Jones v. Berkley

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 7, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-03128
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Berkley (Jones v. Berkley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Berkley, (C.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEFFREY T. JONES, ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 21-3128 ) LINCOLN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et. al. ) Defendants )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

JAMES E. SHADID, U.S. District Judge: This cause is before the Court for merit review of the Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court is required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A to “screen” the Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A. Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, claims Defendants Lincoln Police Department, Logan County Sheriff’s Department, Logan County States Attorney, the City of Lincoln, the Mayor of Lincoln, Police Chief Paul Adams, Sergeant Robert Sherren, Sergeant Lynx, Assistant States Attorney Hines, Assistant States Attorney (ASA) Bradley Hauge, and Officers Berkley, Sullivan, Eimer, Johnson, Fox, Steve Nichols, Mark Landers, Jonathon Wright, and John Does #5-8 violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff begins with a description of an event which occurred on November 30, 2016. Plaintiff says Defendants Sergeant Sherren and Officer Berkley used excessive force when they used a taser against him, and Officers Sullivan and an unknown number of John Doe Officers failed to protect him from the use of excessive force.

The incident apparently did not go to trial until June 17, 2019 and Plaintiff was found not guilty of resisting arrest. It is unclear if Plaintiff was found guilty of any other charges. Plaintiff claims during the trial, ASA Hines stated: “How should I say this, when it comes to (Plaintiff), there is a special procedure.” (Comp., p. 4). Based on this event, Plaintiff claims the named Defendants are responsible for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force.

Plaintiff says the verdict did “nothing to deter this unconstitutional behavior.” (Comp., p. 4). Plaintiff then describes an incident sometime in 2017 when unnamed police officers investigating a broke window invaded a home where Plaintiff was sleeping and handcuffed him. Based on the allegations, it does not appear Plaintiff was arrested.

On March 18, 2018, unnamed officers stopped and searched Plaintiff after he was walking away from a bar. Plaintiff was arrested and stayed in jail overnight before he was released the next morning. No charges were filed. On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff arrived at the Budget Inn to visit a friend when an unnamed officer pulled a gun on Plaintiff, wrestled him to the ground, and arrested

him. Plaintiff says he was released the next day without charges. Plaintiff says he is again in the Logan County Jail based on a false arrest. (Comp, p. 11). Plaintiff does not explain when he was arrested, who was involved, or what charges he faces. Plaintiff claims “[i]t is clear that there is a ‘policy’ or ‘special policy’” just for him based on the comments of Defendant ASA Hines. Plaintiff also alleges the Defendants

are conspiring against him to violation his constitutional rights. There are several problems with Plaintiff’s complaint. First, Plaintiff is required to file any complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 within the two-year statute of limitations period. See Wilson v Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992); Farrell v. McDonough, 966 F.2d 279, 280-82 (7th Cir. 1992). Many of Plaintiff’s claims do not meet this requirement. The statute of limitations clock for both Plaintiff’s excessive force

claim and his false arrest claim began more than four years ago on the day of his arrest in 2016. See i.e. Foryoh v. Triton College, 197 Fed.Appx. 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2006). In addition, Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution is not a constitutional violation. See Anderson v. City of Rockford, 932 F.3d 494, 512 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that there is no federal constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable

cause). Plaintiff has also failed to articulate a constitutional violation based on a prosecutor’s comments during his trial. Even if any of the remaining claims were filed within the two-year statute of limitations period, Plaintiff has failed to identify any Defendants who were responsible for his claims. See Kuhn v. Milwaukee County, 59 F. App'x 148, 150 (7th Cir. 2003)(merely

naming defendants in the caption of a complaint does not state a claim against them); Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (district court properly dismissed pro se complaint where it alleged no specific conduct by the defendant and only included the defendant's name in the caption). To hold an individual liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must “show that the

defendants were personally responsible for the deprivation of their rights.” Wilson v. Warren Cty., Illinois, 830 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2016). “A defendant is personally responsible ‘if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and consent.’” Id. quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). In addition, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor

liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 616 (7th Cir. 2008)(supervisor liability not permitted under § 1983); Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992)(supervisors are not liable for the errors of their subordinates). If Plaintiff were attempting to state a claim against a municipality pursuant to

Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) his complaint also fails. “To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show the existence of an official policy or other governmental custom that not only causes but is the moving force behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff can establish an official policy

through “(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” Estate of Sims, 506 F.3d at 515 (citing Lewis v.

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
James R. Wilson v. Linda A. Giesen, County of Lee
956 F.2d 738 (Seventh Circuit, 1992)
Charles Farrell v. Captain Lawrence McDonough
966 F.2d 279 (Seventh Circuit, 1992)
Frank Teesdale v. City of Chicago
690 F.3d 829 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Smith v. Gomez
550 F.3d 613 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Lewis v. City of Chicago
496 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Foryoh, Prince E. v. Triton College
197 F. App'x 500 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Thomas Wilson v. Warren County, Illinois
830 F.3d 464 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois
932 F.3d 494 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Kuhn v. Milwaukee County
59 F. App'x 148 (Seventh Circuit, 2003)

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Jones v. Berkley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-berkley-ilcd-2022.