Jones 190298 v. Davis

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJanuary 20, 2021
Docket3:19-cv-08055
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones 190298 v. Davis (Jones 190298 v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones 190298 v. Davis, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO KAB 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Edward Lee Jones, Sr., No. CV 19-08055-PCT-MTL (JZB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 R Davis, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Edward Lee Jones, Sr., who is currently confined in the Arizona State 16 Prison Complex-Eyman, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 17 (Doc. 31.) Pending before the Court are: Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 18 (Doc. 76), Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 88), and Plaintiff’s Motion for 19 Extension of Time and Request to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 90.) 20 I. The Operative Complaint 21 On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 22 an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Davis based on Plaintiff’s 23 allegations that while handcuffed, he was “abruptly slammed into a bar on a fence, resulting 24 in a laceration” to his chin, and “at the time the altercation occurred, Plaintiff was compliant 25 and did not resist being handcuffed or walked by Defendant Davis through the intake door” 26 (Doc. 30 at 8), and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Rydren based 27 on the following allegations. (Doc. 30 at 9; Doc. 9 at 8-9.) On June 15, 2018, Defendant 28 Rydren issued a disciplinary infraction charging Plaintiff with filing a vexatious grievance 1 in retaliation for Plaintiff filing 26 grievances since arriving at the facility on April 25, 2 2018, and filing an informal complaint on June 13, 2018, accusing Defendant Rydren’s 3 subordinate of failing to do her job. (Doc. 9 at 8-9.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Rydren’s 4 charge related to a May 2018 grievance Plaintiff filed against Defendant Tyler, but 5 Defendant Rydren assigned a case number to that grievance and requested an “extension 6 of time frames [until] June 5, 2018,” to address it, which “clearly demonstrated that 7 Defendant Rydren had previously reviewed the grievance and had already determined the 8 grievance was made in good faith and would be processed.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was 9 kept in maximum custody approximately three weeks longer than necessary while the 10 disciplinary charge was processed, and the disciplinary infraction was ultimately “modified 11 and resolved informally.” (Id.) 12 II. Plaintiff’s Subpoenas 13 On May 28, 2020, a United States Marshal served subpoenas on two third parties: 14 the Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry (ADC) and Centurion 15 of Arizona seeking discovery relating to the prosecution of this action. (Docs. 55-58.) 16 Each subpoena was addressed to the “Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation 17 and Reentry-Custodian of Records.” (Id.) Three subpoenas sought ADC policies, internal 18 ADC reports, orders, and documents related to Plaintiff’s claims. (Docs. 52-54). One 19 subpoena sought Plaintiff’s medical records. (Doc. 55.) In the Proofs of Service returned 20 by the United States Marshal, the Marshal stated that ADC Program Specialist II Michelle 21 Banks accepted service of three of the subpoenas related to ADC documents, but told the 22 United States Marshal that Centurion, the medical provider for the ADC, was the 23 “custodian of [medical] records” for the ADC and that Centurion should be served with the 24 subpoena seeking medical records. (Docs. 55.) The United States Marshal indicated that 25 Centurion was then served with the subpoena, but did not identify the individual who 26 accepted service on behalf of Centurion. (Id.) 27 Thereafter, Plaintiff informed the Court that he never received responses to the 28 subpoenas, and in an August 10, 2020 Order, the Court ordered the ADC and Centurion to 1 file a notice indicating the status of the subpoenas within 14 days of the Court’s Order. 2 (71.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections to certain parts of the August 10, 2020 Order, 3 the objections were ruled on in a December 3, 2020 Order. (Doc. 86.) Neither the ADC 4 or Centurion complied with the fourteen day deadline in the August 10, 2020 Order. 5 III. Plaintiff’s Motions 6 Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to the discovery sought in his subpoenas before 7 he should be required to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 88, 90.) 8 Centurion has now appeared in this matter for the limited purpose of objecting to the 9 subpoenas served on it. (Doc. 93.) Centurion argues that the subpoenas at issue are not 10 addressed to Centurion, but are addressed to the ADC’s custodian of records, that the 11 Marshal’s proof of service does not indicate who accepted service on behalf of Centurion, 12 and that Centurion never received the subpoenas at issue. (Id.) The ADC has not appeared 13 in this action to date. 14 Under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve a 15 subpoena commanding a nonparty to “attend and testify; produce designated documents, 16 electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, 17 or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). The nonparty may serve objections to the 18 subpoena within fourteen days after service, or before the time for compliance if less than 19 fourteen days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). “A nonparty’s failure to timely make objections 20 to a Rule 45 subpoena . . . generally requires the court to find that any objections have been 21 waived.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp, 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citations 22 omitted). However, “[i]n unusual circumstances and for good cause, . . . the failure to act 23 timely will not bar consideration of objections [to a Rule 45 subpoena].” McCoy v. Sw. 24 Airlines Co., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 25 The court has discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to 26 compel. See Garrett v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 27 1987). In general, the court is vested with broad discretion to manage discovery. Hunt v. 28 Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012). 1 The court “may hold in contempt a person who, having been served, fails without 2 adequate excuse to obey the subpoena or an order related to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g) 3 (emphasis added). By entirely failing to respond to the document requests by their original 4 deadlines, subpoenaed defendants and third parties waive any objections unrelated to 5 service of those requests. See Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 636; WideVoice Communications, Inc. 6 v. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-00467-GMN-VCF, 2012 WL 7 1439071, at *3 (D. Nev. April 26, 2012) (quoting Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 8 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ); Forsythe v. Brown, 281 F.R.D. 577, 587 (D. Nev. 2012); see 9 also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) 10 (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required 11 constitutes a waiver of any objection.”) (citation omitted).

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William Hunt v. County of Orange
672 F.3d 606 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Manjon v. Lebron
23 F.2d 266 (First Circuit, 1927)
McCoy v. Southwest Airlines Co.
211 F.R.D. 381 (C.D. California, 2002)
Moon v. SCP Pool Corp.
232 F.R.D. 633 (C.D. California, 2005)
Forsythe v. Brown
281 F.R.D. 577 (D. Nevada, 2012)
Garrett v. City & County of San Francisco
818 F.2d 1515 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
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959 F.2d 1468 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
Jones 190298 v. Davis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-190298-v-davis-azd-2021.