Jones 190298 v. Davis

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided January 20, 2021·No. 3:19-cv-08055·Unknown

Opinion

WO KAB Edward Lee Jones, Sr., No. CV 19-08055-PCT-MTL (JZB) Plaintiff, v. ORDER R Davis, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Edward Lee Jones, Sr., who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 31.) Pending before the Court are: Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76), Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 88), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time and Request to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 90.) I. The Operative Complaint On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Davis based on Plaintiff’s allegations that while handcuffed, he was “abruptly slammed into a bar on a fence, resulting in a laceration” to his chin, and “at the time the altercation occurred, Plaintiff was compliant and did not resist being handcuffed or walked by Defendant Davis through the intake door” (Doc. 30 at 8), and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Rydren based on the following allegations. (Doc. 30 at 9; Doc. 9 at 8-9.) On June 15, 2018, Defendant Rydren issued a disciplinary infraction charging Plaintiff with filing a vexatious grievance in retaliation for Plaintiff filing 26 grievances since arriving at the facility on April 25, 2018, and filing an informal complaint on June 13, 2018, accusing Defendant Rydren’s subordinate of failing to do her job. (Doc. 9 at 8-9.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Rydren’s charge related to a May 2018 grievance Plaintiff filed against Defendant Tyler, but Defendant Rydren assigned a case number to that grievance and requested an “extension of time frames [until] June 5, 2018,” to address it, which “clearly demonstrated that Defendant Rydren had previously reviewed the grievance and had already determined the grievance was made in good faith and would be processed.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was kept in maximum custody approximately three weeks longer than necessary while the disciplinary charge was processed, and the disciplinary infraction was ultimately “modified and resolved informally.” (Id.) II. Plaintiff’s Subpoenas On May 28, 2020, a United States Marshal served subpoenas on two third parties: the Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry (ADC) and Centurion of Arizona seeking discovery relating to the prosecution of this action. (Docs. 55-58.) Each subpoena was addressed to the “Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry-Custodian of Records.” (Id.) Three subpoenas sought ADC policies, internal ADC reports, orders, and documents related to Plaintiff’s claims. (Docs. 52-54). One subpoena sought Plaintiff’s medical records. (Doc. 55.) In the Proofs of Service returned by the United States Marshal, the Marshal stated that ADC Program Specialist II Michelle Banks accepted service of three of the subpoenas related to ADC documents, but told the United States Marshal that Centurion, the medical provider for the ADC, was the “custodian of [medical] records” for the ADC and that Centurion should be served with the subpoena seeking medical records. (Docs. 55.) The United States Marshal indicated that Centurion was then served with the subpoena, but did not identify the individual who accepted service on behalf of Centurion. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff informed the Court that he never received responses to the subpoenas, and in an August 10, 2020 Order, the Court ordered the ADC and Centurion to file a notice indicating the status of the subpoenas within 14 days of the Court’s Order. (71.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections to certain parts of the August 10, 2020 Order, the objections were ruled on in a December 3, 2020 Order. (Doc. 86.) Neither the ADC or Centurion complied with the fourteen day deadline in the August 10, 2020 Order. III. Plaintiff’s Motions Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to the discovery sought in his subpoenas before he should be required to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 88, 90.) Centurion has now appeared in this matter for the limited purpose of objecting to the subpoenas served on it. (Doc. 93.) Centurion argues that the subpoenas at issue are not addressed to Centurion, but are addressed to the ADC’s custodian of records, that the Marshal’s proof of service does not indicate who accepted service on behalf of Centurion, and that Centurion never received the subpoenas at issue. (Id.) The ADC has not appeared in this action to date. Under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve a subpoena commanding a nonparty to “attend and testify; produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). The nonparty may serve objections to the subpoena within fourteen days after service, or before the time for compliance if less than fourteen days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). “A nonparty’s failure to timely make objections to a Rule 45 subpoena . . . generally requires the court to find that any objections have been waived.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp, 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citations omitted). However, “[i]n unusual circumstances and for good cause, . . . the failure to act timely will not bar consideration of objections [to a Rule 45 subpoena].” McCoy v. Sw. Airlines Co., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The court has discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to compel. See Garrett v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987). In general, the court is vested with broad discretion to manage discovery. Hunt v. Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012). The court “may hold in contempt a person who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena or an order related to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g) (emphasis added). By entirely failing to respond to the document requests by their original deadlines, subpoenaed defendants and third parties waive any objections unrelated to service of those requests. See Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 636; WideVoice Communications, Inc. v. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-00467-GMN-VCF, 2012 WL 1439071, at *3 (D. Nev. April 26, 2012) (quoting Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ); Forsythe v. Brown, 281 F.R.D. 577, 587 (D. Nev. 2012); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”) (citation omitted). Here, the ADC has entirely failed to respond to Plaintiff’s subpoenas. The record reflects that the subpoenas seeking ADC documents were served by the Marshal on the ADC Custodian of Records. Accordingly, the ADC will be ordered to respond to the subpoenas within 14 days of the date of service of this Order. Based on their wholesale failure to

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Jones 190298 v. Davis, (D. Ariz. 2021).

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