J-S43015-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
NAJAEA JONES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : FOODS ON FIRST III, INC., D/B/A : FOODS ON FIRST, FOODS ON FIRST : VI, INC., D/B/A FOODS ON FIRST, : No. 177 EDA 2024 MANUEL SALAZAR, AND ALDO : SALAZAR : : Appellants :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 210700825
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2025
Foods on First III, Inc., d/b/a Foods on First, Foods on First VI, Inc.,
d/b/a Foods on First, Manuel Salazar, and Aldo Salazar (collectively,
“Defendants”) have appealed from the judgment in favor of Najaea Jones
(“Plaintiff”) with respect to her employment discrimination claims. For the
reasons discussed below, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of
an opinion explaining the court’s rationale for rejecting the issues raised by
Defendants in their post-trial motion and again on appeal.
By way of background, Plaintiff initiated this action on July 13, 2021 by
filing a complaint against Defendants, which as amended raised the following
six counts pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) and
the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (“PFPO”): (1) quid pro quo sexual J-S43015-24
harassment; (2) sexual harassment/hostile work environment; (3) sex
discrimination; (4) retaliation; (5) race harassment/hostile work environment;
and (6) race discrimination. The count for race discrimination was also filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Prior to trial, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Therein,
they contended, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her remedies with
respect to the claims stemming from violations of the PFPO, the PHRA claims
in the complaint were barred by the statute of limitations based upon the date
Plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter from the PHRC, and she did not
establish a prima facie case concerning her § 1981 race discrimination claim.
The court did not dispose of the motion until the onset of the second day of a
nonjury trial, when it denied the motion as moot and deemed the issues to be
preserved for consideration after hearing the evidence.
Following the two-day bench trial, Plaintiff and Defendants submitted
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the trial court. With a one-
page order entered several months later on November 29, 2023, the court
adopted wholesale the proposed findings from Plaintiff and ordered judgment
in her favor in the following amounts: back wages of $31,096, prejudgment
interest of $2,177, compensatory damages of $50,000, and attorneys’ fees
and costs. Notably, the court’s judgment order, which was taken from
Plaintiff’s proposed findings, did not specify which claims it found in Plaintiff’s
favor, nor did it allocate the damages to any specific counts or causes of
action.
-2- J-S43015-24
Defendants filed a post-trial motion raising a variety of issues, including
the contention that the court did not expressly consider the legal issues raised
in their motion for summary judgment. Defendants later timely appealed
while the post-trial motion was pending, and the court thereafter denied the
motion in a brief order without explanation as to its ruling. 1 Defendants were
not required to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the record does
not reflect that one was filed. The trial court then authored a two-sentence
memorandum opinion stating that the reasons for its decision could be found
in the November 29, 2023 order adopting Plaintiff’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
On appeal, Defendants have raised four issues, three of which by their
nature require this Court to consider the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
These include: (1) Defendant’s objection to the admission of purported
hearsay evidence at the bench trial, namely Plaintiff’s handwritten notes
memorializing her hours worked for Defendants; (2) several challenges to the
weight of the evidence supporting the judgment, including an assertion that
Plaintiff admitted to intervening causes with respect to the awarded damages,
and (3) averments of arbitrariness and lack of justification as to the trial
____________________________________________
1 Following a rule to show issued by this Court against Defendants, the trial
court entered judgment on the verdict on June 6, 2024. We therefore discharged the rule.
-3- J-S43015-24
court’s order.2 See Defendants’ definitive brief at 18-31. All these claims are
reviewed for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See Viall v. Garvin, 318
A.3d 905, 922 (Pa.Super. 2024) (noting that “[t]he admissibility of evidence
is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which appellate courts will not
disturb absent an abuse of discretion or error of law”); Thorson v. EDDW,
LLC, 309 A.3d 141, 147 (Pa.Super. 2024) (discussing that the weight of
evidence is within “the province of the fact-finder” and weight determinations
will be upheld “unless the appellant can show that the trial court’s
determination was manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, or
flagrantly contrary to the evidence”); Jacks Auto Parts Sales, Inc. v. MJ
Auto Body and Repair LLC, 305 A.3d 162, 166 (Pa.Super. 2023) (“An abuse
of discretion occurs when a trial court, in reaching its conclusions, overrides
or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” (citation
omitted)).
2 Defendants’ remaining issue concerns the trial court’s failure to explicitly address the merits of the claims presented in their motion for summary judgment and re-raised in their proposed findings and post-trial motion. As recounted above, those questions involve the exhaustion of administrative remedies, applicability of the statute of limitations, and whether Plaintiff established a prima facie case as to the § 1981 claim. See Defendants’ Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 12/24/23, at ¶¶ 12-16. Since those each present a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and thus we could address them based on the current record. See, e.g., Constantine v. Lenox Instrument Company, Inc., 323 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2024). However, we expressly do not do so at this time so as to avoid piecemeal resolution of this appeal.
-4- J-S43015-24
This Court has recently reiterated the importance of Rule 1925 in our
appellate procedure: “Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying
and focusing upon those issues that the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule
1925 is thus a crucial component of appellate process.” McGee v. McDowell,
___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 682787 at *8 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Further, the court’s opinion required by the rule “gives the appellate court a
reasoned basis for the trial court’s disposition of the challenged orders.” Id.
Finally, “[n]ormally, a trial judge may not simply defer to earlier rulings or
decline to address an issue, as this would defeat the purpose of ensuring
thorough consideration of the issues at the trial court level.” Id. (citation
omitted).
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J-S43015-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
NAJAEA JONES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : FOODS ON FIRST III, INC., D/B/A : FOODS ON FIRST, FOODS ON FIRST : VI, INC., D/B/A FOODS ON FIRST, : No. 177 EDA 2024 MANUEL SALAZAR, AND ALDO : SALAZAR : : Appellants :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 210700825
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2025
Foods on First III, Inc., d/b/a Foods on First, Foods on First VI, Inc.,
d/b/a Foods on First, Manuel Salazar, and Aldo Salazar (collectively,
“Defendants”) have appealed from the judgment in favor of Najaea Jones
(“Plaintiff”) with respect to her employment discrimination claims. For the
reasons discussed below, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of
an opinion explaining the court’s rationale for rejecting the issues raised by
Defendants in their post-trial motion and again on appeal.
By way of background, Plaintiff initiated this action on July 13, 2021 by
filing a complaint against Defendants, which as amended raised the following
six counts pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) and
the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (“PFPO”): (1) quid pro quo sexual J-S43015-24
harassment; (2) sexual harassment/hostile work environment; (3) sex
discrimination; (4) retaliation; (5) race harassment/hostile work environment;
and (6) race discrimination. The count for race discrimination was also filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Prior to trial, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Therein,
they contended, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her remedies with
respect to the claims stemming from violations of the PFPO, the PHRA claims
in the complaint were barred by the statute of limitations based upon the date
Plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter from the PHRC, and she did not
establish a prima facie case concerning her § 1981 race discrimination claim.
The court did not dispose of the motion until the onset of the second day of a
nonjury trial, when it denied the motion as moot and deemed the issues to be
preserved for consideration after hearing the evidence.
Following the two-day bench trial, Plaintiff and Defendants submitted
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the trial court. With a one-
page order entered several months later on November 29, 2023, the court
adopted wholesale the proposed findings from Plaintiff and ordered judgment
in her favor in the following amounts: back wages of $31,096, prejudgment
interest of $2,177, compensatory damages of $50,000, and attorneys’ fees
and costs. Notably, the court’s judgment order, which was taken from
Plaintiff’s proposed findings, did not specify which claims it found in Plaintiff’s
favor, nor did it allocate the damages to any specific counts or causes of
action.
-2- J-S43015-24
Defendants filed a post-trial motion raising a variety of issues, including
the contention that the court did not expressly consider the legal issues raised
in their motion for summary judgment. Defendants later timely appealed
while the post-trial motion was pending, and the court thereafter denied the
motion in a brief order without explanation as to its ruling. 1 Defendants were
not required to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the record does
not reflect that one was filed. The trial court then authored a two-sentence
memorandum opinion stating that the reasons for its decision could be found
in the November 29, 2023 order adopting Plaintiff’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
On appeal, Defendants have raised four issues, three of which by their
nature require this Court to consider the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
These include: (1) Defendant’s objection to the admission of purported
hearsay evidence at the bench trial, namely Plaintiff’s handwritten notes
memorializing her hours worked for Defendants; (2) several challenges to the
weight of the evidence supporting the judgment, including an assertion that
Plaintiff admitted to intervening causes with respect to the awarded damages,
and (3) averments of arbitrariness and lack of justification as to the trial
____________________________________________
1 Following a rule to show issued by this Court against Defendants, the trial
court entered judgment on the verdict on June 6, 2024. We therefore discharged the rule.
-3- J-S43015-24
court’s order.2 See Defendants’ definitive brief at 18-31. All these claims are
reviewed for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See Viall v. Garvin, 318
A.3d 905, 922 (Pa.Super. 2024) (noting that “[t]he admissibility of evidence
is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which appellate courts will not
disturb absent an abuse of discretion or error of law”); Thorson v. EDDW,
LLC, 309 A.3d 141, 147 (Pa.Super. 2024) (discussing that the weight of
evidence is within “the province of the fact-finder” and weight determinations
will be upheld “unless the appellant can show that the trial court’s
determination was manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, or
flagrantly contrary to the evidence”); Jacks Auto Parts Sales, Inc. v. MJ
Auto Body and Repair LLC, 305 A.3d 162, 166 (Pa.Super. 2023) (“An abuse
of discretion occurs when a trial court, in reaching its conclusions, overrides
or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” (citation
omitted)).
2 Defendants’ remaining issue concerns the trial court’s failure to explicitly address the merits of the claims presented in their motion for summary judgment and re-raised in their proposed findings and post-trial motion. As recounted above, those questions involve the exhaustion of administrative remedies, applicability of the statute of limitations, and whether Plaintiff established a prima facie case as to the § 1981 claim. See Defendants’ Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 12/24/23, at ¶¶ 12-16. Since those each present a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and thus we could address them based on the current record. See, e.g., Constantine v. Lenox Instrument Company, Inc., 323 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2024). However, we expressly do not do so at this time so as to avoid piecemeal resolution of this appeal.
-4- J-S43015-24
This Court has recently reiterated the importance of Rule 1925 in our
appellate procedure: “Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying
and focusing upon those issues that the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule
1925 is thus a crucial component of appellate process.” McGee v. McDowell,
___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 682787 at *8 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Further, the court’s opinion required by the rule “gives the appellate court a
reasoned basis for the trial court’s disposition of the challenged orders.” Id.
Finally, “[n]ormally, a trial judge may not simply defer to earlier rulings or
decline to address an issue, as this would defeat the purpose of ensuring
thorough consideration of the issues at the trial court level.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Based on our review, it does not appear that the trial court has provided
any analysis concerning these questions raised by Defendants, either in
writing or otherwise of record, despite their being asserted in Defendants’
post-trial motion. Rather, the court merely adopted Plaintiff’s proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which do not speak to the admission
of hearsay or provide an explicit rationale for seemingly allocating no weight
to Plaintiff’s purported admission to intervening causes relating to damages.
Without the benefit of an opinion analyzing these issues, we cannot ascertain
the court’s exercise of discretion, and our review is therefore hindered.
Further, since the court did not opine as to the legal issues initially presented
in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and summarily disposed of after
trial, we lack a “reasoned basis” for the court’s disposition of those claims,
-5- J-S43015-24
and we cannot ensure the court’s “thorough consideration of th[ose] issues.”
Id.
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to remand this matter with
instruction that the trial court provide in writing its rationale for dismissing all
the claims raised in Defendants’ post-trial motion. The trial court shall file its
opinion within sixty days of receipt of the certified record.
Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained.
-6-