Jones v. Barnes

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 25, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00640
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ISAAC JONES, JR., Case No. 22-cv-0640-BAS-BLM

12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 13 v. FAILURE TO SHOW CAUSE

14 DON BARNES,

15 Respondent. 16 17 On October 14, 2022, this Court ordered Plaintiff Isaac Jones, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) to 18 show cause why his habeas action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with this 19 Court’s Dismissal Order, which directed Plaintiff to file an amended petition (Dismissal 20 Order, ECF No. 3). (Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), ECF No. 6.) This Court instructed 21 Plaintiff he could show cause by filing such an amended petition by no later than December 22 9, 2022, and that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the action. (OSC at 3.) 23 Petitioner still has not filed an amended petition. 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 41(b) endows district courts with authority 25 to dismiss a plaintiff’s action for his failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court 26 order, including a court’s directive to file an amended pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); 27 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 1999); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 28 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) 1 (holding that a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of 2 the court); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (holding courts are 3 vested with an inherent power “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly 4 and expeditious disposition of cases”). Although due process generally requires that the 5 party have notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissal, when a party may be said 6 to have knowledge of the consequences of his failure to act, the court may dispense with 7 the necessity of advance notice and a hearing. Link, 370 U.S. at 630–32. 8 “Despite this authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and, therefore, it should only be 9 imposed in extreme circumstances.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260. Therefore, to determine 10 whether dismissal under its inherent authority is appropriate, “the district court must weigh 11 five factors, including: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 12 the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants; (4) the public 13 policy of favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 14 alternatives.” Id. at 1260–61 (internal quotations omitted). 15 Generally, these five factors weigh in favor of sua sponte dismissal where a plaintiff 16 has failed to prosecute a case or comply with an order of the court. See Eldridge v. Block, 17 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 18 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). On balance, the above-mentioned factors weigh decisively 19 in favor of dismissal. 20 The Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution: “[T]he public’s interest in 21 expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (9th 22 Cir. 1999). The lack of an operative pleading has precluded this matter’s expeditious 23 resolution. Thus, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 24 The Court’s Need to Manage its Docket: A district court is best positioned to 25 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management. Ash 26 v. Cuetkov, 739 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984). This factor, too, weighs in favor of 27 dismissal. “[A] case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party’s failure to comply 28 with deadlines . . . cannot move forward toward resolution of the merits.” In re 1 Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). Indeed, this case has not 2 progressed toward any merits resolution and cannot do so because there is no operative 3 pleading. The Court has already waited 181 days since its Dismissal Order for Petitioner 4 to file an amended pleading. It cannot—and will not—await indefinitely Petitioner’s 5 response to the Court’s directive to file an amended petition. 6 The Risk of Prejudice to the Defendant: “[T]he failure to prosecute diligently is 7 sufficient by itself to justify a dismissal, even in the absence of a showing of actual 8 prejudice to defendant from the failure . . . . The law presumes injury from unreasonable 9 delay.” In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Air West, 10 Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976); Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 11 651 (9th Cir. 1991). This case has been pending for more than eight months and remains 12 at an impasse because Petitioner failed to comply with a court-ordered deadline to file an 13 amended petition, which passed nearly two months ago. This delay is inherently 14 prejudicial to Defendant. 15 Public Policy: Public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan, 16 291 F.3d at 643. Dismissing this action would not impede that interest. As noted in the 17 Dismissal Order, the initial Petition mentioned two judgments: one in San Diego County 18 Superior Court and one in Orange County Superior Court. It was unclear on the initial 19 Petition’s face which judgment Petitioner seeks to challenge by this habeas action. To the 20 extent Petitioner seeks to challenge the San Diego judgment, Petitioner already has a 21 pending § 2254 proceeding in this district challenging that judgment. See Jones, Jr. v. 22 Gore, 22-cv-622-JLS-BGS (S.D. Cal. filed May 2, 2022). To the extent Petitioner seeks 23 to challenge the Orange County judgment, venue is not proper in this district and, therefore, 24 the Court has no authority to dispose of such a habeas case on the merits. Petitioner must 25 instead file a habeas petition in the Central Division of California, Southern Division. See 26 Rule 2(e), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (“A petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more 27 than one state court must file a separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of 28 each court.”). Accordingly, dismissal of this instant action under Rule 41(b) does not 1 || preclude disposition of Petitioner’s habeas action on the merits; rather, it merely ensures 2 || the Petitioner’s habeas action is before the proper tribunal. 3 Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives: In assessing whether dismissal under Rule 4 ||41(b) is warranted, the Court considers whether alternatives less drastic than dismissal are 5 || feasible given the circumstances of the case. Jn re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1455. “[A]district 6 || court’s warning to a party that [his] failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal 7 || can satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. 8 When it issued its Order to Show Cause, this Court afforded Petitioner with a less 9 || drastic alternative to dismissal. It did so by directing Petitioner to file an amended petition 10 ||in order to avoid dismissal. As mentioned above, that Order to Show Cause was met with 11 |/silence. After 181 days without an amended petition, this Court concludes that less drastic 12 alternatives to dismissal are not available. 13 All five pertinent factors favor dismissal. Accordingly, the Court exercises its 14 inherent authority to dismiss this action without prejudice. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 15 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding Rule 41(b) allows the court to dismiss a claim 16 || for failure to follow any court order, including failure to file an amended complaint within 17 period designated by the court). The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 18 IT ISSO ORDERED 19 || DATED: January 25, 2023 ( yi uA (Hiphan 6 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _A.