Jones & Laughlin Steel Inc. v. United States

580 F. Supp. 1518, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 935, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18967
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 2, 1984
DocketCiv. A. No. 82-293
StatusPublished

This text of 580 F. Supp. 1518 (Jones & Laughlin Steel Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones & Laughlin Steel Inc. v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 1518, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 935, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18967 (W.D. Pa. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION

ZIEGLER, District Judge.

This is a civil action for the recovery of corporate income taxes for the taxable years 1961 through 1967 and for the period January 1 through May 15, 1967 in the amount of $1,849,868.12, plus interest from the dates of payment. Plaintiff, Jones and Laughlin Steel Incorporated, seeks to recover corporate income taxes which were assessed and collected following an adjustment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that reduced plaintiff’s iron ore depletion deductions for the years at issue. Relying on a regulation of the Department of Treasury, the Commissioner determined that the sintering of iron ore fines and concentrates at the mill sites was a non-mining process so that the increase in the value of the fine concentrates could not be included in plaintiff’s gross income from mining for the purpose of computing a percentage depletion deduction.

The issue presented is whether Treasury Regulation 1.613 — 4(f)(3)(ii) is consistent with the language of Section 613(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

We hold that the regulation at issue is invalid since it conflicts with the Congressional mandate and fails to “harmonize with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.” National Muffler Dealers Association, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477, 99 S.Ct. 1304, 1307, 59 L.Ed.2d 519 (1979). Specifically, Congress has provided that sintering is a mining process which includes the treatment normally applied by mine owners to obtain a commercially marketable mineral product, whether the treatment occurs at [1520]*1520the extraction site or not, and therefore an agency regulation to the contrary cannot be enforced. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment will be granted.

A. History of Case

The facts are not in dispute. Jones & Laughlin Steel Incorporated is the successor to Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, and is organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal office located at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff is a major manufacturer of iron and steel and operates mills at Pittsburgh and Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, and Cleveland, Ohio. The company operates iron ore mines known as the Benson Mine located at Starlake, New York, and five open pit mines on the Mesabi Range in Minnesota. These mines provide a substantial portion of the raw materials required to make iron and steel at plaintiff’s mills.

Plaintiff also operates sintering facilities at the Benson Mine and at the steel mills in Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Aliquippa. Sin-tering is a process or treatment applied to iron ore fines and concentrates to improve their physical structure and make them suitable as a blast furnace feed (Stip. at 17, 21-24). A major portion of the Benson Mine concentrates were sintered at that mine (Stip. at 15) while the remaining concentrates were shipped to plaintiff’s steel mills for treatment. The ore fines sintered at the Benson Mine were shipped to the taxpayer’s steel mills and were fed directly into the blast furnaces (Stip. at 15).

In determining its depletion base for computing the percentage depletion deduction on iron ore mined at the Benson and Minnesota mines, Jones and Laughlin included as part of gross income from mining the value attributable to the sintering of ore at both the Benson Mine and at plaintiff’s mills (Stip. at 18).

After examining the taxpayer’s federal income tax returns for the years at issue, the Commissioner denied that portion of plaintiff’s percentage depletion deduction to the extent the depletion base (gross income from mining) included the value attributable to the sintering performed at the Aliquippa, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland mills. The Commissioner assessed and collected deficiencies in taxes and interest, and the taxpayer responded with this civil action claiming an overpayment of taxes for the relevant years. The Commissioner allowed a depletion deduction in an amount attributable to the value of the iron ore sintered at the Benson Mine (Stip. at 19), and that amount is not at issue.

B. Validity of Treasury Regulation

The United States contends that Regulation 1.613 — 4(f)(3)(ii) permits sintering as a mining process only to the extent that the treatment is needed to ship the iron ore fine. At issue is the validity of the regulation, since Treasury regulations properly enacted carry the force of law.

Treasury regulations are valid if they “implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.” United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967); Commissioner v. Portland Cement Company of Utah, 450 U.S. 156, 169, 101 S.Ct. 1037, 1045, 67 L.Ed.2d 140 (1981). A particular regulation properly implements the Congressional mandate' if the regulation “harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.” National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477, 99 S.Ct. 1304, 1307, 59 L.Ed.2d 519 (1979). When Congress defines the statutory language, the Commissioner may promulgate regulations under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) to “prescribe all needful rules.” Less deference is accorded, however, when the Commissioner interprets a specific Code provision. Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253, 101 S.Ct. 2288, 2292, 68 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981).

In Rowan, the Supreme Court articulated the following test:

Among other considerations relevant to the validity of Treasury Regulations, we inquire whether the regulation ‘is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to [1521]*1521have been aware of congressional intent ... and [i]f the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.’ We also consider, if pertinent, ‘the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent reenactments of the statute.’

452 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 2292-93. To determine the validity of Treasury Regulation 1.613 — 4(f)(3)(ii), we must look to the language and history of § 613(c)(4)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code to gauge “the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation.”

The history of the Code reveals that, since 1932, Congress has declared that the depletion base includes the value attributed to any mining process that brings iron ore to “shipping grade and form” without regard to geographic limitation. Treasury Regulation 77, Article 221(g) (1933) first accorded a percentage depletion to the mining industry. The regulation designated certain processes as mining processes and in the case of iron ore provided that the depletion base shall include the value attributed to the “sorting or concentrating to bring to shipping grade and loading at the mine for shipment.” Id.

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Related

United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co.
364 U.S. 76 (Supreme Court, 1960)
United States v. Correll
389 U.S. 299 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah
450 U.S. 156 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Rowan Cos. v. United States
452 U.S. 247 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United States
435 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1977)

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Bluebook (online)
580 F. Supp. 1518, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 935, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-laughlin-steel-inc-v-united-states-pawd-1984.