Jones 190298 v. Harris

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 25, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-05682
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Edward Lee Jones, Sr., No. CV-19-05682-PHX-MTL (JZB)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 N. Harris, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend His 16 Original Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 of and Request to 17 Exceed Page Limit. (Doc. 26.) The Court will grant the motion. 18 I. Background. 19 On November 25, 2019, Edward Lee Jones, Sr. filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (doc. 1), and an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 21 Pauperis (IFP), (doc. 2). On December 27, 2019, the court granted Plaintiff’s Application 22 to Proceed IFP, dismissed Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint along with Defendant Cool 23 Bear, and required Defendant Harris to answer Count One in his official capacity as to the 24 RLUIPA claim and in his individual and official capacities as to the First Amendment 25 claim. 26 II. Plaintiff’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend and to File Excess Pages. 27 On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion Seeking Leave to Amend His Original 28 Complaint and Request to Exceed Page Limit. (Doc. 26.) Plaintiff concurrently lodged his 1 Proposed First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 27.) The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for 2 Leave to Amend His Original Complaint and File Excess Pages, (doc. 26), and will screen 3 Plaintiff’s Proposed First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 4 III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints. 5 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 6 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 8 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 9 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 10 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 11 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 12 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed 13 factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully- 14 harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals 15 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 16 suffice.” Id. 17 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 18 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 19 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 20 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 21 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 22 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 23 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 24 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 25 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 26 IV. First Amended Complaint. 27 In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges eight total “Counts” against the 28 following Defendants in their individual and official capacities: Harris, Jordan, Riker, 1 Dison, and Shinn. (Doc. 27 at 1–3.) In relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, the return 2 of his property, and Court Orders directed at changing various ADCRR policies. (Id. at 45– 3 46.) 4 A. Count One. 5 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harris violated Plaintiff’s rights 6 under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 7 U.S.C. §§2000cc et. seq., by denying Plaintiff access to his religious property for an 8 unreasonable amount of time. (Doc. 27 at 4–7.) Plaintiff states that the customary 9 timeframe for property return in ADCRR is three to seven business days, but that 10 Defendant Harris took advantage of the “ambiguity” in ADCRR policies by holding 11 Plaintiff’s religious property for a month on two separate occasions. (Id. at 5–7.) Plaintiff 12 states that Defendant’s holding of his property caused him to be unable to practice his 13 religion, specifically, that he was unable to read the Quran or conduct halal prayer. 14 (Id. at 7.) 15 B. Counts Two and Eight. 16 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harris violated the Eighth 17 Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when he held Plaintiff’s 18 personal hygiene products for more than seven days. (Doc. 27 at 8.) Plaintiff also alleges 19 that he was denied indigent hygiene supplies and, consequently, “he was unable to take a 20 shower, brush his teeth, or properly wash his hands and face.” (Id. at 8–11.) Plaintiff further 21 asserts that he suffered financial hardship from being forced to purchase replacement 22 hygiene products. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff notes that his hygiene supplies were eventually 23 returned. (Id. at 11.) 24 In Count Eight, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shinn also denied Plaintiff personal 25 hygiene products. (Id. at 44.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shinn is 26 responsible for failing to provide inmates sanitary conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 27 “prisoners are forced to use personal soap or shampoo to clean black mold” and that “the 28 prison is overrun with mice and roaches.” (Id.) 1 C. Count Three. 2 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harris denied Plaintiff “access to 3 the courts [and] his property in violation of the First, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments 4 by unreasonably limiting Plaintiff’s access to his legal files. (Doc. 27 at 12). Plaintiff 5 claims that being unable to access his legal documents “forc[ed] him to scramble to catch 6 up on missed timeframes/deadlines, prevented him from properly drafting a pleading, and 7 subjected him to unfavorable rulings. Id. 8 D. Counts Four, Five, and Seven. 9 In Counts Five and Seven, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jordan and Dison 10 respectively conspired with Defendant Harris to destroy Plaintiff’s property and cover up 11 the destruction. (Doc. 27 at 41). Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ actions were done in 12 retaliation to Plaintiff’s use of the grievance process. (See id.) 13 E. Count Six. 14 In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Riker threatened Plaintiff with a 15 disciplinary infraction in retaliation to Plaintiff’s continued use of the ADCRR grievance 16 process. (Doc 27 at 35.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Riker tampered with 17 Plaintiff’s existing grievances to prevent Plaintiff’s successful use of the grievance process. 18 (Id. at 38.) 19 V. Discussion of Plaintiff’s Claims. 20 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 21 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. 22 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal 23 interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 24 that were not initially pled. Because Plaintiff aggregated numerous claims in each count of 25 his Complaint, the Court will, for simplicity’s sake, address each type of claim alleged by 26 Plaintiff, rather than fully resolve each count individually and in order. 27 A. Official Capacity Claims. 28 A claim against an individual in his or her official capacity is “only another way of 1 pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of 2 Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). “[A] suit against a state official 3 in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the 4 official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. 5 Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). 6 1. Count One. 7 Plaintiff has stated an official capacity claim against Defendant Harris. Plaintiff’s 8 Count One RLUIPA claim is similar, but not identical, to Count One of his Complaint. 9 (Compare doc. 1 at 3 with doc. 27 at 4–7.) Plaintiff’s cause of action and core facts are 10 identical. However, Plaintiff provides more detail in his allegations; specifically, he adds 11 background on prior RLUIPA complaints he has filed with this Court and information 12 about his use of the ADCRR grievance process. (Doc. 27 at 4–7.) Accordingly, the Court 13 will adopt its analysis of Count One regarding Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim on this premise 14 from its prior Screening Order, (doc. 6 at 3–4), and direct Defendant Harris to answer the 15 new facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint regarding Plaintiff’s prior civil rights 16 complaints and use of the grievance process, (doc. 27 at 4–7). 17 2. Counts Two through Eight. 18 Plaintiff has not stated an official capacity claim against any Defendant in Counts 19 Two through Eight. “[I]n an official-capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have 20 played a part in the violation of federal law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 21 (1985). In Counts Two through Eight, Plaintiff does not allege that any ADCRR policy, 22 practice, or custom has resulted in his alleged injuries. These claims are premised on 23 Defendants’ alleged negligence or retaliation against Plaintiff rather than ADCRR 24 procedure. (See doc. 27 at 4–7, 35–40.) Since Plaintiff has not claimed that ADCRR policy 25 caused his alleged injuries, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s official 26 capacity claims against Defendants Jordan, Dison, Riker, and Shinn, and against Defendant 27 Harris in Count Four. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. 28 1 B. Individual Capacity Claims. 2 To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he suffered a specific 3 injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between 4 the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 5 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s 6 position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional 7 rights does not impose liability. Monell, 436 U.S. 658; Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 8 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because 9 vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that 10 each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 11 violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 12 conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his 13 civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 1. Eighth Amendment Claim. 15 In Counts Two and Eight, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants have violated his 16 Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 17 punishment protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also 18 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 19 (9th Cir. 2006). To state an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, plaintiffs 20 must meet a two-part test. “First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be, 21 objectively, sufficiently serious” such that the “official’s act or omission must result in the 22 denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 23 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Second, the prison official must have a 24 “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with “deliberate indifference to 25 inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is a 26 higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. 27 at 835. 28 1 a. Count Two: Defendant Harris. 2 Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Harris 3 for a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Rights in Count Two. “Indigent inmates 4 have the right to personal hygiene supplies such as toothbrushes and soap.” Keenan v. Hall, 5 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 135 F.3d 1318 6 (9th Cir. 1998). However, ADCRR 0.0#905 provides that non-indigent inmates do not have 7 the right to free personal hygiene supplies. Plaintiff never alleges that he was prevented 8 from having personal hygiene supplies. (Doc. 27 at 4). Plaintiff acknowledges that he 9 purchased and used hygiene supplies while his property was processing. (Id.) Since 10 Plaintiff was not denied access to personal hygiene products, the court will dismiss without 11 prejudice Count Two. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1091. 12 b. Count Eight: Defendant Shinn. 13 Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Shinn in 14 relation to his allegations regarding denial of personal hygiene supplies. Plaintiff does not 15 allege that he was prevented from possessing and using hygiene supplies. Therefore, the 16 Court will adopt the analysis above and dismiss without prejudice the portions of Count 17 Eight pertaining to the denial of hygiene supplies. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1091. 18 Additionally, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim regarding 19 unsanitary prison conditions against Defendant Shinn. “[S]ubjection of a prisoner to lack 20 of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the 21 meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Brown v. Flores, 755 F. App'x 691 (9th Cir. 2019); 22 citing Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a Plaintiff 23 must show more than merely the presence of unsanitary conditions to state a claim under 24 the Eighth Amendment. See Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1047, citing Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 25 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985) (“not all deviations from ideally safe conditions [of 26 confinement] amounts to a constitutional violation.”) 27 Plaintiff alleges that prison “showers are not properly sanitized or cleaned. Prisoners 28 are forced to use personal soap or shampoo to clean black mold and keep gnats out. No air 1 circulation work[s] properly in showers or cells. Moreover, the prison is overrun with mice 2 and roaches which destroy prisoner’s property.” (Doc. 27 at 44). However, Plaintiff does 3 not allege how long the conditions have persisted or specify what harm he has suffered 4 because of those conditions. (See id.) Since Plaintiff has not shown that the issues he 5 identifies have been severe or prolonged, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of 6 “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 7 Hoptowit, 753 F.2d at 783.1 The Court will dismiss Defendant Shinn without prejudice and 8 dismiss without prejudice Count Eight it pertains to the allegation of unsanitary conditions. 9 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 10 2. Access to Courts. 11 As a matter of standing for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he 12 suffered an “actual injury—i.e., “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing 13 litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis v. 14 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996) (citation omitted); see also Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 15 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Mere ‘delay in being able to work on one’s legal action or 16 communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.’”) 17 (citations omitted). 18 Plaintiff alleges in Count Three that Defendant Harris prevented Plaintiff’s access 19 to courts by withholding Plaintiff’s “legal boxes” for an unreasonable time. (Doc. 27 at 12– 20 17.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant’s actions caused actual prejudice with respect 21 to contemplated or existing litigation, only that Plaintiff’s lack of access to his legal 22 1 Even if the Court found that Plaintiff’s assertions were sufficient to establish unsanitary 23 conditions rising to the standard of an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff fails to implicate Defendant Shinn as the cause of those conditions. “A supervisor may be liable if 24 there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 25 constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 62,646 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303–04 (5th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff has not alleged that 26 Defendant Shinn is personally involved in evaluating sanitary conditions at the prison. (See Doc. 27 at 44). Nor does Plaintiff allege facts that support the conclusion that Defendant 27 Shinn is acting through his subordinates. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court would still dismiss both Count Eight of the First Amended Complaint and Defendant Shinn because Plaintiff’s 28 allegations of unsanitary conditions are conclusory and fail to state a claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 1 materials made him struggle to catch up on deadlines and affected the quality of his filings. 2 (Id. at 12.) Since Plaintiff has not shown actual injury, this Court will dismiss Count Three 3 without prejudice. See Goord, 320 F.3d at 352. 4 3. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims. 5 To determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections afforded 6 by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions imposed and 7 ask whether they “’present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state 8 might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 9 1995), quoting Sandin v. Conner, 15 U.S. 472, 468 (1995). Due process also requires that 10 there be “some evidence” to support the prison officials’ decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 11 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). However, this “does not require examination of the entire record, 12 independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. 13 Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 14 support the conclusion.” Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 15 The “Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official 16 causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 17 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Even unauthorized and intentional deprivations of property do not 18 constitute a violation of procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause if a meaningful 19 post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 20 (1984). 21 The availability of a common-law tort suit against a state employee constitutes an 22 adequate post-deprivation remedy. Id. at 534-35. Moreover, Arizona provides a meaningful 23 and adequate post-deprivation remedy through the prison grievance system, specifically 24 Department Order 909.09. Dennison v. Ryan, 522 Fed. App’x 414, 417-18 (9th Cir. 2013); 25 Aldrete v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 2011 WL 30959, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2011); see also 26 Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2000) (both state tort claims and prison 27 grievance procedures provide adequate post-deprivation remedies). That a prisoner “might 28 not be able to recover under these remedies the full amount which he might receive in a 1 § 1983 action is not . . . determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies.” Hudson, 468 2 U.S. at 535. See also Dennison, 522 F. App’x at 418 (“To the extent that [plaintiff] argues 3 that the postdeprivation remedy is inadequate because he was unable to access the 4 grievance procedure, his argument is unavailing.”). 5 In Counts Four, Five, and Seven, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jordan and Dison 6 worked with Defendant Harris denied Plaintiff procedural due process because 7 Defendants’ poor recordkeeping and retaliatory motives led to the loss, destruction, and 8 withholding of Plaintiff’s property. (Doc. 27 at 8, 12, 28.) However, it is more likely that 9 Defendants were following standard procedure to hold property when an inmate is moved. 10 The complaint recognizes that property processing was delayed at the time when Plaintiff’s 11 belongings were being inventoried. (See id. at 31.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations of 12 destruction of property are unclear as to what property was allegedly destroyed, and when 13 and how it was destroyed. (See id. at 28–34.) Moreover, Arizona provides a meaningful 14 and adequate post-deprivation remedy through the prison grievance system, specifically 15 Department Order 909.09. Dennison, 522 Fed. App’x at 417-18. Accordingly, the Court 16 will dismiss counts Four, Five, and Seven with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment 17 claims without prejudice. 18 4. Retaliation Claims 19 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials 20 and to be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th 21 Cir. 2012). A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) 22 an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 23 that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 24 his First Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) 25 did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 26 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) 27 (retaliation claims require an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in retaliation 28 for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action “advanced no 1 legitimate penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his 2 exercise of his First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the 3 defendants’ conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 4 287 (1977); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 a. Counts Four, Five, and Seven: Defendants Harris, Jordan, 6 and Dison. 7 Plaintiff does not have a viable First Amendment Retaliation claim against 8 Defendant Harris, Jordan, or Dison. Plaintiff does not show that Defendants took any action 9 because of Plaintiff’s use of the grievance process or filing of Civil Rights Complaints. 10 Defendants acted consistently with inventory procedures. (See Doc. 27 at 19). Plaintiff 11 makes no allegation that would make retaliation a more likely cause for Plaintiff’s 12 experience with the grievance process than normal administrative mistakes. (See id.) 13 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts Four, Five, and Seven with respect to the 14 retaliation claims without prejudice. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 15 at 681. 16 b. Count Six: Defendant Riker. 17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Riker retaliated against him for using the grievance 18 process. (Doc. 27 at 44). While Defendant Riker’s alleged statements would be evidence 19 of retaliation if Plaintiff was actually denied access to the grievance process, Plaintiff does 20 not allege that Defendant Riker acted on the statement he made to Plaintiff. (Id.) Because 21 a First Amendment Retaliation claim requires adverse action and no adverse action was 22 alleged by Plaintiff, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Six and Defendant 23 Riker. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// IV. Summary 2 In summary, the Court will require Defendant Harris, who is already served in this || matter, to answer Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against him in Count One of the First Amended Complaint. All remaining claims and defendants are dismissed without prejudice. 5 IT IS ORDERED: 6 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Exceed Pages (doc. 26) is granted. 7 2. Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Leave to Amend His Original Complaint 8 || (doc. 26) is granted to the extent provided in the Order. The Clerk is directed to file 9|| Plaintiff's proposed First Amended Complaint (lodged at doc. 27). 10 3. Defendant Harris shall answer the claims against him in Count One of 11 || Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. 12 4. On screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), Counts Two through Eight 13 || of the First Amended Complaint, and Defendants Jordan, Dison, Riker, and Shinn, are dismissed for failure to state a claim. 15 Dated this 25th day of September, 2020. 16 Wichal T. Hburde 18 Michael T. Liburdi 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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