Jones License

2 Pa. D. & C.3d 351, 1977 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 346
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County
DecidedJune 16, 1977
Docketno. 2332
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 351 (Jones License) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones License, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 351, 1977 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).

Opinion

WICKERSHAM, J.,

Petitioner was arrested on the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.1 She was taken to State Police Headquarters where she was requested to submit to a chemical breathalyzer test.2 The Department of Transportation contends petitioner refused to [352]*352submit to this test, and accordingly, subjected herself a fortiori to a six month suspension of her driver’s license as required by section 624.1(a) of The Vehicle Code. From this suspension, petitioner appeals to this court.3

At issue is whether petitioner “refused” to submit to the test within the meaning of section 624.1(a) of The Vehicle Code, such as would justify suspension of her license; the only justifiable “refusal” being on the basis of a physical inability to submit to a breathalyzer test.

Clearly, a simple declaration of inability to perform the test, absent supportive medical proof, will not justify a refusal: Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Kelly, 18 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 490, 495, 335 A.2d 882, 885 (1975). Acquiescing to the test, and then failing to provide sufficient breath, also will [353]*353not justify a refusal absent medical corroboration: Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Medalis, 24 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 12, 354 A.2d 43 (1976). Such “refusals” are inapposite, however, to a situation in which an individual acquiesces to the test, attempts to inflate the test balloon, and through sheer physical inability cannot do so. This, indeed, is not a “refusal” at all. We feel petitioner has adequately supported her position that she falls within this final category. She never “refused” as it were to take a chemical test, and the suspension of her license was unjustified.

It would be anomalous, of course, if physical inability, whether corroborated by medical proof or not, could ever be interpreted as a refusal. The Vehicle Code seeks to foreclose such a happenstance by providing an alternate means of testing a person’s blood alcohol content, i.e., extracting a blood sample,4 in the event of a physical inability to supply enough breath to complete a breath test. This not only ensures admissible scientific evidence proving inebriation, but also provides a means to expose anyone who seeks to fraudulently escape undergoing a chemical test by feigning an inability to supply enough breath for the breathalyzer.

Of course,, there would be no need to attempt the blood test when faced with a refusal to undergo the breath test.5 When, however, the police are faced with an apparent inability to undergo the breath test, we feel The Vehicle Code places upon them an affirmative obligation to offer the blood test as [354]*354an alternative before they will be heard to complain that the driver “refused” a chemical analysis. The order of Department of Transportation suspending petitioner’s operator’s license will therefore be reversed.

ORDER

And now, June 16, 1977, the order of the Department of Transportation suspending the operator’s license of petitioner Helen Jones is hereby reversed, with all attendant privileges reinstated.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Hanes
411 A.2d 571 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
2 Pa. D. & C.3d 351, 1977 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-license-pactcompldauphi-1977.