. 17 Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Instead, the court must determine “whether 18 conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” 19 Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). When ruling on a motion to 20 dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to 21 the complaint, and documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint where 22 authenticity is not contested. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 23 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 24 b. Legal Standard in Pro Se Civil Rights Actions 25 Where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights suit, the Court must be careful to 26 construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt. Garmon v. 27 Cty of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016). The rule of liberal construction is 28 “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 1 Cir. 1992). Moreover, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 2 complaint and an opportunity to amend the complaint and thus cure its deficiencies. Cato 3 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 4 (9th Cir. 1987). 5 V. DISCUSSION 6 The three defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the 7 grounds (1) it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata; (2) service of process was 8 insufficient2; and (3) Defendants lack evil motive or reckless indifference to be held liable 9 for punitive damages. (Doc. No. 43-1.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion and argues the instant 10 action is not barred because (1) he filed his action in federal court before initiating his state 11 court action3; and (2) the remedies he seeks from the federal and state court actions arise 12

13 2 Defendants argue the Second Amended Complaint should also be dismissed pursuant to 14 Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to complete 15 service of process as required. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 12.) However, because the Court dismisses the Second Amended Complaint on res judicata grounds, it need not address whether 16 Plaintiff properly served Defendants. 17 3 Plaintiff argues res judicata does not apply because he filed the instant action before the 18 state court action. Without citing to legal authority, Plaintiff implies the date an action is 19 filed controls whether res judicata applies, rather than the date final judgment is entered. Not so. The Court has extensively researched legal authority that may support Plaintiff’s 20 position and finds none exists. The Ninth Circuit has made clear “[r]es judicata bars 21 relitigation of all grounds of recovery that were asserted, or could have been asserted, in a previous action between the parties, where the previous action was resolved on the merits,” 22 without regard for whether the previous action was first or subsequently filed. United States 23 v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 24 (9th Cir. 2003)). Indeed, the res judicata inquiry turns on the timing of entry of final 25 judgment and not the sequence in which two separate actions are filed. See Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982) (“California’s law of res 26 judicata dictates what preclusive effect is to be accorded to the prior judgment against 27 appellant. That California law, however, determines the res judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment by applying federal standards. Therefore, those federal standards are 28 1 from significantly different facts. (Doc. No. 45.) 2 a. Res Judicata 3 i. Legal Standard 4 The preclusive effect of a prior judgment is referred to as res judicata. Taylor v. 5 Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Res judicata includes both claim preclusion and issue 6 preclusion. Americana Fabrics, Inc. v. L&L Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 7 1985). Claim preclusion, at issue here, treats a previously entered judgment as the full 8 measure of relief between the same parties on the same claim or cause of action and 9 prevents re-litigation of all grounds of recovery or defenses, regardless of whether they 10 were asserted or decided in the prior proceeding. Id. at 1529; Owens v. Kaiser Found. 11 Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 Under 28 U.S.C. section 1738, a federal court must “give to a state-court judgment 13 the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in 14 which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 15 75, 81 (1984). Accordingly, federal courts must apply state doctrines of claim and issue 16 preclusion to determine the preclusive effect of prior state adjudications in subsequent 17 federal litigation, including under Section 1983. See id. at 83-85. Here, Plaintiff's 18 underlying state-court claim was brought in the state of California; thus, California law 19 applies. See Gonzales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2014) 20 (applying California doctrine of res judicata). 21 Under California law, res judicata precludes a plaintiff from relitigating a claim if 22 (1) the claim relates to the same “primary right” as a claim in a prior action; (2) the party 23 against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party to the prior action; and (3) the prior 24 judgment was final and on the merits. Trujillo v. Santa Clara Cty., 755 F.2d 1359, 1366 25 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). 26 ii. Same Primary Right 27 Unlike the federal courts, which apply a “transactional nucleus of facts” test, 28 California courts employ the “primary rights” theory to determine what constitutes the 1 same cause of action for claim preclusion purposes. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 2 952 (9th Cir. 2004). Under this theory, a cause of action is (1) a primary right possessed 3 by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and (3) a 4 harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right and duty. City 5 of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2003). “[I]f 6 two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant, 7 then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff seeks different 8 forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” Eichmann v. Fotomat Corp., 9 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (1983). So long as the same primary right is involved in the 10 two actions, judgment in the first bars subsequent consideration of all matters that were 11 raised or could have been raised in the first action. Id. at 1175. 12 In the instant action, the same primary right asserted here was also at stake in 13 Plaintiff’s state claim against the three defendants. Between both the state and federal court 14 actions, Plaintiff alleged the harm he suffered was negligent performance of a routine 15 cataract surgery on his right eye and negligent follow-up medical care, which resulted in 16 irreversible damage to his right eye. Plaintiff alleged the exact same types of wrongful acts 17 by the three defendants in the state and federal actions: (1) Dr. Carraby performed a 18 “botched” cataract surgery on Plaintiff on March 17, 2017; (2) Dr. Carraby did not provide 19 sufficient anesthesia, causing Plaintiff “unb[e]arable pain” and to regain consciousness 20 during the surgery; (3) a medical instrument detached Plaintiff’s retina during the surgery, 21 resulting in severe visual impairment in his right eye; (4) Dr. Carraby over-prescribed 22 Prednisolone, resulting in irreversible damage to Plaintiff’s eyesight; and (5) Drs. Carraby, 23 Delengocky, and Mani, and other defendants not named in this action failed to properly 24 address Plaintiff’s serious medical needs post-surgery. 25 In sum, the primary rights involved in this action are identical to the claims raised in 26 Plaintiff's state court action. Accordingly, under California law, the claims Plaintiff seeks 27 to relitigate before this Court invoke the preclusive effects of res judicata. Therefore, the 28 first prong of the Court’s inquiry into res judicata here is fulfilled. 1 iii. Same Parties 2 California claim preclusion applies where the party “against whom the doctrine is 3 being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” In re Anthony 4 H., 129 Cal. App. 4th 495, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Privity is a legal conclusion finding 5 an individual “so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he represents 6 precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved.” In re Schimmels, 127 7 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir.1 997) (quoting Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 168 8 U.S. 1 (1897)). 9 Here, both Plaintiff’s state and federal claims involve the exact same plaintiff and 10 the same three defendants. Accordingly, the requirement under the res judicata doctrine 11 that the action be between the same parties or parties in privity is met. In turn, the second 12 prong of the Court’s res judicata inquiry is fulfilled. 13 iv. Final Judgment on the Merits 14 For res judicata to bar Plaintiff's due process claim here, the state court’s decision 15 must be final and on the merits. Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift 16 Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1065 (1998). A decision is considered final and on the merits 17 when the court resolves the rights of the parties on the substance of the claim, rather than 18 on a procedural basis or under some other rule precluding state review of the merits. Barker 19 v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2005). A summary judgment dismissal is 20 considered a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes. Hells Canyon Pres. Council 21 v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). 22 In the state court action, Plaintiff’s claims were indisputably decided on the merits. 23 There, the trial court granted the summary judgment motion, filed on behalf of all named 24 defendants, including the three defendants here, based on substantive law rather than on a 25 procedural basis and fully explained its reasoning in its dispositive opinion. Further, the 26 state appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision, set forth its rationale, and finalized 27 the trial court’s decision on the merits. Thus, this third and final prong of the Court’s res 28 judicata inquiry is satisfied. 1 v. Conclusion 2 The Court finds the three-pronged res judicata inquiry is met here. In sum, Plaintiff 3 had the opportunity to fully litigate his state court action, a final judgment on the merits 4 issued, and Plaintiff now impermissibly seeks to relitigate identical claims before this 5 Court. Under such circumstances, res judicata bars the claims alleged in this instant action. 6 In turn, any further amendment to the operative Second Amended Complaint would be 7 futile. Davis v. County of Maui, 454 Fed. App’x 582, 583 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The district 8 court correctly denied Davis leave to amend his complaint because res judicata would bar 9 relief even with his proposed amendments; [the] amendment would be futile”). 10 b. Punitive Damages 11 The three defendants also move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive 12 damages. In view of the Court’s above analysis, the matter of punitive damages becomes 13 moot. Even so, the Court addresses punitive damages substantively here. To maintain his 14 claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must contain at least 15 some allegations that the three defendants’ “conduct [was] motivated by evil motive or 16 intent, or [] involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of 17 others.” Arrellano v. Blahnik, 2021 WL 1195798, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021) (citing 18 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1986)). The Court finds no such allegations here. The 19 Second Amended Complaint principally alleges the three named defendants “failed to 20 respond to plaintiff[‘s] serious medical need” and sets forth what treatment plan each of 21 the three defendants implemented while Plaintiff was in their care. (Doc. No. 36 at 3.) 22 Plaintiff’s lay and conclusory interpretation of his course of treatment and the loss of vision 23 in his right eye, however unfortunate, do not amount to a claim for punitive damages. In 24 liberally construing his pleading, the Court finds Plaintiff’s assertions translate to a 25 colorable negligence claim but nothing more. Absent any factual specificity demonstrating 26 the three named defendants’ evil motives or intent or reckless or callous indifference 27 towards Plaintiff, the Court has no basis to find Plaintiff has any means to sustain a punitive 28 damages claim under Section 1983 here. vi. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ 3 || Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint be GRANTED without leave * |lto amend. No later than January 21, 2022, the Parties may file written objections and > serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 6 || Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be filed and served on all parties no 7 \INater than February 25, 2022. Failure to file objections within the specified time may 8 || waive the right to waive objections on appeal of the Court’s order. ? Dated: 12/21/2021 WS Hon. William V. Gallo 12 United States Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28