Jones v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana

740 So. 2d 163, 1999 WL 321558
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 14, 1999
Docket98 CA 0962
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 740 So. 2d 163 (Jones v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana, 740 So. 2d 163, 1999 WL 321558 (La. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

740 So.2d 163 (1999)

Greshlyn JONES
v.
BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA and National Union Fire Insurance Company.

No. 98 CA 0962.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

May 14, 1999.
Writ Denied September 24, 1999.

*164 Jennifer Braud Gautreau, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John E. Faherty, Jr., New Orleans, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before: CARTER, C.J., SHORTESS and de la HOUSSAYE,[1] JJ.

SHORTESS, J.

On September 23, 1996, Greshlyn Jones (plaintiff) was walking in the atrium of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana (defendant) where she was employed as a claims control clerk. Plaintiff fell backwards while walking, hitting her back and head on the floor. She alleges that she injured her back and experienced neurological problems including severe vision problems, and that due to these injuries, she was unable to return to work. Defendant paid plaintiff workers' compensation benefits through one compensation period from September 30, 1996, to October 20, 1996. Then, defendant terminated benefits it was paying to plaintiff. Defendant also denied plaintiff's request for various medical expenses.

Plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against defendant and its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,[2] Pennsylvania (defendants) seeking compensation benefits, medical expenses, and attorney fees. Plaintiff contends defendants were arbitrary and capricious in failing to pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses and workers' compensation benefits. The workers'-compensation court (WCC) found plaintiff was entitled to temporary total *165 disability in the amount of $185.70 per week[3] and past and future medical expenses and benefits, and it awarded $4,000.00 in penalties against defendants.[4] The WCC also assessed against defendants $10,000.00 in attorney fees for their arbitrary and capricious failure to pay indemnity benefits, and $15,000.00 in attorney fees for their arbitrary and capricious refusal to approve reasonably necessary medical treatment.[5] Defendants appeal.

Defendants allege the WCC committed reversible error: 1) in finding plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses from the date of the accident to present, 2) in awarding penalties and attorney fees, and 3) in denying a continuance of the trial date.

DISABILITY

It is well settled that "[a workers'-compensation judge's] factual findings regarding whether a worker[s'] compensation claimant has met the burden of proving disability is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned, absent manifest error."[6] The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact-finder's conclusion was a reasonable one.[7]

We have reviewed the entire record, including the testimony of plaintiff, the deposition of Dr. Ernest G. Thompson (plaintiff's physician), the reports of Dr. Charles E. Eberly (defendants' expert), Dr. Michael Haik (plaintiff's ophthalmologist), and Dr. Allen Proctor (plaintiff's neurologist), and all other medical records, reports, and evidence presented by plaintiff and defendants. We conclude the WCC's finding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that her condition of back pain and visual problems were job-related is clearly supported by the record. The WCC's finding that plaintiff was disabled due to her back and visual problems was more than reasonable based upon the record. The WCC's reasons for judgment more fully illustrate the rational basis for these findings. We adopt those reasons as our own, and attach them to this opinion.

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

Defendants also allege the trial court committed error in denying their motion to continue. Defendants maintain they did not receive Thompson's medical records, specifically a prescription from him for a TENS unit for plaintiff, until near the date of the trial. Therefore, defendants contend if the medical records had been produced earlier in the case, they would have requested an independent medical examiner sooner and would have been able to question Thompson about a possible disability.

A trial court is vested with wide discretion in granting or denying a continuance, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in absence of clear abuse.[8]*166 While defendants may not have received the information until near the trial date, this information did not deprive them of the knowledge that plaintiff contended she was disabled. Plaintiff did not return to work after the accident because of her injury; in addition, defendants terminated plaintiff for being on disability leave in excess of the time provided by Blue Cross's Employee Handbook. Furthermore, defendants have shown no prejudice arising from their inability to have an independent doctor examine plaintiff. We do not find the WCC abused its discretion in denying the motion to continue the trial.

ATTORNEY FEES

Defendants contend they were reasonable in denying plaintiff's claim, so the award of attorney fees was not justifiable. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1201.2 allows for the award of attorney fees when an employer or insurer is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause in discontinuing payment of a workers' compensation claim.[9] Defendants contend plaintiff's claim was reasonably controverted because there was a conflict between the opinions of defendants' and plaintiff's medical experts. The greatest problem with defendants' contention is that this information was not discovered until after plaintiff's compensation had been terminated. It was stipulated at the hearing that plaintiff was injured during the course and scope of her employment. After the accident, plaintiff received one payment from defendants for workers' compensation benefits for the period from September 30, 1996, to October 20, 1996. However, the report of defendants' expert, Eberly, is dated May 29, 1997, seven months after her payments had been terminated. In addition, plaintiff and her physician, Thompson, were not deposed until September 1997, almost an entire year after the accident. However, defendants were aware plaintiff was alleging she was disabled because her employment was terminated due to her disability leave period being beyond the time allowed by defendant's employee handbook. In addition to workers' compensation benefits, defendants refused to pay for various devices and medical exams plaintiff's doctors prescribed or requested to aid in treating her. As stated by the WCC judge:

As soon as they see that she is having these problems and she is claiming they are work-related because they are being notified that she is claiming that they are due to the work injury, they should have sent her to their neuro asap, quickly. They did not. And, their neuro's evaluation does not unequivocally state that this cannot happen the way she said it did. He said that it probably didn't; it's more likely it didn't. That is not absolutely, positively, did not happen.
They are very arbitrary and capricious in refusing to pay indemnity benefits. They are more arbitrary and capricious in refusing to approve the back treatment, especially the TENS unit and the physical therapy. There was nothing, nada, zip, not a hair, not a scintilla of evidence to show any reason for not approving those very conservative— she's not asking for lumbar surgery here—very conservative back treatment.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Butler v. New Orleans Paddlewheels
863 So. 2d 602 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
Barrilleaux v. Cypress Bayou Casino
844 So. 2d 326 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
Jackson v. Quikrete Products, Inc.
816 So. 2d 338 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
740 So. 2d 163, 1999 WL 321558, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-blue-crossblue-shield-of-louisiana-lactapp-1999.