Jones v. Barnhart

518 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98582, 2007 WL 2907533
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedOctober 5, 2007
DocketCivil Action 05-G-1134-NW
StatusPublished

This text of 518 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Jones v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Barnhart, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98582, 2007 WL 2907533 (N.D. Ala. 2007).

Opinion

*1328 MEMORANDUM OPINION

J. FOY GUIN, JR., District Judge.

The plaintiff, Clarence E. Jones, brings this action pursuant to the provisions of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the Commissioner) denying his application for Social Security Benefits. Plaintiff timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies available before the Commissioner. Accordingly, this case is now ripe for judicial review under 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The sole function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983). To that end this court “must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloods-worth, at 1239 (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bloodsworth, at 1239.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

In order to qualify for disability benefits and to establish his entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled. The Act defines disabled as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i). For the purposes of establishing entitlement to disability benefits, “physical or mental impairment” is defined as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, Social Security regulations outline a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;
(2) whether she has a severe impairment;
(3) whether her impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;
(4) whether the claimant can perform her past work; and
(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir.1993); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir.1986). “Once the claimant has satisfied Steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her past work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” Pope, at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir.1995).

In the instant case, the ALJ, Randall C. Stout, determined the plaintiff met the first two tests, but concluded he did not suffer from a listed impairment. The ALJ found the plaintiff unable to perform his past relevant work. Once it is determined that the plaintiff cannot return to his prior work, “the burden shifts to the [Commis *1329 sioner] to show other work the claimant can do.” Foote, at 1559. Furthermore, when a claimant is not able to perform the full range of work at a particular exertional level, the Commissioner may not exclusively rely on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the grids). Foote, at 1558-59. The presence of a non-exertional impairment such as pain, also prevents exclusive reliance on the grids. Foote, at 1559. In such cases “the [Commissioner] must seek expert vocational testimony”. Foote, at 1559.

DISCUSSION

The ALJ found the plaintiff “has a limited education and prior unskilled work.” [R 18] The ALJ found the plaintiffs residual functional capacity limited him to light work in a controlled environment. [R 19] In the prehearing order in the present case, the plaintiff listed grid rules 201.09 and 202.9 to support his claim of disability. [R 163] Grid rule 201.9 applies to claimants restricted to sedentary work and provides that an individual closely approaching advanced age (50-54 years old) will be found disabled if his educational level is limited or less and he has no transferable skills from his prior relevant work. Grid rule 202.09 applies to claimants limited to light work and provides that an individual closely approaching advance age will be found disabled if he is illiterate and his previous work was unskilled. At the time of the ALJ hearing decision, the plaintiff was 54 years of age. [R 18] Therefore, because the ALJ found the plaintiff is limited to light work, and that his previous work was unskilled, he would be disabled under Grid Rule 202.09 if he is illiterate. At the plaintiffs ALJ hearing in the current case, the issue of illiteracy was raised by the plaintiffs attorney and there was an extensive discussion on the record about whether illiteracy had been alleged in the plaintiffs previous application. 1 [R 25-29] In the earlier decision, ALJ Vanderhoef found the plaintiff, who was then 52 years of age, had “a ninth grade education.” [R 72] Therefore, the first issue that the court must address is whether ALJ Stout reopened the prior decision of ALJ Vander-hoef as to the issue of whether the plaintiff was illiterate. If ALJ Stout did not reopen the earlier decision, the doctrine of administrative res judicata would bar the plaintiffs assertion that he is illiterate in the present case.

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Bluebook (online)
518 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98582, 2007 WL 2907533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-barnhart-alnd-2007.