Jones, Rory
Opinion
ILli'tH /47T/Y I67W( CASE NOS. PD-1976-14, PD-1677-14 & PD-1678-14
ORIGINAL
IN RE § IN THE
RORY JONES, § COURT OF COUFTT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS TDCJ-CID#01914710 § CRIMINAL APPEALS MAR 18 2015
PETITIONER JONES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DISMISSAL OF PDR'S AS BEING UNTIMELY Abel Acosta, Clerk
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF T6HE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
Comes now, your Petitioner, Rory Jones, proceeding in pro se in the above-styled and numbered
causes and files this, his Motion for Reconsideration of his PDR's being Dismissed as being untimely FILED IN
filed and in support thereof, would show the Court as follows: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS L MAR 20 2015 Abel Acosta, Clerk
Procedural History
Petitioner was convicted of the felony offenses of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault and
aggravated kidnapping in the 211th Judicial District Court of Denton County in the State ofTexas v. Rory Jones in case numbers: F-2014-0079-C, F-2014-0080-C and F-2014-0081-C on February 07, 2014. A
direct appeal was taken by Petitioner to the Second Court of Appeals in Jones v. State, Case Nos. 02-14- 00068-CR, 02-14-00069-CR & 02-14-00070-CR, who affirmed the judgment and sentences in an
unpublished opinion dated November 20, 2014. On December 31, 2014, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to file his pro se PDR, giving him up to and including February 20, 2015,
in which to file his pro se PDR in all three cases. Petitioner placed all three of his PDR's in the prison
mail box for the authorities to forward to the Court on February 19, 2015, as demonstrated by the
associated dates written above his signature and certificates of service of his PDR. On March 04, the
Clerk of the Court issued a notice to Petitioner that his three PDR's had been dismissed as being untimely
filed. This proceeding followed. See Appendix A.
H.
Motion for Reconsideration
Petitioner relies upon two procedural rules of law adopted by the Texas Supreme Courtto remedy
the alleged deficient filing. First, Petitioner would direct the attention of the Courtto the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 4, infra:
A. Rule 4. Time and Notice Provisions
4.1. Computing Time
(a) In General. The day of an act, event, or default after which a designated period beginsto run is not
included when computing a period prescribed or allowed by these rules, by court order, or by statute.
The last day of the period is included, but if thatday is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period
extends to the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
9.2. Filing
(b) Filing by Mail.
(1) Timely Filing. A document received within ten days afterthe filing deadline is considered
timely filed if:
(A) it was sent to the properclerk by United States Postal Service or a commercial
delivery service;
(B) it was placed in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped; and
(C) it was deposited in the mail or delivered to a commercial delivery service on or before the last day for
filing.
Petitioner submits that he signed his three PDR's on February 19, 2015 and placed them in the
prison mail for them to forward to the Courts Clerk for filing. For reasons unknown to Petitioner the
package mailed was not post-marked before the last day of filing, which would have been February 20,
2015. Thereafter, the clerk of the Court dismissed all three PDR's as being untimely on March 04, 2015.
Once an inmate places his pleading(s) in the prison mail box for forwarding to the clerk of a court for
filing he has no control on how his pleadings are actually handled and/orforwarded for filing.
B. Federal Mail box Rule Extended to State Filings
In Campbell v. State, PD-1081-09, this Court held in relevant part:
We granted appellant's sole ground for review, which he filed pro se: "The court of appeals erred in holding that the mailbox rule filing and received by clerk after deposited within ten days applied to indigent criminal defendants acting pro se." An amended briefhas been filed by "Counsel for Appellant." In that brief, appellant asserts that the court of appeals "erred in holding that the ten-day late-filing requirement, incorporated into TEX.R. CIV. P. 5 and TEX.R.APP. P. 9.2, applies to an indigent, incarcerated litigant acting pro se." He asks, "Should pro se, incarcerated litigants be exempted from enforcement of the ten-day filing provisoembedded within TEX.R. CIV. P. 5 and TEX.R.APP. P. 9.2(b)(1)?"
In Texas, the mailbox rule is encompassed by TEX.R.APP. P. 9.2(b) and TEX.R. CIV. P. 5. Rule 9.2(b) provides that, if filed by mail, a document received within ten days after the filing deadline is considered timely filed if: 1) it was sent to the proper clerk by United States Postal Service first-class, express, registered, or certified mail; 2) it was placed in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped; and 3) it was deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing. Rule 5 also provides that additional time to file is permitted, including specific provisions that if any properly addressed and stamped document in an envelope or wrapper sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail and deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing, and received by the clerk not more than ten days afterthe lastdayfor filing, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time.
The Supreme Court also pointed out that, "[u]nlike other litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the notice is stamped Tiled' or to establish the date on which the court received the notice." Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 2379. The Court also noted that pro se prisoners are forced to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail, while other litigants who use that method can "place the notice directly into the hands of the United States Postal Service (or a private express carrier); and they can follow its progress by calling the court to determine whether the notice has been received and stamped, knowing that if the mail goes awry they can personally deliver notice at the last moment or that their monitoring will provide them with evidence to demonstrate either excusable neglect or that the notice was not stamped on the day the court received it." Id. It also notes that "[p]ro se prisoners cannot take any of these precautions; nor, by definition, do they have lawyers who can take these precautions for them."
The Supreme Court recognizes that "[w]orse, the pro se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to prison authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who may have every incentive to delay." Id. "No matter how far in advance the pro se prisoner delivers his notice to the prison authorities, he can never be sure that it will ultimately get stamped Tiled' on time." Id. (Emphasis in original.) "And if there is a delay the prisoner suspects is attributable to the prison authorities, he is unlikelyto have any means of proving it, for his confinement prevents him from monitoring the process sufficiently to distinguish delay on the part of prison authorities from slow mail service or the court clerk's failure to stamp the notice on the date received." Id. It also recognizes that "[ujnskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and unable to leave the prison, [the pro se prisoner's] control over the processing of his notice necessarily ceases as soon as he hands it over to the only public officials to whom he has access — the prison authorities — and the only information he will likely have is the date he delivered the notice to those prison authorities and the date ultimately stamped on his notice." Id. at 271-72, 108 S.Ct. 2379.
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